Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan. Combat Studies Institute. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Combat Studies Institute
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isbn: 9788027240593
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finance construction projects for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. He quickly branched into supporting military operations against the Soviets using troops, approximately half of whom were Saudis, who were trained in his camps. After returning to Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was expelled in 1994 for statements against the regime. Bin Laden was next tracked to Khartoum, Sudan, when the Sudanese government asked him to leave in 1996. He settled in Jalalabad until the Taliban threatened the city. Sometime after relocating to Kandahar, Osama bin Laden met Mullah Omar.

      From Kandahar on 23 August 1996, bin Laden issued his Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. Angered that Saudi Arabia let the United States launch attacks against Iraq in 1990, he condemned them for permitting U.S. military forces to be stationed on the Arab peninsula where the holy sites of Mecca and Medina are located, attacked Israel for its “occupation of Palestine,” and declared war against the United States as an occupier of Muslim lands. In 1998, Osama bin Laden formed the al-Qaeda and created an umbrella organization for Islamic extremists called the International Islamic Front for Holy War Against Jews and Crusaders. During an interview with ABC News in December 1998, bin Laden made clear his anti-America views. “Hostility toward America is a religious duty,” he declared, “and we hope to be rewarded for it by God.”

      The response to the 7 August 1998 embassy bombings came less than two weeks later when U.S. cruise missiles slammed into terrorist training sites near Khowst and in Sudan on 20 August 1998. Afterward, President Bill Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Secretary Albright all emphasized that the United States was not fighting Islam but warned that international terrorists could not “escape the long arm of justice.” Two days later, President Clinton revised Executive Order 12947, issued in 1995, to add Osama bin Laden to a list of terrorists whose assets in the United States would be frozen. The Taliban’s funds had been frozen by Executive Order 13129 on 4 July 1999. Clinton further allowed intelligence agents to use lethal force for self-defense, to preempt possible terrorist attacks, and to focus on bin Laden’s associates. Secretary Cohen ordered two submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Persian Gulf. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Secretary Albright queried Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General (GEN) Henry Shelton about using small Special Forces ground teams to attack bin Laden. News reports said that Shelton thought the idea was naïve. The State Department’s Counterterrorism Reward Program raised the reward for information leading to bin Laden’s arrest to $5 million.

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      Figure 10. William Cohen.

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      Figure 11. GEN Henry Shelton.

      American actions did not intimidate or deter the Taliban or bin Laden. As the Taliban recruited and rearmed, Massoud recaptured Bamian in April 1999. Three weeks later, the Taliban drove Massoud’s forces from the city. Having garnered 250 opposition leaders and their families, the Taliban fighters herded the captives into houses and set them afire, killing all of them. On the diplomatic front, the Taliban offered to exchange bin Laden for U.S. recognition of their regime. State Department officials spoke directly with Mullah Omar and established a February 1999 deadline to deliver bin Laden to U.S. authorities. Omar refused after declaring bin Laden to be his guest. Shortly afterward, bin Laden departed Kandahar amid reports of growing dissension between him and the Taliban. Albright warned the Pakistanis that their country was becoming more and more isolated in the region because of their refusal to act decisively against the Taliban. The growing isolation was true because the murder of the Iranian diplomats in Mazar in August 1998 had so infuriated Iran against the Taliban and Pakistan that relations between Iran and the United States had begun to improve. Another major issue was the Taliban’s attitude about the drug trade, a blatant contradiction of Muslim theocracy.

      While Afghans died in civil war, opium dealers thrived. The U.S. State Department had labeled Afghanistan an international conduit for drugs as early as 1996. Although drugs are not permitted under Islamic law, growing poppies to convert into opium was permitted freely. “Opium is permissible because it is consumed by kafirs in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans,” argued the Taliban’s antidrug force commander. The reality was that opium consumption helped finance the fighting necessary for the Taliban to gain control of the country. From 1995 to 1997, during much of the fighting to consolidate power (gaining control of the Afghan cities), opium production increased 25 percent. The UN attempted to negotiate with the Taliban, promising aid to grow substitute crops if they would eliminate the drug trade. That effort ended when the Taliban ordered the UN to leave Afghanistan in 1998. Government customs revenues and agricultural taxes for poppy propagation went directly into the Taliban treasury—a box kept under Mullah Omar’s bed. Afghan opium accounted for 72 percent of the world’s supply in 2000.

      When the elusive bin Laden was discovered residing south of Jalalabad on 4 July 1999, ABC News had just reported that Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf businessmen were financing his terrorist activities. The Saudis arrested one banker on charges of funneling $2 million to bin Laden. This prompted President Clinton to issue Executive Order 13129. On 9 July, the Taliban acknowledged that bin Laden was in Afghanistan.

      Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was meeting with President Clinton when Afghanistan admitted that bin Laden was living there. Although the president angrily addressed the lack of Pakistani cooperation in apprehending bin Laden and pointedly told Sharif that he would send a communiqué outlining Pakistan’s suggested role, that topic was not a part of the message. Sharif did agree to withdraw Pakistani military forces from Kashmir—at the time the critical concern to the United States because India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons. The internecine war in Afghanistan and bin Laden were overshadowed by the threat of regional nuclear war.

      Although there was fighting in the first half of 1999, it was sporadic. A major three-prong offensive that Taliban forces launched from Kabul signaled the resumption of full-blown combat on 28 July. For the first time this major Taliban effort combined tanks, artillery, and organized infantry. Bagram fell on 31 July, and other cities quickly followed, including a key point along Massoud’s supply line to Tajikistan. From the Shomali plain north of Kabul the Taliban drove the refugees—numbers varied from 55,000 to 250,000—toward the capital. In their wake was devastation—burned villages, destroyed crops, slaughtered livestock, and uncounted numbers of dead villagers. Massoud struck back, killing more than 1,000 Taliban fighters, including Arabs and Pakistanis. When he quickly closed on Kabul and Bagram, Mullah Omar sought help from Pakistan; 2,000 more madrassa students volunteered. On 24 August, Omar survived an assassination attempt by unknown persons when a fuel truck was detonated near his house in Kandahar. Those responsible never sought recognition. With Afghan assistance to capture bin Laden seemingly out of the question, the U.S. government sought alternate approaches.

      Having prevented nuclear war between India and Pakistan, Washington redirected its priorities toward capturing bin Laden. Having concluded that Pakistan offered the best avenue to that end, President Clinton lifted some trade sanctions in September. The following month Prime Minister Sharif’s brother met with several Persian Gulf states’ envoys to apprise them of Pakistan’s intent to demand bin Laden’s extradition from Afghanistan. The Pakistan army chief of intelligence met with Mullah Omar to insist that the Taliban stop training Pakistanis who he considered threats to his nation’s stability. A few days later Omar made an official statement denouncing terrorism.

      To complicate matters, on 12 October 1999, Pakistan army General Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a military coup that overthrew the democratically elected Sharif. Musharraf, supported by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, pledged to reduce tensions along the Indian border while warning India not to take advantage of the situation in Pakistan. As for Afghanistan, Musharraf vowed to “continue our efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution. . . .” The U.S. government was disappointed that the general did not set a date to return to democracy.

      During his visit to Pakistan in March 2000, President Clinton