In early February, the French ambassador to London, Charles Corbin, asked Foreign Secretary Halifax for ‘the whole question of [the] policy in Scandinavia and Finland’ to be discussed in the next meeting of the Supreme War Council. The meeting was convened in Paris on 5 February. Three days earlier, the British War Cabinet had decided, against cautioning from the Foreign Office, that it ‘ought to do something, even if it were only to divert from ourselves the odium of having allowed Finland to be crushed’. Thus, Chamberlain, after having dismissed a French proposal to land troops at Petsamo in northern Finland, advocated the larger project. He did however, urge the Council not to lose sight of the principal aim, the defeat of Germany, in their determination to save Finland. The ideal operation would, according to Chamberlain, be one which, proceeding from Norwegian ports, combined assistance to Finland with control of the Lapland ore fields. Daladier was happy to comply and on this day, almost two weeks before the Altmark incident, the council agreed to set up an Anglo-French expeditionary force – to be ready by 20 March – ostensibly to help Finland but first and foremost to secure the Swedish iron ore, gain strategic control over the Norwegian coast and, with any luck, to divert substantial German forces from the Western Front. To overcome their unwillingness it was decided to exert ‘vigorous moral pressure’ on Norway and Sweden, while Finland would be asked to issue an official appeal for help to add moral pressure. According to Churchill, the issue of what to do if Norway and Sweden refused, as seemed probable, was never brought up. The risk of becoming entangled in a war with Russia appears also to have been pushed under the carpet; possibly few of the British delegation really expected that the soldiers would go beyond the Swedish ore fields. The Germans would respond, but this would take time and meanwhile any attack in the west would be postponed – it was assumed.77
General Ironside noted enthusiastically in his diary:
If we bring this off, we shall have carried out a great coup, which will upset . . . German preparations. One is almost frightened at the boldness of the plan, knowing what slender means one has at the moment to carry it out. We must see we are politically strong, and remain quite cynical about anything except stopping the iron-ore.78
The plan was indeed bold. In spite of the setback in late January, military preparations had continued steadily and plans were now nearing completion. Operation Avonmouth would seize the Lapland fields, Operation Stratford would secure control of western Norway and Operation Plymouth would secure a defence of southern Sweden. Four to five divisions, including five French and one or two Polish battalions would be deployed in Narvik–Lapland–Luleå, while five additional battalions would occupy Trondheim and Bergen (from where railway lines necessary for transport of heavy material connected eastward) and would be prepared to protect these ports against German attacks.79 A front line was envisaged from Bergen via Oslo to Stockholm, south of which German air attacks would be fierce. Stavanger would be occupied temporarily and in the event that superior German forces attempted to take control of the airfield and the city’s port, both should be demolished before a withdrawal towards Bergen.
In all, a hundred thousand British and fifty thousand French/Polish troops with naval and air support would be deployed under overall British command. Two or three brigades were all that would end up in Finland, where they would remain near the railway in the north to avoid getting too close to the Russians or being cut off by a likely German intervention when the Gulf of Bothnia unfroze. The ultimate goal for the Allied planners was the Norwegian west coast and the Swedish iron ore, not aid to Finland. The secretary of state for war, Oliver Stanley, warned the Cabinet on 18 February that the ‘whole affair was in danger of becoming unmanageable’, as with a commitment of this scale Britain would ‘not be able to send any more troops to France until well into the summer’. Chamberlain expressed concern over this ‘new and somewhat disturbing [information], which had not before been brought to the notice of the War Cabinet’, but left it at that.
Churchill also had second thoughts for a while; partly on moral grounds, partly from seeing the size of the Scandinavian operation. He wished for a ‘pretext for getting a footing in Scandinavia’ and within a fortnight got this from the Altmark incident, which he to a large extent orchestrated himself. Following this, he argued emphatically that the alleged Norwegian inability to protect its own waters from German trespassing should be used to lay one or more minefields in Norwegian territorial water forthwith, ‘to prevent similar episodes’. This would not ‘prejudice the larger operation’, he held, but might – quite to the contrary – ‘succeed in provoking Germany into imprudent action, which would open the door for us’. Invading Norway on a large scale against Norwegian acceptance, Churchill warned, would be a ‘grave error’. Even a few shots between Norwegian and British forces ‘would be a most unfortunate affair’, but minor violations at carefully selected sites could be performed without confrontations with the Norwegian Navy. His arguments were not accepted by the Cabinet this time either, but he did receive support to start preparations for mining, should it be decided later. Hence the Admiralty was ordered to be prepared for operations in Norwegian waters, which, ‘being minor and innocent may be called Wilfred’.
According to General Ironside, the army was not ready for a ‘hurried action’ and would not be so until mid-March. ‘This [mining] project of the First Lord will accelerate any contemplated German actions in Scandinavia,’ he held with some frustration. ‘We must be absolutely clear that once we land a Force in Scandinavia, we are committed to a war there. . . . The expedition itself may be small to begin with, but will grow to be a major effort.’ On 29 February Chamberlain concluded that, in spite of Altmark, he could ‘not advise the War Cabinet to take action in Norwegian territorial waters for the present’. Any mining would have to be deferred ‘and its execution reconsidered as the situation developed’. In a letter to Ambassador Corbin on the same day, it was explained that the War Cabinet did not think mining or any other minor naval actions offered ‘advantages sufficient to offset the disadvantages on moral ground . . . but rather to make difficult . . . the plan for sending help to Finland’ as it would inevitably make Norway and Sweden hostile to the Allies.80
By the beginning of February the Russians had renewed their attacks on the Finnish defences on the Karelian Isthmus with new units and improved tactics. The brave Finns were tiring and could not hope to sustain the resistance for long. After a few weeks, the Russians were approaching the ‘Mannerheim Line’, the final defences before Helsinki. In an attempt to avoid a disaster, Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim advised his government to opt for peace while still maintaining an impression in the Kremlin that an Allied intervention was an option.81
French impatience with what was considered British indecision was made well known through the embassy in London. Admiral Auphan later wrote: ‘It’s a little cynical to say so, but no one really hoped to stop the Soviet army and save Finland. The idea was to use the pretext of such an operation to lay our hands on the Swedish iron ore, and thus deny it to Germany.’ Paul Reynaud also goes a long way in his memoirs to say that an expeditionary force might never reach Finland, but still attain a major goal should it occupy the Swedish ore fields and halt the export to Germany. Seen from Paris, there were few reasons why the Allies should respect Norwegian and Swedish neutrality if this could avert a German attack on France.82
The British Cabinet eventually agreed to submit yet another memorandum to Oslo and Stockholm, informing that Allied forces were all set for despatch to Finland, requesting co-operation during the transit through Narvik and Kiruna-Gällivare. Should this cooperation lead to hostilities with Germany, other Allied forces were being prepared for ‘extensive military assistance’. The Norwegian government would be informed when British forces were prepared to land at Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger