In the summer of 1981 the covert operation in Chad got underway. After the CIA’s deputy director for operations, Max Hugel, briefed the House Intelligence Committee on the operation, a number of committee members questioned the wording of the finding, which was vague enough that it could be interpreted as justification for directly challenging Qaddafi’s hold on power. Concerned committee members sent a classified letter to Reagan in which they strongly protested the operation. The media soon caught wind of the letter and reported that several members of the Intelligence Committee were objecting to a CIA covert operation taking place in an unnamed African country. In a half-page article Newsweek described the operation as “a large-scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime of Col. Muammar Qaddafi.” The article then reported that “the CIA’s goal . . . was Qaddafi’s ‘ultimate’ removal from power. To members of the House Intelligence Committee who reviewed the plan, that phrase seemed to imply Qaddafi’s assassination.”51 A scheme to assassinate Qaddafi, however, would be in direct violation of Executive Order 12333, signed by Reagan in 1981. According to the order, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”52
Casey was furious about the leaks and subsequent news reports. The CIA’s Directorate for Operations had carefully designed a covert support operation for Chad, a country in which the agency believed it had a reasonable chance of success and where U.S. allies France, Egypt, and Sudan were already involved. Reports of a plan to topple the Qaddafi regime undoubtedly would make the Libyan dictator more cautious and vigilant just as the CIA was trying to strike at him indirectly through Chad. In response to the Newsweek story the White House issued a statement that denied the contents of the article but acknowledged that some members of the House Intelligence Committee had written a letter to Reagan protesting an unspecified operation. Newsweek reporters then sought clarifying information about the operation from their source, who happened be a member of the committee. Soon afterward Congressman Clement J. Zablocki—Democrat of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee—admitted to House staff personnel that he had been the source of the Newsweek story. Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, rebuked Zablocki for the leak and informed him of his misunderstanding of the facts, but Boland did not pursue disciplinary action against his colleague.53
The next component of Reagan’s Libya strategy to take shape was the calculated use of military power. One month into his presidency Reagan approved an assertive, comprehensive FON program that was designed to defend U.S. national interests against the unreasonable maritime claims of more than forty nations, including Qaddafi’s Libya. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), particularly Admiral Hayward, urged Reagan to authorize a FON exercise for the Gulf of Sidra. Carter had blocked the most recent proposals for an exercise in the gulf, but Weinberger and Hayward did not want to follow the former president’s policy of avoiding the disputed body of water. Conducting maneuvers in the gulf, they argued, would demonstrate U.S. determination to exercise its rights and would undermine Qaddafi’s credibility since there was nothing he could do to prevent the Sixth Fleet from operating there. Reagan sided with the top officials at the Pentagon.
In the late spring of 1981 at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)—a gathering of the president’s most senior advisers and chaired by the president himself—Reagan directed the Pentagon to plan a major Sixth Fleet exercise that would challenge Qaddafi’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra. The exercise was tentatively planned for late summer. It would boldly yet peacefully assert U.S. rights in international waters and airspace and would demonstrate to America’s friends and adversaries in the Middle East the United States’ commitment to peace and stability in the region. The Pentagon spearheaded the planning of the exercise, but other departments and agencies were involved in the process owing to the sensitive nature of it. One day before the start of the exercise Newsweek reported that the Reagan administration “will test Qaddafi’s reactions—and those of his allies in Moscow—by staging war games inside the gulf.” According to the magazine the maneuvers would serve as the administration’s “first direct challenge to the Libyan strongman.”54 (Details of the FON exercise and its surprising outcome are presented later in this chapter.)
Regarding the diplomatic components of the new Libya strategy, the administration pursued several initiatives. First it appealed to U.S. allies in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to join the United States in condemning and isolating Libya. Several European governments advised the administration not to confront Qaddafi publicly because such an approach might strengthen him at home and enhance his stature throughout the Third World. On the other hand, President Sadat, who once described Qaddafi as “a lunatic,” encouraged American efforts to pressure the Libyan leader. Second, the administration pledged diplomatic support and significant increases in military assistance to several of Libya’s neighbors in North Africa, namely Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.55 Meanwhile, strong evidence emerged that Qaddafi’s liquidation campaign against Libyan exiles had reached the United States, which had a profound effect on diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya.
In October 1980 Faisal Zagallai, a graduate student at Colorado State University and one of the leaders of the Libyan exile dissident community, was grievously wounded when he was shot twice in the head by an assailant using a .22 caliber pistol. Incredibly, the Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency (JANA), the official information bureau of the Libyan government, announced that the attack had been carried out by one of Libya’s revolutionary committees. The FBI traced the gun to a former U.S. Army Green Beret, Eugene Tafoya, who had been recruited by the Libyan government and was serving as a Libyan agent. When Tafoya was arrested on 22 April 1981 investigators found in his possession an address book containing the names of other Libyan exiles living in the United States. The publicity over Tafoya’s arrest supported the Reagan administration’s efforts to paint Qaddafi as an international outlaw and practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism. The arrest also led to the first public action taken by the administration against the Libyan government.56
On 6 May 1981 Haig ordered the closure of the Libyan people’s bureau in Washington and gave the twenty-seven Libyan diplomats posted there five days to leave the United States.57 The official State Department announcement cited “a wide range of Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism.” The statement also noted that the United States was disturbed by “a general pattern of unacceptable conduct” by the Libyan government, which “is contrary to internationally accepted standards of diplomatic behavior.” The State Department also warned U.S. citizens not to travel to Libya and advised all Americans living there to leave.58 The closure of the people’s bureau was Reagan’s first signal to Qaddafi that more serious consequences were to follow if he did not curtail his involvement in international terrorism.59
One month later the Reagan administration took another step to isolate Qaddafi. On 2 June Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, announced that the United States would support all African states that opposed Libyan intervention in their countries. “The administration . . . is deeply concerned about Libyan interventionism in Africa and in particular the presence of Libyan troops in Chad,” Crocker stated. The administration announced huge increases in military assistance to Qaddafi’s neighbors in Africa and the Middle East: Egypt received $900 million in aid; Sudan, $100 million; Tunisia, $140 million; Morocco, $100 million; Somalia, $95 million; and Oman, $1 billion (for improvements to bases used by U.S. forces).60
Arguably the most important component of Reagan’s Libya strategy was economic sanctions, since they could have the most immediate and profound impact on the Qaddafi regime. Nevertheless, concerns about the U.S. oil industry, about American citizens in Libya, and about the degree of allied cooperation greatly influenced the development of a package of economic sanctions against Libya. In early 1981 Libya was the third largest supplier of oil to the United States, with Libyan oil