Ronald I. Spiers, the chief of the State Department’s intelligence branch, informed Haig privately that current intelligence did not support his public statements. Unconvinced, Haig requested from William Casey a formal intelligence report—a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—to analyze the role of the Soviet Union in international terrorism. Since terrorism was not a topic routinely covered by NIEs, Casey ordered the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) to draft a special NIE (SNIE) on Moscow’s involvement in terrorism. Although Casey’s gut instincts told him that Haig’s thinking was correct, Casey believed that the best way to prove Haig’s point was through good analysis of the available intelligence.25 While the SNIE was being written Casey held a meeting with Sterling, who lambasted the CIA for not thoroughly investigating the Soviet role in international terrorism. Casey came away from the meeting impressed by the strength and passion of her arguments. “God damn it. . . . I’ve got this woman who’s written a pretty persuasive book faulting us,” he fumed. “Just because nobody heard a tree fall in the forest doesn’t mean it didn’t fall.”26
The first draft of the SNIE did not support Haig’s perception of the Soviet role. It concluded that the Soviets did not organize or direct terrorist activity and argued that the Soviets did not approve of it. The estimate made a careful distinction between the actions of national liberation movements and other insurgent groups that were supported by Moscow versus the activities of terrorist organizations that were not. The SOVA analysts also stressed that no conclusive evidence of Soviet or Eastern European involvement in international terrorism existed. In late March Casey reviewed the draft and stated that he was “greatly disappointed” with its conclusions and “he would not be willing to put his name on it.” He accused SOVA of trying to prove Soviet involvement in terrorism beyond a shadow of a doubt and relying too heavily on Moscow’s own pronouncements on terrorism. Rather than ask SOVA to rethink its conclusions, Casey directed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to prepare a new draft analysis. Casey favored the DIA’s version which, in contrast to the SOVA analysis, stated that current intelligence reporting supported the existence of terrorist training camps in Eastern Europe. Over the next few weeks a senior CIA analyst supervised the preparation of a compromise draft analysis, which SOVA and DIA accepted with few reservations.27 In May the SNIE, titled Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence, was signed by Casey and forwarded to Haig and other senior administration officials.28
The estimate contained a number of key judgments and conclusions:
the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the support of revolutionary violence for the purpose of “weakening unfriendly societies, destabilizing hostile regimes, and advancing Soviet interests”;
the Soviets were ambivalent about the use of terrorist tactics in the performance of revolutionary violence, but they were deeply concerned that terrorist violence would promote or harm their interests in specific situations;
strong evidence existed that the Soviets directly or indirectly supported several national insurgencies and liberation movements that used terrorism in their programs of revolutionary violence;
evidence of Soviet support for nihilistic terrorist organizations—groups whose only purpose was to attack symbols of the status quo—was weak and contradictory since some members of nihilistic groups were trained and supported by Soviet friends and allies while the Soviets occasionally characterized nihilistic terrorism as “criminal”;
some revolutionary organizations supported by the Soviets accepted a degree of control and direction from Moscow, while others did not;
the Soviets provided extensive military and paramilitary training to members of revolutionary organizations in camps located in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the Middle East, and they supplied weapons and other forms of assistance to a wide spectrum of revolutionary groups around the world;
the Soviets backed many countries or organizations that in turn supported the terrorist activities of revolutionary groups, including Libya, South Yemen, Palestinian groups, Eastern bloc nations, and Cuba;
Moscow accepted the support that its allies and friends gave to revolutionary groups because these actions either advanced its interests or were “the price to be paid” for maintaining and strengthening its influence with its friends and allies; and
the Soviet Union’s policy of supporting various forms of revolutionary violence was likely to continue because it enhanced Soviet interests at minimal cost and with little damage to Soviet prestige.29
The SNIE made it clear that the Soviets were responsible to a significant degree for the phenomenon of modern international terrorism. The Soviets became involved in the deadly movement after Israel’s stunning victory in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. After the war the Palestinians had concluded that conventional Arab military forces could not defeat Israel and decided to mount a protracted guerrilla war against Israel just as the Vietcong guerrillas were doing against the United States in South Vietnam. This change in Palestinian strategy coincided with Moscow’s determination to play a more prominent role in the affairs of the Middle East. The Palestinians believed that effective use of terrorism would demonstrate their national strength and would prompt Israel to respond with repressive measures that would turn international public opinion against them and encourage many Palestinians living in exile to join the armed struggle against Zionism. The Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe developed the Palestinian insurgent movement into an effective fighting force and, in the process, trained several guerrillas in the complex workings of international terrorism.
In the late 1960s Soviet, Czech, and East German instructors trained a large number of PLO commandos in camps located in Czechoslovakia. The Palestinians then established their own training facilities in several countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa. By the early 1970s the Palestinians were training not only their own guerrillas but also members of several nihilist terrorist groups such as the West German Baader-Meinhoff Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Japanese Red Army. In return the PLO received political and logistical support from several nihilist groups in Europe. By 1970 the Soviets had very little direct involvement in terrorist training yet, according to Reagan’s deputy CIA director Adm. Bobby Inman, little doubt remained that the Soviets were “the grandparents” of modern international terrorism. “They built the original training camps and gave the PLO the capability to train their own,” Inman said.30
The impact of the new Palestinian strategy was felt immediately. In the eighteen months following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War the Israeli government reported more than twelve hundred terrorist attacks within the country’s borders. Furthermore, radical factions of the PLO, such as the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), refused to limit their guerrilla war to Israel. The PFLP vowed to attack Zionism and its supporters anywhere in the world.
Two essential conclusions can be drawn about Moscow’s involvement in international terrorism. First, although the Soviets were deeply engaged in supporting acts of revolutionary violence, their support was largely opportunistic. They hoped to advance their interests simply by creating trouble for their opponents. There was no centralized program for terrorism in Moscow but, if a revolutionary group sought assistance, the Soviets rarely turned it down. Second, international terrorism became self-sustaining largely through the efforts of the Soviet Union. Moscow conducted the initial terrorist training in the late 1960s and, by the end of the decade, its graduates were operating their own camps and carrying out their own terrorist operations. Therefore, since terrorism was operating independently of the Soviet Union, being able to persuade Moscow to disavow support for revolutionary or terrorist groups would not end the problem of terrorism. The SNIE did not support Haig’s view that the Soviet Union controlled day-to-day terrorist operations. The Soviets supported terrorism when the opportunity presented itself, but they did not call the shots.31
A decade later, after the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, the former communist governments disclosed the true nature of the terror network. The Eastern Europeans, most notably East Germany, provided extensive support to several nihilist groups and