. . . It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that your force should land only with the general cooperation of the Norwegian Government . . . It is not the intention that your force should fight its way through Norway. If Norwegian troops or civilians open fire on your troops, a certain number of casualties must be accepted. Fire in retaliation is only to be opened as a last resort. Subject to this, you are given discretion to use such force as may be required to ensure the safety of your command, but not more . . . You are to obtain further instructions from the War Office before entering Sweden.95
The 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons were to be kept ready as a ‘striking force’, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow respectively, and the Home Fleet would be ready ‘to deal with any sea borne expeditions the Germans may send against Norway’. None of the covering force would be at sea and all reactions depended on a timely recognition of German intentions.
On 4 April, the CoS submitted another memorandum to the War Cabinet informing that ‘Special arrangements have been made for obtaining from Scandinavia the earliest possible authentic information of a German move against Norway or Sweden. We have been informed of the details of these arrangements and are satisfied they should prove adequate.’ It is not detailed what the arrangements were, but as soon as information of German action was received in London, it would be forwarded to the War Cabinet, the Foreign Office and the service departments, including their sources in order to ascertain authority. Timing would be all important, and it was suggested that the Admiralty was empowered to initiate the departure of the troopships as soon as the first news of a move against Scandinavia was rumoured, however vague. It would take some twenty hours until the ships were off their Norwegian targets and they could be recalled at any time during this period should the War Cabinet decide the information was false or inadequate. Such pragmatism, which the Cabinet endorsed, makes the decisions made by the Admiralty a few days later to disembark the troops even more curious.
Part of the ‘arrangements’ referred to by the CoS in all likelihood included a handful of Military Intelligence Research (MIR) officers, clandestinely arriving at the legation in Oslo during 2 and 3 April. Nominally, they were to supervise the transit of remaining equipment for Finland. Actually they were to report status in Norway and to liaise with the Norwegian forces when R4 arrived. Captains Croft and Munthe came via Sweden, while Major Palmer flew in via Perth. The legation was instructed to give them all necessary assistance. Within a few days, Munthe continued to Stavanger, Croft to Bergen and Palmer to Trondheim. A fourth officer, Captain Torrance, went directly to Narvik via Stockholm. How these men were to detect German intentions regarding Norway before anybody else is not obvious.
The willingness of the British decision makers to engage in complicated and far-reaching operations with so limited preparations and so little knowledge of things Norwegian is startling – as is their lack of realistic analysis of German intentions. The degree of provocation necessary for Berlin to react seems never to have been debated properly, far less realistic scenarios of how the Germans might respond. All British (and French) thinking was based on traditional suppositions of moves and countermoves within given ‘rules’ of strength and mobility. That the new German war machine was operating under its own dynamics was yet to be revealed.96
At Sullom Voe, the C-in-C of 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, Captain (D)2 Bernard Warburton-Lee wrote in a letter to his wife Elisabeth dated 4 April, after learning that he was to escort the minelayers to Vestfjorden: ‘. . . the war is going to start quite soon – I am going to start it.’97 Not even he could imagine that German naval units were already preparing to take to sea.
Rubicon
During March, intelligence mounted in Berlin, indicating consistent Allied pressure on the Norwegian government to allow transit of troops to Finland and the establishment of bases in Norway. There would be protests, said the reports, but only nominal and no opposition would be offered. One report for instance, arriving via Scheidt, held that ‘a person close to both the King and Commanding Admiral’ considered a British intervention ‘unavoidable’ – and it would come ‘very soon’. Another agent reported with certainty that ‘England had requested right of passage through Narvik and a naval base in Kristiansand.’ Further reports alleged that Allied officers were surveying Norwegian ports with tacit Norwegian acceptance. In an unsigned report to SKL dated 5 March, it is stated that the Norwegian government had given in to French and British pressure and accepted ‘transit of Allied troops and the establishment of points of support’ on the Norwegian coast. It was part of the alleged agreement that the Norwegian government should deny the existence of any accord and should protest verbally against the Allied intrusions, as it had done during the Altmark episode.98 Further reports of increased British air reconnaissance, agent activity in Norway, troopship concentrations in Scotland, French Alpine troops embarking ships in the Channel ports, the return of the British Home Fleet to Scapa Flow and heavy cruisers withdrawn from the Northern Patrol, augmented the picture: large-scale Allied landings in Norway were under development.
There was little doubt in Berlin that, in spite of the expressed grief over Finland, the real objective of the Allied landings was to sever the iron-ore traffic to Germany and capture bases in Norway. Hitler decided Germany would have to act ‘quickly and decisively’.
‘Full speed ahead for Weserübung,’ Halder noted in his diary on 4 March and the next day Hitler for the first time discussed Weserübung with all three service commanders present. Two days later, he declared that the occupation of Norway and France should be planned independently and that the disposition of forces, as suggested by von Falkenhorst, was final and no longer subject to change. To avoid any provocation, it would be necessary to inform the Russians prior to the attack and let them know that the occupation of northern Norway was only for the duration of the war with Britain.99
‘Operations Order No. 1 for the Occupation of Norway’ was issued by von Falkenhorst on 5 March. Weserübung was ready to be launched, but the persistent severe ice conditions in the Baltic meant a number of the warships and transports were confined to port and there was growing concern that the Allied intervention in Scandinavia could be initiated any day. On the 6th, General Halder noted in his diary that it had been ascertained that the Allies had requested free transit of troops for Finland through Sweden and Norway, adding ‘the Führer will now act.’100
In a status meeting with Hitler and von Falkenhorst on 9 March, Admiral Raeder held that in his opinion the current development of the situation in Finland made Weserübung ‘urgently necessary’. If the Allies were to use the pretext of helping Finland, as intelligence indicated, they would certainly occupy Norway and Sweden en route, completely severing the supply of iron ore and establishing offensive bases. Raeder added that it was his duty to point out that Weserübung contradicted all principles of naval warfare, as it would have to be carried out in the face of a superior British fleet. He was convinced, though, that the operation would succeed, if complete surprise could be obtained.
On 10 March, it was noted in the SKL War Diary that ‘. . . the totality of the reports point in a compelling manner towards the possibility of immediate action by the Allies in Norway.’ Radio intercepts during the 13th tracked no less than thirteen British submarines deployed in the North Sea and at the entrance to the Skagerrak, with two more underway from Rosyth. This was more than twice the usual number and a clear signal that something was going on. Most likely, the boats were covering the flank of an Allied landing operation in Norway that appeared from other intelligence to