Although united by a military objective, the mujahideen fighting groups could not agree on a common political objective. The Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, an alliance of six parties created in January 1980, began to fall apart in March. Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the anti-Western Party of Islam gained prominence in the Kandahar area. Mullah Omar soon joined Hekmatyar, but rather than seeking the company of other factions, the Party of Islam seemed to be more intent on establishing an Islamic theocratic state than in removing the foreign invaders. The Islamic Alliance wanted a country ruled by a loya jirga but with a very clear Islamic focus. By the mid-1980s, the Party of Islam, with a primarily Pashtun membership, had spread its influence into the provinces near Kabul. Although the Party of Islam cooperated with other mujahideen groups, a RAND study’s conclusion was not encouraging: “Many of the political parties seem to be expending most of their energy bickering and fighting each other and are rife with corruption and nepotism. In the opinion of many mujahideen field commanders, the political factions at present represent more of an obstacle to effective resistance than an asset.”
Afghan military forces in Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat had initially opposed the invading 40th Soviet Army, but three battalions in Jalalabad had deserted en masse. By summer 1980, only one-third of the old Afghan army supported the Soviets and their puppet government. Karmal pleaded for an end to “factionalism,” affirming his government’s support of Islam. But he also made it clear that “eternal friendship and solidarity with the Leninist Communist Party of the USSR” was a key tenet of his regime. Factionalism in the Afghan army units was so severe that occasionally elements fired on each other. Defections, desertions, and sabotage destroyed Soviet trust. Somewhat more effective than the army were government militia units created in the tribal areas. By paying off tribal leaders, the government sought to secure a region against rival mujahideen tribes. Occasionally, these efforts backfired when “loyalists” switched sides and took the government-supplied equipment with them.
In January 1980, Soviet forces occupied Farah and Herat to guard against incursions from Iran. A motorized rifle division moved into Mazar-e-Sharif. In March 1980, another motorized rifle division secured control of Konar Province, north of Jalalabad. In June, however, disaster struck when the mujahideen ambushed and annihilated a motorized rifle battalion on the road between Gardez and Khowst. With only a few helicopters in Afghanistan, the Soviet supply convoys were extremely vulnerable. This also meant that attacking or pursuing the mujahideen in mountainous areas was difficult. By mid-1981, the number of helicopters had increased fivefold—from 60 to 300—and by the end of the year, 130 jet fighters were in Afghanistan. Realizing that tanks were largely ineffective in what had become a guerrilla war, Soviet tanks were reduced from nearly 1,000 to 300 that same year.
Figure 4. Soviet tank carcass.
With few exceptions, conventional division- and brigade-size offensive operations were the norm. Many of these were directed at guarding supply routes. Exceptions occurred toward the end of 1980 when heliborne troops conducted raids in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul and in Lowgar Province south of the capital. Still, the Soviets were unable to dominate any region permanently. In the Panjshir, their limited success was due in no small measure to mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, “the Lion of the Panjshir,” who organized his troops into defense, mobile strike, and reaction forces. In the vicinity of Herat, resistance units of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, commanded by Ismail Khan, enjoyed some success. By February 1982, however, Soviet forces had inflicted significant casualties on these guerrilla forces.
Mujahideen leaders, having recognized that their elements could not stand toe to toe with Russian military forces, focused on attacking Soviet residential areas and assassinating officials in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. The Soviets often retaliated with brutal efficiency to cleanse the cities and nearby villages of rebel forces and sympathizers. A successful attack on Bagram Air Base in April 1982 that destroyed 23 aircraft prompted a major Soviet offensive into the Panjshir Valley. The mujahideen captured nine tanks and killed 300 to 400 Russian soldiers in this engagement, but the guerrilla and civilian casualties were twice that number. The “Lion of Panjshir,” Ahmad Shah Massoud (war leader of another Party of Islam), withdrew into the mountains. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet military left the valley in a wake of destruction, razing villages, burning crops, and blowing up irrigation systems. Guerrillas in the south, supplied from Pakistan, attacked Soviet garrisons in Khowst and surrounding villages. In the north, kidnapping Soviet technicians in Mazar-e-Sharif triggered large-scale Soviet and Afghan army operations in the region.
Soviet conventional forces faced a major counterinsurgency situation for which they were doctrinally unprepared. The mujahideen did not mass to facilitate destruction by Soviet artillery. The Russians established control in specific areas only as long as large formations maintained an active presence. Once they withdrew, the area reverted to guerrilla control. In essence, the Soviets faced many of the problems that the British had faced previously. Unlike the British, however, the Soviets gained the upper hand with air power. They quickly learned that, although the guerrillas could choose the time and place to ambush convoys, helicopters could put ground forces on the high ground along convoy routes. If the convoys were attacked, the massive firepower of tactical aircraft could be called on the attacking forces. Although limited by terrain, weather, and aircraft performance limits, helicopters were able to deliver supplies to remote garrisons, thus avoiding defiles that channeled ground convoys for ground ambush. In 1983, the Soviet garrisons in Bamian, Ghazni, Gardez, and Khowst were resupplied entirely by airdrops and helicopters. The mujahideen resorted to using conventional ground weapons, like the ZPU-1 and 12.7 millimeter (mm) DshK machine gun, to shoot down 20 helicopters a year. In 1983, the mujahideen first acquired SA-7 (surface-to-air) missiles from Pakistani arms dealers. Three years later they began to receive British Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles.
In 1986, several Congressmen recommended funds to supply the mujahideen with U.S. Stinger antiaircraft missiles. Exactly when the American shipments commenced remains cloudy; they possibly began as early as July 1985 but not later than September 1986. The CIA shipped 300 in 1986 and 700 in 1987. According to CIA officer Vincent Cannistraro, “The Stingers neutralized Soviet air power and marked a strategic turning point in the war.” Soviet aircraft losses averaged one a day for the initial 90 days when Stingers were first employed. In 1987, 270 aircraft were shot down.
The rigidity of Soviet military leaders delayed tactical and systemic changes that could have reduced aircraft and crew member losses. A system that discouraged initiative or deviation from established procedure caused casualties. Initially, pilots stuck to the flight route, even if it meant flying through confirmed enemy air defense zones. All training emphasized a doctrinal approach to flight operations with no room for innovation if situations changed. As one analyst noted, “The learning curve seems to have been quite lengthy.” Rather than gathering the tactical lessons learned in Afghanistan and disseminating them to all units, changes were made based on individual pilot or unit recommendations. Pilots adapted to survive. They flew higher, did more night operations, dropped flares during takeoff and before landing, and learned the value of false helicopter insertions. They also began dropping bombs from higher altitudes, which significantly reduced accuracy. With the greater air defense threat, especially from Stingers and other antiaircraft missiles, Soviet air operations became less frequent and less effective.
In 1983, ground tactical operations shrank to battalion- and regimental-size efforts instead of the previous division-size operations. Part of the rationale behind the smaller-scale operations was a cease-fire in the Panjshir Valley arranged by Massoud. Although this initiative infuriated Hekmatyar (the leader of the original Party of Islam centered about Kandahar), who regarded Massoud’s act as a betrayal, it gave the “Lion of Panjshir” time to rebuild his depleted forces and to reestablish a supply network in the valley. At the same time, the Soviets