American relations with Pakistan had always been and would continue to be extremely delicate. Although the United States had a long history with Pakistan that included surrogate support of the mujahideen, the Pakistanis provided recruits and equipment and recognized the Taliban government. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a leading figure among the leaders of the growing coalition, knew that Pakistani cooperation would be critical. The day after the attacks on the United States, President Musharraf had pledged his “unstinted cooperation.” Powell provided Musharraf with a list of exactly what support the United States wanted. The sometimes violent internal reactions to Musarraf ’s commitment indicated how tenuous his power was, especially after the Taliban had threatened invasion if the United States was permitted to launch attacks against Afghanistan from Pakistan. A strong diplomatic push from State Department officials convinced Pakistan to send envoys to meet with Mullah Omar to urge him to turn bin Laden over to the United States. A similar demand from the UN followed. On 21 September, the Taliban rejected the UN demand and a week later informed Pakistan that it would not surrender bin Laden. As the only country maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban, Musharraf did not want Pakistan to become an international pariah. At the same time, U.S. government officials needed to exploit that link to convey messages to the Taliban and quietly urged the Pakistanis to maintain ties. The United States prevailed until the war was well on its way. On 22 November 2001, Pakistan ordered all Taliban diplomats out of the country, and the embassy closed.
Figure 2. Pakistan government building.
Equally as important as creating a coalition of nations to fight the al-Qaeda and drive the Taliban from power was creating an alliance among the anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan. Former Soviet Army Lieutenant Igor Lisinenko, a wounded Afghanistan veteran, warned, “the Afghans will stop fighting each other and join together to fight you.” American diplomats, mindful of the Soviet experience, began weaving their way through the maze of tribal, subtribal, factional, and religious relationships that had characterized Afghanistan for centuries. In Washington, a representative of the Northern Alliance living in exile met with U.S. officials who recognized the importance of building a strong relationship. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld understood that the Northern Alliance could “be useful in a variety of ways.” To avoid offending Pashtuns who were not well represented in the Northern Alliance, Rumsfeld reminded officials that ties had to be forged with “tribes in the south.” An alliance that included all Afghan tribes was critical to dispelling the appearance of favoritism, that a foreign power was supporting one group, or that another foreign army was invading Afghanistan. In the forefront of every major military decision was the political goal of providing the Afghans with the environment and opportunity to establish a stable government after the Taliban was forced from power. Powell made that clear in a late September 2001 pronouncement: “We are interested in a multiethnic Afghanistan.”
Figure 3. Tribal factions, regions, and leaders.
Ironically, just as Leonid Brezhnev had done in 1980 to justify the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter—“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense”—to establish secure footing for additional coalition support. The difference in September 2001 was that the community of nations saw through the Soviet chimera of foreign invasion while the rubble of the World Trade Center towers provided glaring evidence to UN diplomats in New York. Calmly, systematically, and methodically, U.S. government leaders were “dotting the i’s” and “crossing the t’s.”
“Dead or Alive” was the order issued at the Pentagon on 17 September 2001. That was how badly the president wanted bin Laden brought to justice. This was no idle threat. Two days earlier at Camp David, President Bush met with his national security team to review options for responding to the terrorist attacks. CIA Director George Tenet proposed a plan to capitalize on the Northern Alliance’s opposition to the Taliban. U.S. ground forces would link up with those fighters to attack terrorist supporters in and around cities of northern Afghanistan. According to the president, Rumsfeld “understood the utility of having the CIA involved” and “quickly grasped” the essence of the plan “to mate up our assets with the Northern Alliance troops.” Then the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Henry Shelton presented three military options. The first two consisted of cruise missile and manned bomber attacks; the third combined cruise missile and manned bomber attacks with placing American “boots on the ground”—inserting Army Special Forces troops.
Figure 4. Map depicting the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Afghanistan.
President Bush ordered development of Shelton’s third option. According to National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice afterward, “Probably the most important conclusion that he [Bush] came to was that this military action . . . had to look different from what the United States had been doing over the past ten years or so. It could not just be an air campaign. It could not just be a cruise missile campaign. There had to be boots on the ground. We had to have a ground presence to demonstrate our seriousness. Probably that insight governed more of what we did than anything else.” As the American news media bandied about on courses of action, Russian veterans of Afghanistan shared their experience and opinions.
Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz lectured statesmen and commanders that “the most far-reaching act of judgment” that they “have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who studied Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, concluded that Soviet leaders failed to heed Clausewitz’s warning: “Our armed forces came prepared for the Cold War, for general battle, and they were completely ineffective.” Lieutenant General (LTG) Boris Gromov, who had commanded the Soviet 40th Army, agreed with Golts: “For the Americans, introducing land forces would not lead to anything good,” he predicted. Other Soviet officers speculated on the value of committing American ground forces to fight in Afghanistan and what they would encounter. A ground war would be “useless” warned General Makmut Goryeev. Former infantry battalion commander Ruslan Auslev predicted, “The American army will meet with fanatical resistance.” GEN Tommy Franks, who commanded the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), knew full well the history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and made it clear that he did not intend to repeat those mistakes. “The Soviets introduced 650,000 troops,” he said. “We took that as instructive, as a way not to do it.”
It would not be done that way. On 15 September 2001, when President Bush, as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, told “everybody who wears the uniform to get ready,” Washington Post reporters had already speculated that Special Forces were “certain to be at the center of the action.” Rumsfeld acknowledged that when the war against terrorism began, “a lot of the effort . . . will be special operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White seconded that acknowledgment. He warned America’s adversaries “to watch carefully, for you are about to see our finest hour.” At a joint session of Congress on 20 September, Bush spoke passionately about grief, anger, resolution, and justice. “The Taliban is committing murder,” he declared, and as “heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20th century . . . they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.” U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) would push the Taliban into that grave.
Some background history is