Commander of X Fliegerkorps, the 48-year-old Generalleutnant Hans Ferdinand Geisler, and his Chief of Staff, Major Martin Harlinghausen, were called to Berlin on 5 March and, in a meeting with Göring and Jeschonneck, informed of their involvement in Weserübung. In addition to transport of troops and equipment, X Fliegerkorps was to provide direct support for the landings as well as reconnaissance and offensive capacity against intervening Allied naval forces. Geisler was instructed to co-operate with von Falkenhorst and the Kriegsmarine, but he should not report to any of them. To meet its tasks, the X Fliegerkorps would be temporarily strengthened with additional bomber, long-distance fighter and reconnaissance units, supplementing the two permanent bomber wings, KG 26 and KG 30, so far mainly tasked with anti-shipping operations in the North Sea.32 During March, 500 Junkers Ju52/3m aircraft were gathered for the sole purpose of Operation Weserübung. Oberst Carl-August von Gablenz, a former Lufthansa manager and transport specialist was appointed to oversee the establishment and tactical operation of the transport units. The aircraft and pilots were assembled at airfields in the north while Geisler and his staff moved into Hotel Esplanade in Hamburg. The top floor of the six-storey building was discreetly emptied of all guests, but otherwise the hotel was run as usual to avoid drawing any attention to the arrangement. Maps, communication equipment and files were brought in and Geisler, Harlinghausen, von Gablenz and their staffs settled down to plan the huge task.33
The greatest weakness of Operation Weserübung, besides the lack of enforced co-operation between the services, was the absence of contingencies. There was no indepth assessment of the accuracy of the assumption of Norwegian acceptance of the invasion. Neither was there any fallback if things did not evolve as planned – other than application of brute force. The political and administrative aspects of the invasion and subsequent occupation were nowhere near as well considered as the military, largely because few outside the OKW and the Weserübung staff had knowledge of the operation being planned at all.34 Apart from the initial XXI Corps staff, the OKW and parts of the SKL, knowledge of Operation Weserübung was kept on a strictly need-to-know basis. Division commanders, staff officers and naval and air group commanders were informed individually at the latest possible moment – and with details only of the part of the operation they were to be involved in.35 This would benefit security but was detrimental to any joint doctrine or training prior to the operation.
A draft note on the administration of the occupied areas was issued by Oberst Warlimont in late February and appears to have been accepted without much discussion. A key element in the draft was to secure military control of Norway with minimal disturbance of the existing administration. Hitler believed King Haakon could be persuaded to legalise the occupation through a convincing show of force and it was considered particularly important that he remained in Oslo. Government, civil administration and police should continue as unaffected as possible, provided there was collaboration. The radio would be taken over by German personnel, while press loyal to the new regime could continue as before; the people should be won over through propaganda. Political parties and the Parliament – the Storting – would be ignored and eliminated as soon as possible. If the government would not co-operate, they would be removed and replaced with ministers open to accept the new situation. The same would apply to local authorities outside Oslo.
All communication with the Norwegian government should be through Curt Bräuer, the German minister in Oslo. Von Falkenhorst and his men should focus on the military tasks of the occupation and suppress any activity directed against Germany. When Raeder queried the political development in Norway following the occupation, von Falkenhorst and Keitel reassured him that the Führer would handle this and they, as soldiers, need not worry. Von Falkenhorst assured Raeder it would be feasible to collaborate with Foreign Minister Koht, a statement Raeder later referred to as ‘politically naive’.36
Neutrality Watch
The news of the German attack on Poland was received with anxious apprehension in Norway. The empathy with Poland and anger with Germany was virtually unanimous, but there was also a general feeling that this was not Norway’s war. During the afternoon of 1 September, the Norwegian government issued a declaration of neutrality. When Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later, the neutrality was extended to cover this conflict as well. An immediate freeze of all prices was decided while petrol, coal and some imported provisions were rationed. The government advised that people followed a careful lifestyle and asserted there would be no shortage of basic goods as long as nobody started hoarding. Private use of cars, motorcycles and boats was limited for a while, and the demand for horses and bicycles rose sharply. During September the situation stabilised and the war seemed far away, even if the newspapers often carried stories of death and dramatic rescues at sea. Between September 1939 and April 1940, fifty-five Norwegian merchant ships were sunk outside Norwegian territory, almost exclusively the result of German activities; 393 Norwegian sailors perished in these actions.
There was broad political agreement to limit the mobilisation of the Norwegian defences. The cost had been astronomical during 1914–18 and it was felt it would be better to keep a reasonable coastal defence and only mobilise fully if a crisis developed. Last time, no real threat to Norwegian territory had developed and few believed it would be different now. Consequently, the navy was given the first-line task of maintaining a Neutrality Watch, focusing on escort and patrol duties. The neutrality was to be vigilant but passive; prepared to handle ‘occasional violations’. Force should be used with discretion except in the case of alien warships seeking to enter a restricted area or krigshavn, where all means should be applied after due warning.37 In support, the air forces of the army and navy were mobilised whereas only a limited part of the coastal artillery was set up.38
The Royal Norwegian Navy (RNN) of 1939 was by no standards an instrument of deterrence. Originally a symbol of the Norwegian quest for independence at the beginning of the twentieth century, general disarmament and political development had reduced the once-imposing naval force almost to insignificance, with a severe lack of qualified officers and NCOs. Nevertheless, Commanding Admiral Henry Diesen on 28 August 1939, with the consent of the government, issued orders to prepare for recommissioning the ships of the naval reserve.39 Staff officers were drafted and coastguard stations, naval air bases and communication centres were manned. By the end of September, all ships fit for commissioning were in service, including two panserships and nine submarines; the only vessels that could be considered anything like a tactical reserve. The ships had been well looked after during storage and most were found to be in acceptable condition.
The pansership Eidsvold passing Stavanger in the autumn of 1939 on her way to northern Norway. Norge and Eidsvold were armoured cruisers or coast defence ships of some 4,200-ton displacement. They were elegant, well-designed vessels with good sea-keeping abilities – and obsolete in every conceivable manner. (Ingrid Willoch)
By 8 April 1940, 121 vessels were in commission by the RNN, of which fifty-three were chartered auxiliaries and nine unarmed support vessels.40 Of the fifty-nine naval ships, nineteen had been launched after WWI, while seventeen were of pre-1900 vintage. Some 5,200 naval officers and men were in service onboard or onshore. Of these, 3,565 were sailors and 237 drafted officers, the rest professional officers and NCOs from the pre-war navy. The latter was a highly qualified cadre with much experience at sea; there were just not enough of them. Some NCOs were given temporary rank after brief officer courses and sent to serve on the auxiliaries, thus leaving holes in the ranks and disrupting well-exercised routines and relationships onboard the more modern ships.
During the 1933 reorganisation of the armed forces, the Naval Defence Force (Sjøforsvaret) was established, consisting of the Navy (Marinen), the Coastal Artillery (Kystartilleriet), the Naval Air Arm (Marinens Flyvevåben) and the Coastguard (Kystvakten). The coast was subdivided into three sea defence districts (SDD), in turn sub-divided into sea defence sectors (SDS). Each district was led by a sea defence commander based in Horten, Bergen or Tromsø respectively, reporting to the commanding