Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan. Combat Studies Institute

the potential of aircraft being shot down during the air campaign, Calland established the Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (JSOTF-North) to recover downed aircrews. Anticipating that ground operations, humanitarian assistance, and UW would follow initial air attacks, the 5th SFG was tasked to serve as the JSOTF-North. Since an SFG doctrinally would direct only the ARSOF assigned to a joint task force (JTF), the 5th SFG had not trained for this expanded role and did not have the personnel and equipment necessary to perform as a joint field headquarters. Considerable augmentation from the other military services was required, more equipment was needed to accommodate different requirements of the other services, and a “cram course” on joint staff functions facilitated the rapid transition to a JSOTF headquarters. In late December 2001, Calland established JSOTF-South to integrate coalition forces with American SOF conducting direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions in southern Afghanistan. This JTF was built around the headquarters of Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1). Together, these two JTFs would maintain pressure on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan. Rather than deploy his SOCCENT headquarters to a staging base near Afghanistan, Calland established his base in a Persian Gulf country to maintain theaterwide situational awareness. “My job is AOR wide,” the rear admiral said.

      As the supported combatant command, many headquarters assisted CENTCOM. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and its Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) immediately began planning the logistics support required for any military operation in Afghanistan. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) sent training teams to the 3rd and 5th SFGs to help staffs identify other service augmentees, to coach JTF operations procedures, and to provide experienced joint staff officers to facilitate the necessary rapid standup of the JSOTF headquarters. In addition to the military, numerous U.S. government departments and activities were called on to support the war, and soldiers were called on to coordinate with those staff elements.

      The primary USASOC mission was to provide ARSOF to fight and support the war effort. COL Phillip McGhee, the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM), met daily with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration (DCSFDI) under the direction of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to brainstorm requirements and funding; to provide additional equipment and vehicles to deploying ARSOF units; to identify the training, instructors, and facilities needed to produce more ARSOF soldiers faster; to increase flying hours for the 160th SOAR; and to identify internal sources of funding for immediate needs while the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) was appropriated to fund the war in Afghanistan.

      The DCSRM staff, major subordinate commands (MSCs), and major subordinate units (MSUs) began daily meetings on 9 October 2001 to discuss plans to finance the war, what requirements had funding priority, reporting systems, and the approved use of DERF funds from USSOCOM. LTG Bryan D. Brown’s guidance on DERF funds for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM was very specific: “Along with this funding comes the responsibility to comply with guidelines related to spending and accounting for expenditure of these dollars. . . . My guidance to you is succinct—Do What’s Right! I will personally review selected DERF expenditures on a weekly basis.” Needless to say, the $69 million DERF appropriation did not expire on 30 September 2001, but the fiscal year (FY) end close for FY 01 was a success.

      Figure 7. LTG Bryan D. Brown encourages soldiers.

      Training soldiers to fill the ARSOF ranks is the primary mission of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). Without war pending, this is a difficult task. Two sobering realities are that units scheduled for deployment are filled to full strength, and during war, casualties have to be replaced. Thus, reconstituting SF detachments would severely impact the SF training cadres.

      With the prospect of a lengthy special operations campaign, manpower was critical. Special operations soldiers cannot be mass-produced quickly. Enlisted soldiers who volunteer for SF duty, on average, have been in the Army for four years. Officers must have three and onehalf years of service. The individual training necessary to produce an SF soldier requires approximately six months. All SF-qualified soldiers then undergo four to six months of language training. Many then attend advanced training in underwater operations or military freefall parachuting. Special operations aviators must have three to four years’ flying experience before volunteering for the 160th SOAR. The pilots and air crewmen undergo six months of intensive training to attain basic mission qualification status. Then they must have one and one-half to two years of SOF flight operations experience before they are considered fully mission qualified to fly all special operations missions. On 2 December 2001, the U.S. Army directed all soldiers with military occupational specialties (MOSs) of SF, special operations aviation, and other aviation specialties to be retained on active duty involuntarily. This directive resulted in one officer, 13 warrant officers, and 983 enlisted soldiers being retained on active duty beyond the date they otherwise would be eligible to retire, resign, or be released from their enlistments.

      While Department of the Army instituted “stop loss” to freeze retirements, resignations, and end-of-enlistment releases of SF-qualified personnel and ARSOF aviators, SWCS developed a plan to continue training SF-qualified personnel with a reduced military cadre. SWCS mobilized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) augmentees; prepared to hire contractors as instructors; evaluated the impact of shortened courses of instruction; and made contingency plans for additional housing, classrooms, and transportation for an increased student load. The plan, fortunately, did not have to be implemented fully. Several CA officers’ courses were conducted to meet critical needs in the Army Reserve units. Because of a shortage of SF soldiers, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command increased its efforts and initiated a program to recruit for SF “off the street,” just as they do for Army Rangers.

      Mobilizing Army reservists, National Guardsmen, ARNG SFGs and aviation maintenance units, and USAR PSYOP and CA units was a major task for USASOC and its subordinate commands, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC); the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC); and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). The SWCS accelerated initial training programs for ARNG SF soldiers and increased refresher training class sizes. USASOC used USAR training battalions to qualify approximately 300 CA soldiers in their MOSs. In addition, USASOC exercised an approved contingency plan to activate 36 USAR CA instructors. That decision enabled SWCS to double the number of CA and PSYOP enlisted soldiers the school could train. The quality of training that Army special operations soldiers received had prepared them well for the rigors and dangers of combat.

      ARSOF staff and unit training with conventional Army forces had to be reduced during the war buildup. Normally, ARSOF train at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The special operations group and battalion staffs are rotated regularly through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. These realistic training experiences give commanders and staffs the opportunity to “fight” their units in a variety of environments, getting performance feedback that will enable the leaders to capitalize on the experience and improve their capabilities under combat conditions. Overseas deployment orders caused the rescheduling of one JRTC exercise and the cancellation of another. Three BCTP exercises were cancelled; one was conducted but with reduced numbers. No exercises were scheduled for the NTC.

      In addition to field exercises in the United States, the ARSOF regularly trains with foreign militaries. Thirteen JCS-scheduled annual overseas exercises to increase military-to-military contact and train at unit level were cancelled because of the terrorist attacks. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program differs from the JCS overseas training exercises in that its purpose is to familiarize American SOF with how their counterparts in other countries operate. According to former Department of Defense (DOD) spokesman Ken Bacon, JCETs allow American SOF “to build up relationships with the military in other nations.” Twenty-one exchanges were cancelled because of the attacks. While these invaluable foreign exchanges could not be supported, responsibilities and obligations