The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan once again became a discussion topic in the UN Security Council. On 22 October 1999, the Council belatedly condemned the Taliban for the 1999 summer offensive; called for the extradiction of bin Laden, an end to drug trafficking, and the restoration of human rights; and castigated the leaders for the Iranian diplomats killed in 1998. CIA Director George Tenet told a Senate Select Committee in February 2000 that bin Laden “is still the foremost among these terrorists” and that “he wants to strike further blows against America.” The Taliban, following the typical summer campaign cycle, launched another offensive in July 2000 that concentrated on Massoud’s headquarters in Taloqan. On 5 September, the city fell. Massoud was pushed back into the Panjshir valley from where he made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Taloqan. While Massoud and Dostum had met in March 1999 in Termez allegedly to plan joint operations, the “Lion of Panjshir” appeared to be battling the Taliban alone, despite Dostum’s assertion on 1 October to the contrary.
Figure 12. George Tenet.
By early 2001, with Massoud controlling only portions of the two northeastern provinces, Badakhshan and Takhar, neighboring countries began giving recognition of the dominant Taliban regime and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov stated that Russian troops would not be allowed into his country to move against the Taliban. He also made it clear that Uzbekistan would avoid any border confrontations with the Taliban. In October 2000, Karimov, who previously declared the Taliban to be the “main source of fanaticism and extremism in the region,” stated a willingness to accept it as the government of Afghanistan if “the people of Afghanistan trust it.”
What the change reflected was the growing influence of the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Trained in bin Laden’s camps, IMU leaders made the creation of an Islamic state within Uzbekistan a major goal. Improved relations with the Taliban would potentially allow the Uzbeks to focus on destroying the IMU as well as eliminating an excuse for Russian intervention.
In January 2001, the trial of four men accused of bombing the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania began in New York. Among 22 suspects, also indicted was Osama bin Laden, in absentia. On 18 May 2001, a jury convicted the four and sentenced them on 18 October 2001 to life imprisonment without parole. Thirteen of the men indicted, including bin Laden, remained at large. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continued to consolidate its repressive hold on most of the country. On 9 September 2001, two assassins, posing as journalists filming a documentary, struck Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. They detonated a video camera packed with explosives. One assassin was killed in the explosion, and bodyguards killed the other. The “Lion of Panjshir” died en route to the hospital. Shortly after the act, bin Laden released a video interview to the world press in which he stated, “It’s time to penetrate America and Israel and hit them where it hurts the most.”
Two days later, the people of the United States were painfully aware that Osama bin Laden’s threat had been a promise.
Chapter 2
Awakening the Giant
War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.
Taliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. As the rays of the early morning sun reflected from the twin towers of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11), few Americans had heard those names. Within hours, however, few Americans would not recognize those names. Not since 1941 had a foreign power directly attacked the United States. Just as one generation of Americans can recall where it was on 7 December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was bombed and another remembers 22 November 1963—the day President John F. Kennedy was assassinated— so, too, will another generation of Americans recall where it was on the morning of 9/11.
President George W. Bush characterized the 9/11 attacks as “acts of mass murder” and pledged “to find those responsible and bring them to justice.” Unequivocally, he declared that the attacks were “acts of war.” Within 24 hours, intelligence reports had linked bin Laden to the attacks, and congressmen and military officials were calling for retaliation.While Secretary of State Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offensive to garner support for U.S. offensive action, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prepared an order to mobilize reservists and members of the National Guard. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that the military was “entering into a campaign against terrorism.” On 14 September 2001, the U.S. Congress approved a joint resolution that authorized “the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden had become America’s “public enemy number 1” and the focus of an unprecedented worldwide manhunt with Afghanistan the center of attention.
Having been regarded as a “backwater” country by U.S. government departments and agencies, designating Afghanistan as a top priority after 9/11 did not yield instant gratification, even with America’s vast information resources and technology. The geography and demography posed significant challenges to operations in Afghanistan. Mountains that rise to almost 17,000 feet cover two-thirds of the country, and high desert plateau dominates the rest. Only 15 percent of the land can support agriculture. There are three major languages and 30 minor languages spoken. Religious divisions between the majority Sunni Muslims and minority Shi’a Muslims are further complicated by different tribal cultures and historic rivalries. Centuries of oppression, 80-percent illiteracy, famine conditions as a result of seven years of drought, and general lack of infrastructure would hamper diplomatic and military options designed to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorists and drive the Taliban from power. Of no small import were the millions of unmarked land mines strewn all over the country during the 10-year Soviet occupation.
Figure 1. Extensive mountainous terrain.
History also had made Afghanistan a difficult battleground. Whether it was involved in the “Great Game” played by Russia and Great Britain or a newer regional power version that involved the Russians, Iranians, and Americans, Afghanistan had been a geopolitical pawn for more than a century. Its neighbor, nuclear-armed Pakistan, could not be ignored nor could that nation’s nuclear-armed rival to the east, India. Within Afghanistan, perpetual ethnic infighting, tension between the extreme fundamentalists and the more moderate branches of Islam, primary loyalty to ethnic regional warlords rather than to a nation, a common willingness to sell military service to the highest bidder, and a tradition of violent overthrows of any “national” governments were legacies that U.S. diplomats and soldiers could not disregard.
“We will rally the world,” declared the president, and Powell immediately launched a diplomatic offensive to garner the support of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “We’re building a strong coalition to go after these perpetrators,” Powell told reporters. Within days, U.S.government officials had received words of support from Russia, China, NATO, and the European Union.