On 27 December, the War Cabinet discussed the Scandinavian issue again, now with firm conclusions from the Admiralty that the three merchant ships had been torpedoed inside Norwegian territory. Norwegian authorities, though not directly to blame in the opinion of the Admiralty, had been unable to prevent this, and ‘steps to stop the German traffic from Narvik down the Norwegian coast’ were advised. This time the War Cabinet concurred. Before any operations were initiated, though, Oslo and Stockholm should be informed that they could count on Allied help, should they undertake to assist Finland, followed by a notice to Norway that Britain was planning to send warships to intercept the German traffic. Meanwhile, the CoS was instructed to finish their report on the military implications of severing the iron ore from Sweden to Germany, while the War Office should ‘continue preparations with a view to the ultimate despatch of a force to Narvik’.70
The Swedish and Norwegian ministers in London were that same day called to the Foreign Office and given aide-mémoires informing them that His Majesty’s and the French government were disposed to give ‘all the indirect assistance in their power’ to Finland and were at present assessing how this could be done in the most efficient manner. The two countries were requested to grant consent for the transit of equipment and ‘technicians’, in return the Allies would be willing to discuss protection against the consequences of such permission. The Norwegian answer came over New Year: Norway would be pleased to assist in any aid to Finland, including transit of material ‘. . . without any military attendance’ and transit of a ‘technical mission to Finland . . . granted that such technicists will travel . . . in their private capacity’. The note concluded that ‘the Norwegian government was grateful for the offer of an assurance for the preservation of the integrity and independence of Norway’, but did not ‘at the present moment wish to have this assurance more precisely defined’.71 The Swedish answer was identical.
In the meantime, on 31 December, the CoS reported to the War Cabinet that – provided it was ascertained that Germany would be adversely affected by an interruption of the Lapland ore – despatching an expedition to Scandinavia could be worthwhile. It was underlined that this would represent a ‘fundamental change’ in British policy and a shift to ‘offensive operations, which might well prove decisive’. Provided the security of France was not compromised, the strategy of operating in Scandinavia was considered ‘sound’, but an expedition inland from Narvik, in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition, would not be feasible. Concluding, the CoS advised against any minor naval projects until the larger project was ready in March, as this might trigger a major German offensive, which could not be forestalled.
Initial plans for the expedition, assuming Norwegian and Swedish co-operation, were presented to the War Cabinet and their advisers on 2 January and discussed thoroughly in the following days. The significance of the Swedish iron ore for the long-term German ability to wage war was generally agreed and few doubted that severing the supply through Narvik would provoke a response from Berlin. What kind of response was unclear, but besides direct action in Sweden, a likely retaliation would be to seize bases in southern Norway, probably between Kristiansand and Stavanger. A move on Oslo was considered less probable, as this would be a much larger operation and most likely to be met with Norwegian opposition. German bases on the Norwegian west coast would be a most serious threat to British control of the North Sea and it might be difficult to dislodge them once established. Hence, forestalling a German intervention in Norway would be essential. Norwegian reactions to an unprovoked Allied intrusion were largely expected to be symbolic.
Churchill was not convinced the Germans would react in force at all and repeatedly urged immediate action to ‘see what happened’, adding that British naval forces were standing by and ready to seize German ore ships coming out of Narvik. Chamberlain wished to gauge the Norwegian reactions through political means, and the delivery of a second, stronger memorandum to the Norwegian government was agreed. Meanwhile, the CoS should give further consideration to the consequences of a German occupation of southern Norway and how this could be avoided – including pre-emptive occupation of Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim.72
Eric Colban, Norwegian ambassador in London. (Topfoto/Scanpix)
On Saturday 6 January, Halifax called Minister Colban to his office again, handing him a memorandum expressing dire concern by His Majesty’s government over the recent ‘flagrant violation of Norwegian territorial waters by German naval forces’. The British government, Halifax said, would in the near future be obliged to take ‘appropriate dispositions to prevent the use of Norwegian territorial waters by German ships and trade’, if necessary by operating inside those waters. The Norwegian government was taken aback by the British note. ‘Colban’s report from his meeting with Halifax shocked me,’ Koht wrote, ‘it was the most serious scare and I really felt the war looming. Not for a second did I doubt the Germans would see this as a provocation and turn their war-machine against Norway.’ The memorandum and its implications were discussed at length in the Norwegian government over the next few days. Koht held that, should a situation arise where there was no choice left, it was vital Norway was not brought into the war on the German side. It was equally important, he said, that this was not publicly known as it might in itself compromise the neutrality.
The reply from Oslo eventually took the form of an emphatic letter from King Haakon to King George, delivered by Colban on 9 January. The king’s letter, no doubt endorsed by the government, underlined his ‘great surprise and consternation’ over the plans to ‘make Norwegian territorial waters a basis for British naval action’ and ‘appealed to [His Britannic Majesty] to prevent such steps, which inevitably would bring Norway into the war and imply the greatest danger for her existence as a Sovereign State’. Embarrassed by this approach and fearing Norwegian reactions might harm the ‘larger project’, Chamberlain and Halifax decided to abandon any operations against the Narvik traffic for the time being. As the Swedish reactions were also very negative, the War Cabinet accepted this on the 12th. The CoS was nevertheless ‘invited to consider the possibility of capturing the Gällivare ore fields in the face of Norwegian and Swedish opposition’.73 No indication of the decision to stand down should be given to the Scandinavian governments, but Laurence Collier of the Foreign Office remarked sourly to Colban a few days later: ‘You have won – so far.’74
Scandinavia was not long off the agenda of the War Cabinet, however. Minister Colban was called to Halifax again on 18 January and learned that:
. . . the real question at issue was not one of law, and it was for that very reason [Halifax] regarded the case of His Majesty’s Government as stronger than the Norwegian Government seemed willing to admit. Not only was it a case in broad equity for equalising the treatment of the two parties in respect of the conduct of war so that the Germans could no longer be permitted to break all the rules and commit inhumanities of every sort, not only in Norwegian waters but everywhere on the high seas while His Majesty’s Government were expected to refrain from even the smallest technical violation of international law.75
To this, Colban answered that after the incidents in mid-December, the Norwegian Navy had started escorting convoys along the exposed parts of the coast and nothing more had happened. As for supporting the Allied cause, the charter agreement for merchant tonnage had just been signed and the negotiations for a war trade agreement were making progress.
Meanwhile, the planning of the ‘larger project’ progressed unfalteringly and had by late January grown to three parallel, complementary operations; one in northern Norway–Lapland, one in southern Norway and one in southern Sweden. It was underlined by the CoS to the War Cabinet on 28 January that the stakes of such an operation would be high, but the prize of success would be ‘great’ and should be seized ‘with both hands’ should an opportunity arise. Breaking through determined resistance would be costly and the co-operation of both countries was ‘essential’. Even with the consent of the Scandinavian governments, the operation would draw heavily on