It was agreed that by 1 April, diplomatic warnings should be submitted to Norway and Sweden, stating the Allies reserved the right to stop the German iron-ore traffic. Three days later, mining in German waterways would commence, followed by Norwegian waters on the 5th. One minefield would be laid in the approaches to Vestfjorden north of Bodø and one off Stadtlandet, south of Ålesund. A third area off Bud between Molde and Kristiansund would be declared dangerous, but no mines would be laid. Confrontation with Norwegian naval forces was to be avoided, but if the mines were swept they should be relaid. Parts of the Home Fleet would be available for protection of the minelayers, just in case. Churchill’s Operation Wilfred was finally on. Lawrence Collier wrote after the war that the intention was to ‘stop German misuse of Norwegian neutrality’. Before the meeting, however, Halifax told Ambassador Corbin that in British opinion, German violations of Norwegian territory had been neither numerous nor well documented lately and now that spring was approaching and opening the Baltic, actions in Norway would only have a ‘small interference with Germany’s import’.88
The British decision-making process at this stage became imprecise and ambiguous. General Ironside and Général Gamelin met after the meeting, and the next day the British War Cabinet almost casually added ‘a British brigade and a French contingent [to be] sent to Narvik to clear the port and advance to the Swedish frontier in case of German countermeasures to the mining’. Plan R4, as the operation was called, would be activated when the Germans took the bait and ‘set foot on Norwegian soil, or there was clear evidence they intend to do so’ – although what evidence of German action was needed was not specified. Landings at Narvik alone made little sense to the CoS and part of the plans from two weeks earlier were put forward again while efforts were initiated to try to reassemble as much as possible of the dispersed Stratford and Avonmouth forces. Troops for southern Sweden were no longer available. This operation would be confined to Norway and, if necessary, Lapland.
Two separate but linked interventions were thus being prepared: the mining and the landing of Allied soldiers in Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. The laying of mines was not subject to Norwegian consent and when the landings were added so casually, the political safety valve, which had been a prerequisite for the War Cabinet so far, was lost. The CoS concluded that ‘All preparations should be made for the despatch of at least one British battalion at the same time as the laying of the minefield, to be followed by the remainder of the force at the earliest possible date.’ Within parts of the military it appears Plan R4 was expected to go ahead without waiting for the Germans. Churchill told the War Cabinet on 29 March that it was necessary ‘to continue in a state of readiness to despatch a light force to Narvik and possibly . . . Stavanger’, but added that he ‘personally doubted whether the Germans would land a force in Scandinavia’. He probably kept the issue low-key on purporse so as not to raise objections and postpone Operation Wilfred once more. It is noteworthy that in the early morning of 31 March Vice Admiral Cunningham of 1st Cruiser Squadron was notified by the Admiralty that Plan R4 would be ‘put into operation [and] also Stratford, probably 3rd April’. Less than two weeks after they had been saved by the Finnish capitulation, Chamberlain and Halifax had lost control of events again. This time, they would not regain it.
General Ironside commented in a note to the CoS and the War Cabinet that ‘The projected operation in Scandinavia [has] a different political background from that . . . in early March when similar operations were contemplated.’ Apprehensively, he added: ‘From this beginning, we cannot foresee what may develop,’ and advised them to ‘have in hand a reserve’, pending German reactions, including plans for ‘the withdrawal of two to three divisions from France’.
On the request of the War Cabinet, the CoS issued a memorandum on 31 March, assessing various German reactions. The most that could be envisaged by the CoS was that Berlin might establish air and naval bases in southern Norway in order to take control of the minefields and attack British naval and air bases. Increased intelligence to detect German countermoves would be initiated, even if it were recognised that this might not be so easy.89
On 8 April, the British Military Intelligence Branch (MI) issued a paper entitled: ‘The Possibilities of German Action against Scandinavia’. Based on the information available in the service departments and the Foreign Office, it concluded that the known disposition of German forces did not ‘support any probability of a Scandinavian invasion’. Limited operations on the Norwegian coast were to be expected to counter any Allied mining, but there was little advantage to be gained by Germany from occupying Denmark.90
The French and British press printed, with remarkable indiscretion, reports of the Council’s meeting on 28 March, including stories of imminent Allied intervention in Norway. For once, Koht asked the envoys in London and Paris to investigate. Colban reported back on the 29th, after meeting Halifax, that he did not believe ‘the British Government had made any decision regarding actions in Norwegian territory’. Similarly, Minister Bachke in Paris reported that he could not see that any concrete actions had been decided, but a ‘test-campaign might be launched to observe reactions’.
On 2 April, Chamberlain gave a speech in the House of Commons, but avoided any mention of concrete actions emerging from the Supreme War Council.
[The] most important . . . weapon of our economic warfare is the employment of our sea power, and the Allies are determined to continue and intensify the use of this weapon to the full. His Majesty’s ships have already taken certain practical steps to interfere with the unimpeded passage of the German cargo ships from Scandinavia. These operations have been carried out in close proximity to German naval bases, showing once again how empty are the German boasts the control of the North Sea has passed into their hands . . . The House may be assured that we have not yet reached the limit of our effective operations in this region.91
Colban commented to Oslo that the prime minister had ‘carefully circumvented any revelation of the intentions of the government’. Other less diplomatic commentators concluded that Chamberlain’s words actually signified that an intervention was already being prepared.
Reynaud, who felt that accepting mining of the German waterways was but a ‘minor concession’ compared to swaying the British Cabinet into offensive actions in Scandinavia, went home after the meeting on the 28th to discuss the plans with his Comité de Guerre Français. The French War Committee, under the influence of Daladier, strongly supported the actions in Norway, but rejected any execution of Operation Royal Marine, and Reynaud had to inform London accordingly on 31 March. Frustrated over what he considered French manipulation, Chamberlain told Ambassador Corbin, ‘no mines, no Narvik’, and both operations were postponed.92
On 3 April, Chamberlain discussed the status of the Norwegian issue with the Military Coordination Committee – of which Churchill had just taken over the chairmanship.93 Intelligence of troop concentrations in the Baltic were given, but dismissed as German preparations to counter Allied moves. The French refusal of Royal Marine had stalled momentum but Chamberlain was acutely aware that a line had been crossed and ‘ . . . matters had now gone too far for us not to take action.’ If the French eventually turned down Royal Marine altogether, it would be necessary to ‘proceed with the Norwegian Territorial Waters Operation alone’. Churchill was asked to go to Paris to try to change their minds, while a personal letter was sent from Chamberlain to Daladier. It appears the persuasion worked better the other way and on 5 April Churchill reported back to Halifax that Reynaud needed room to manoeuvre and the French may be ‘right in wanting to postpone the mining of the Rhine until the French Air Force is strong enough to meet German retaliation’. To avoid a renewed political crisis in Paris, the War Cabinet later in the day gave in and accepted to ‘proceed with the Norwegian plans’. The date for Operation Wilfred was confirmed as 8 April. That this was close to Reynaud’s intentions all the time is difficult to ascertain, but easy to believe.94
Available units were hastily assembled: the 24th Infantry (Guards) Brigade supported by French troops for Narvik and the incomplete 49th Division for Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Norwegian-speaking officers were transferred from wherever they could be found and information on conditions in Norway was distributed to officers and NCOs. Though not officially acknowledged, there was