Halvdan Koht, Norwegian foreign minister from 1935. The photo is taken in Molde in late April and Koht (left) is in a meeting with his secretary, Tostrup. (Krigsarkivet/Scanpix)
Minister of Church and Education Nils Hjelmtveit later wrote that he often ‘had the impression the military administration worked efficiently, but very slowly [and] often took a very long time to prepare purchase of new equipment’.49 Chief of the General Staff Oberst Rasmus Hatledal, however, held that prioritised lists of needed equipment and supplies were submitted on several occasions to the Ministry of Defence, but never responded to. It appears that at least part of the confusion can be explained by the unfortunate lack of co-ordinated management between the services and the inability of the Ministry of Defence to secure a proper dialogue between the military and the government. On the other hand, years of political neglect could not be restored overnight, irrespective of the increased funds available. The lack of experienced officers, NCOs and technical personnel would take considerable time to amend. Above all, the purchase of high-quality weapon systems from abroad was rapidly becoming virtually impossible, while Norway’s own armament industry had been all but decimated. Specialised naval vessels could only be built at the naval yard in Horten and building of the Sleipner-class destroyers there, for all practical purposes, took up the available capacity – these would be the only RNN vessels with genuine combat value launched after 1936.50
By the spring of 1940, the Army and Navy Air Arms jointly had some 150 aircraft under order from Britain, the USA, Italy and Germany – sixty of them fighters. All of these had been delayed several times and in some cases purchases had been cancelled just before delivery. Nineteen Curtiss Hawk 75A-6 fighter aircraft from the USA had actually been delivered, but not yet made operational.51 Around 150 20–40-mm guns were ordered from wherever they could be found, but none was delivered before 9 April. Last but not least, eight modern motor torpedo boats (MTBs) were ordered from Britain in early 1939. Two officers and four engineers went to Britain in February to oversee the completion of the boats, but none had been delivered before the invasion.52
In London it was recognised that Norway might be important for Germany as a source of vital supplies. To prevent this and tie the country as close as possible to the Allies with the smallest of means, the British minister to Norway, Sir Cecil Dormer, was instructed to assure Koht in a ‘confidential but formal’ manner that Britain would give Norway support against potential German aggression and would consider ‘a German attack on Norway as tantamount to an attack on this country’. This he did on the 11 September 1939. Koht later wrote that the assurance pleased him and, as it was given to him in strict confidence, he considered it a trustworthy commitment. As he ‘did not wish to tie [Norway] closer to Britain than it already was’, he replied curtly that he did not believe Germany ‘would do anything like that as there was nothing to gain’. Dormer reported to London that Koht made few remarks, but it probably ‘had a good effect’.
On the 22 September the British minister was back. This time he confirmed that Britain would respect the declared Norwegian neutrality, but added that this would only apply as long as Germany did the same.53 Again Koht did not respond much, but later wrote that this visit caused him concern as it made British respect for Norwegian sovereignty depend on London’s interpretation of third-party action, not Norway’s own handling of affairs.54 Still, there was no doubt in Koht’s mind as to which was the ‘right side’, should Norway be drawn into the war. In an interview with Reuters in early April, he said with clear reference to London:
. . . We understand very well the difference between the goals of the warring parties, but it is part of our neutrality not to take sides. Neutrality is the only possible policy for us. . . . The harm done by Germany to Norwegian life and property has created great anger in this country and we do what we can to make it stop. British acts against our neutrality are of a different character, often affecting our honour and independence as much as our material interests [and] it may come to a point when also small nations must defend their honour.55
On 22 December, Koht told the Foreign Affairs Committee that he believed ‘England and France would very much like to drive Norway out of its neutrality and into the war.’ Koht realised that circles in London saw a direct interest in undermining Norwegian neutrality and provoking retaliatory German actions, which would force Norway into the war on the Allied side. He mistakenly believed that Berlin would find the reasons for maintaining Norwegian neutrality more compelling than those for military actions and therefore would not rise to the Allied lures. In all his rationality, Koht failed to grasp that the leadership in Berlin had a logic of its own and was not hindered by international boundaries and declarations of neutrality, even after Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been overrun.
For personal and political reasons, Koht declined several invitations to go to Berlin and Rome. He never travelled to London either, but later alleged this to be coincidental and largely due to lack of a good opportunity. In his memoirs, he wrote that a planned visit to England in early 1939 was cancelled on the advice of the Norwegian minister in London, Erik Colban, as a recent visit from the Polish foreign minister had been portrayed in British media as the building of an alliance. Had Koht and Colban found an opportunity to develop relations and perhaps a better understanding of intentions in both London and Oslo, things might have been very different. Koht played a hard hand with both the German and British ministers in Oslo, being very conscious not to let them know what he really believed or expected. That the politicians in London were offended by his apparent lack of distinction between the aggressive German warfare and what they considered defensive measures did not occur to Koht. ‘My impression was that both the Germans and the Allies were uncertain of me . . . I think this was to the benefit of my country,’ he wrote. One may wonder.56
In December 1939, Oberst Birger Ljungberg was appointed defence minister, replacing the ageing Fredrik Monsen. The appointment was somewhat surprising as Ljungberg was a professional officer, unknown outside the army and not a member of the Labour Party. If anything, he was a Conservative. The appointment of a professional military man was well received in the Parliament, where it was believed that the government would now be guided in the right direction.57 For many, Oberst Otto Ruge, the inspector general of the army, would have been the natural choice. Nygaardsvold and Koht agreed, however, that he was too obstinate for them and would never accept a passive role in the government. Thus, when Monsen suggested Ljungberg as his successor, Nygaardsvold eagerly concurred.58 Welcoming his new minister to the government, Nygaardsvold bluntly advised him to ‘concentrate on the administration of the defence [as] the political side would be handled by the other ministers’. That this reinforced Ljungberg’s position as an outsider seems not to have bothered Nygaardsvold. The communication between the military and the government was unsatisfactory during the neutrality period in general and in early April in particular. The responsibility for this cannot be put anywhere but on the defence minister. What might have happened, had a stronger, more influential personality