USASOC, as do most other Army commands, has a mobilization table of distribution and allowances (TDA) that allows the headquarters in wartime to augment its staff with USAR and ARNG officers, warrant officers, and NCOs. On 14 September 2001, President Bush authorized the activation of 10,000 USAR and ARNG personnel. From those numbers and based on the TDA, six personnel reported to serve on the USASOC and subordinate command staffs on 23 September, and another 98 arrived over the next few months. USASOC also mobilized the two ARNG SFGs, one PSYOP company, one CAB, one aviation maintenance company, a transportation company, a quartermaster company, an ordnance company (attached to the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion [SOSB]), and two military history detachments from September 2001 through April 2002. The mobilization had some problems. Some individuals were mobilized before the USAR units that were to in-process the soldiers had been mobilized. Highly motivated USAR and ARNG soldiers reported to USASOC headquarters, but they could not be put to work until they had been officially brought onto active duty. There were staff issues concerning responsibilities and standing operating procedures (SOPs) to administer the individual and unit federal service activations. These problems were resolved as the command settled into a war posture. All that became reality within three weeks of 9/11.
On 8 October 2001, President Bush announced to the American people in a nationally televised address that during the previous night U.S.-led airstrikes struck targets near Kabul and Kandahar. However, to wage a military campaign effectively in the remoteness of Afghanistan, the use of regional bases was critical. Secretary of State Powell, the CJCS during Operation DESERT STORM, clearly recognized that need and, in particular, the critical value of Uzbekistan: “Uzbekistan was [the country] of greatest interest to us . . . because it was a direct line of supply down into the area of the Northern Alliance.” Powell’s focused diplomatic efforts paid off when the Uzbeks granted airspace clearance and permitted coalition support and search-and-rescue forces to be based at Karshi Kanabad. With permission granted, U.S. Air Force cargo planes began to shuttle ARSOF nonstop into Karshi Kanabad (later known as K2) from European bases. Elements of the 528th SOSB, 112th Signal Battalion, and 160th SOAR preceded the advance parties of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), the 96th CAB, and the 5th SFG. The 5th SFG was the nucleus of JSOTF-North that initially provided command and control for combat search and air rescue operations in northern Afghanistan.
Figure 8. Helicopter view of Karshi Kanabad (K2) Air Base, Uzbekistan.
Critical to conducting any military operations is establishing a command and control center, communications network, and logistics base. While the 528th SOSB valiantly labored to convert half of a former Soviet airfield into a usable American facility, the 112th Signal Battalion established critical communications.
Figure 9. The 528th Support Battalion kept the water flowing.
Figure 10. The 112th Signal Battalion established the JSOTF-North communications links.
Figure 11. The 528th Support Battalion soldiers prepared for base camp construction.
Within JSOTF-North headquarters, the 160th SOAR staff coordinated combat search and air rescue missions with Joint Special Operations Air Component Command (JSOACC) planners and with 5th SFG for future combat missions. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that envoys were in contact “with the whole gamut of Afghan factions, including the Northern Alliance,” and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had stated on “Meet the Press” that the United States was attempting to find ways to assist antiterrorist forces. CA detachments prepared plans to provide blankets and food to displaced persons within Afghanistan as soon as the tactical situation stabilized. Concerned that winter would exacerbate survival problems for Afghan villagers who had already faced seven years of famine, U.S. Air Force C-17s began airdropping food on 7 October.
Two days later, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft broadcast radio messages that emphasized an international mission to free the Afghan people from oppressive, fundamental Islamic, Taliban rule. Some messages the Product Development Company (8th Psychological Operations Battalion), JPOTF, prepared were pointed directly at the Afghan populace, urging them to “Drive out the Foreign Terrorists.” These ARSOF precombat activities and the air campaign were preparing the way for ground combat operations.
Figure 12. C-17 Globemaster III taking off from K2 to make humanitarian food drops.
Figure 13. Commando Solo airborne broadcasting platform.
Figure 14. “Drive Out the Foreign Terrorists” leaflet dropped during the air campaign.
During the night of 19 October 2001, the ground war began when nearly 200 Rangers parachute assaulted into Afghanistan from MC-130s, and two operational detachment As (ODAs) from the 5th SFG were inserted into the mountains of northern Afghanistan by 160th SOAR MH-47E helicopters. Those well-orchestrated multiple night combat operations put American “boots on the ground” to launch the ground campaign to root out and destroy the al-Qaeda and Taliban and establish a viable multiethnic government in Afghanistan. War as an instrument of U.S. policy had begun.
Figure 15. 75th Rangers night parachute assault on Objective Rhino.
Figure 16. MH-47E helicopters taxi for preflight checks before night missions.
Figure 17. 160th SOAR—loaded and ready for night operations.
Since it was the efforts of individual ARSOF soldiers and detachments on the ground that made the ground campaign to drive the Taliban from power and successfully provide an environment in which a multiethnic government could be established, the story of the war can be presented most interestingly in a chronological series of “soldier stories.” The first group describes initial preparations for war in the United States by PSYOP and SF staff personnel and two SFGs—the 5th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 3rd at Fort Bragg—with support from the Special Operations Command of the Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. These stories are based primarily on recorded interviews with participants.
“Subdue Without Fighting”: JPOTF, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” So spoke ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Rare is the war in which no fighting occurs, but many are the wars in which PSYOP is employed to minimize the degree of fighting. The war in Afghanistan was but the latest war in which PSYOP was used to convince the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and its people that resistance to coalition forces was not only futile but also detrimental to the future welfare of the nation. Coordinating that PSYOP effort was the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) located at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JPOTF commander was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Sam Halstedt (pseudonym), commander of the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion (POB), 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), U.S. Army Special Operations