The Allied military hardly registered the rejections. Général Sylvestre-Gérard Audet and his expeditionary force were standing by in France and most things were also ready in Britain. Major-General Pierce J. Mackesy, commander of the 49th Division, was confirmed as overall land commander and Admiral Edward R. Evans as commander of the naval force.
Chamberlain made it clear to the War Cabinet on the 11th that ‘it would be fatal to abandon the expedition altogether merely because we had received diplomatic refusal from the Scandinavians to our demand for passage.’ Churchill, with fewer reservations than he had two weeks earlier, did not think the landings would be ‘vigorously opposed’ by the Norwegians, but rather ‘a matter for persuasion and cajolery’. The reward was high in his opinion:
Once ashore we should have secured a valuable prize not only in the possession of about a million and a half tons of iron ore, but also in our occupation of the harbour which would be of the greatest use for naval purposes. Even if the railway had been sabotaged, our forces should install themselves securely in the port in the hope that ultimately we might persuade the Scandinavians to give us railway facilities for a further advance.
Things suddenly accelerated. Ambassador Corbin had earlier in the day told Halifax that Prime Minister Daladier would have to consider resigning unless the issue of aid to Finland was decided positively very soon. At the end of the meeting, the War Cabinet invited the CoS to consider the details of landing in Norway and to report the next day for a final review. Also the instructions to be given to the naval and military commanders were to be presented for approval by the Cabinet. Next day, caution prevailed and the Cabinet decided that Operation Avonmouth should be confined to landings at Narvik at first. Departure should be the next day, 13 March, and if things developed satisfactorily at Narvik ‘without any appreciable use of force’, landings at Trondheim could follow immediately, the ships standing by offshore. The forces for Bergen and Stavanger were not to be despatched until further decisions by the Cabinet, in order to avoid the impression of ‘a general attack’. In Oslo, Dormer was instructed to deliver a ‘formal and urgent request’ to the Norwegian government for the passage of ‘a force of Allied troops across Norwegian territory to Finland’ as soon as the news of landings at Narvik was confirmed.84
The British commanders were informed in a meeting with the CoS and parts of the Cabinet later in the day that their objectives were to establish a force at Narvik and to render assistance to Finland, while ensuring that ‘north Swedish ore fields were denied to Germany and Russia for the longest possible period.’ The Norwegian reaction was uncertain, they were told, and the War Cabinet only wished the force to land ‘provided it could do so without serious fighting’. ‘Minor opposition’ could be accepted, even if it involved casualties; the British soldiers were only to fire back ‘as an ultimate measure of self-defence should their forces be in jeopardy’. How to recognise ‘minor opposition’ was not detailed. When the first ships reached Narvik the turn of events would depend on the reactions of the local Norwegian commanders and the Allied commanders’ interpretation of their intentions. General Ironside was certain it would be handled well:
General Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. (Author’s collection)
We are now working away at this plan, which means we must be prepared for some sort of an opposed landing. I can see our great big Scots Guards shouldering the sleepy Norwegians out of the way at 5 a.m. in the morning. It seems inconceivable the Norwegians should put up any opposition if they are in anyway surprised.85
In spite of Ironside’s optimism, Major-General Mackesy, who would be C-in-C in the field, was concerned that a dangerous situation might develop. It would take weeks before his largely untrained troops were at full strength. No roads existed into the mountains and the only connection from the coast to Lapland was the singletrack railway. This was electrified and there were few if any diesel or steam engines if the electricity was cut. Destruction of rolling stock and demolition of tunnels and overhangs would further hamper transportation eastwards. German retaliation could easily escalate beyond Allied capacity. The operation had all the prospects of becoming a dismal failure by having to turn back in the face of Norwegian opposition or worse, a quagmire of growing liability. Still, the embarkation of the British expeditionary force began in the morning of the 13th.
Meanwhile, the Finnish government decided the Allied offer of large-scale support was unrealistic and authorised its negotiators in Moscow to sign an armistice on 12 March 1940, to become effective the following day. Around midday on the 13th the news of the ceasefire in Finland broke and Chamberlain issued orders to suspend the expedition that afternoon.
In the War Cabinet the next day, the expedition was officially cancelled and orders for disembarkation of the soldiers issued. Churchill argued that the primary goal of the expedition, the Lapland ore fields, remained and insisted the landings at Narvik should still go ahead, lest Russia should seize the opportunity and ‘make her way to the Atlantic’. Ironside urged the Cabinet to keep the force assembled. Both were overruled by an obviously relieved Chamberlain. The majority of the troops were disbanded and sent to France, against the protests of the Daladier government, who still hoped for a second front. The French warships and transports, which had been ready in Brest and Cherbourg, were released and sent to the Mediterranean, while the legionnaires and Alpine troops returned to their billets. Only some twelve thousand special forces – British, French and Polish – were retained in northern Britain, ‘in case minor actions against the oretransport should become necessary’.86
Operation Wilfred and Plan R4
In France, there was great bitterness over the Winter War and the government’s inability to help the Finns. On 19 March, Daladier lost a vote in the Parliament and his administration folded. The new government, formed two days later by the 62-year-old Paul Reynaud, predictably took an aggressive stance, eagerly supported by Général Gamelin. Reynaud wrote to the British Cabinet, stressing the need for a military initiative and proposed to intercept German shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, if necessary through occupation of strategic points on the coast. It was also suggested that a ‘decisive operation’ was launched in the Baltic, the Caspian or the Black Sea, with the aim of cutting Germany’s petroleum supplies and ‘paralysing the whole Soviet economy’. The note arrived in London on 26 March and created a storm of frustration, not least with Chamberlain, who read it as a direct criticism of his conduct of the war. In the Cabinet on the following day, there was broad agreement that the war should be fought neither in the Balkans nor in the Black Sea. On the other hand, a continued crisis in the French government would be disruptive and was to be avoided, even at the cost of Norwegian neutrality.87
In early March, preparations for Operation Royal Marine – the laying of floating mines in German rivers and estuaries to disrupt commercial traffic – were reported to be near completion. The War Cabinet found the concept interesting, but it had, so far, been rejected by the French government for fear of retribution. In London on 28 March, at the first meeting of the Supreme War Council since Reynaud took over, Chamberlain strongly advocated Royal Marine, while brushing lightly over Reynaud’s repeated proposals for the Balkans. During the ensuing debate, which at times was quite heated, the British delegation vetoed any actions that could draw Russia into the war. The French were still sceptical about Royal Marine, but after some bargaining agreed to consider the concept – provided it was tied to a simultaneous mining of the Norwegian Leads. Chamberlain accepted this, as he expected it might draw attention away from the infringement