Approximately three minutes after first detecting the Fitters the engagement was over. The air battle occurred approximately sixty miles off the coast of Libya and lasted barely a minute.98 At approximately 0719 Fast Eagle 102 and Fast Eagle 107 joined up and headed back to the Nimitz, watching each other’s “six” to ensure that no Libyan MiGs crept up behind them. While en route Kleeman reported the result of the engagement to the carrier: two Fitters shot down, both pilots ejected, one parachute observed. Muczynski remembered the understated reply from the carrier. “The admiral wants to talk to you, when you get back,” responded the voice on the radio.99
Muczynski activated the autopilot in his Tomcat and let it fly the plane back to the vicinity of the carrier, all the while attempting to settle himself down. “We were so pumped up . . . I literally was shaking uncontrollably,” he said.100 Muczynski landed on his first try, trapping the number three wire. Kleeman was also excited. Rated the best pilot in the squadron at carrier landings, Kleeman took two “practice bolters” before landing on his third approach. After landing safely the four aviators were given an exhilarating heroes’ welcome by a jubilant crowd of officers and sailors who instantly swarmed onto the flight deck.
The Libyans supposedly recovered their two hapless pilots, and later that day two fliers were presented alive and well on Libyan television. Meanwhile, the LAAF continued to probe the defensive perimeter of the battle force. A total of forty-five intercepts, including the two kills, were performed during the two-day exercise. Admiral Service concluded OOMEX on the afternoon of 19 August and withdrew the two-carrier battle force from the exercise area.
On 24 August, while anchored in Naples, Italy, the Nimitz provided the venue for a press conference attended by more than one hundred reporters representing news agencies from around the world.101 Kleeman and the other Black Aces described the short air battle in great detail and answered several questions about the incident. They left little doubt that their actions were justified. Admiral Service and Vice Adm. William H. Rowden, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, praised and supported the actions of the Black Aces. “The aircrews correctly reacted in self-defense,” remarked Rowden, a surface warfare officer who had embarked in the Forrestal for the exercise. “They did not require or ask [for] any specific authorization from Admiral Service or anyone else. . . . Our pilots went out and they performed a duty, and they performed it perfectly. They performed as they had been trained and disciplined to do.” Service added: “We had the superior airplane, superior pilots, and our weapons systems are . . . better.”102
Several of Kleeman and Muczynski’s fellow aviators were certain that the Libyan lead pilot must have fired by mistake, because his chances for success were overwhelmingly against him. Muczynski, however, thought the attack was deliberate. His opinion was validated when the crew of an electronic surveillance plane informed him that they monitored voice traffic between the Fitters and their ground controller. They overheard the lead pilot report that he fired a missile at one of the American fighters; he mentioned nothing about making a mistake.103
The Libyans may have selected low-performance Fitters for the attack to enhance the element of surprise. Their plan may have been to lull the American pilots into dropping their guard, fire a quick shot, and then run like hell for home. If they were counting on the Americans not to respond quickly with force they were dead wrong. Under the Reagan ROE there were no more free shots at Americans.
“You Fight Like You Train”
In the brilliant sunlit skies over the Gulf of Sidra, American fighter crews successfully acquitted themselves in their first aerial combat since the Vietnam War. The seeds for the unexpected victory had been planted during the latter years of the Vietnam War, when the U.S. Navy made a concerted effort to improve the combat performance of its fighter crews. During the Korean War, Navy and Air Force fighter pilots had enjoyed a kill ratio of thirteen to one against Communist pilots. During the first half of America’s involvement in Vietnam the kill ratio against enemy fighters fell to one loss for every two victories. By 1969 the ratio was approximately one for one. Particularly discouraging was the combat record of the high performance, four million dollar F-4 Phantom II. In combat against the one million dollar MiG-21 Fishbed, the Phantom won fewer engagements than its less sophisticated foe. Beginning in early 1968 a team of experienced naval aviators and technical experts studied the performance of Navy fighters in Vietnam. Capt. Frank Ault, former skipper of the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) who had served a combat tour in the Tonkin Gulf off North Vietnam, led the team. After nine months of analysis the Ault Report found no single reason for the Navy’s mediocre air combat record, but instead it identified several problems that seriously degraded combat performance. Among those problems were faulty missile performance, an emphasis on long-range intercept tactics, and insufficient training in basic fighter tactics. U.S. fighter crews flew extremely powerful aircraft but their overreliance on radar and air-to-air missiles diminished their basic dogfighting skills. They could not outmaneuver the MiG pilots and, arguably worse, they did not understand the physics of a successful air-to-air missile engagement. Learning to use missiles effectively was especially important to the Navy since their version of the F-4 was armed only with missiles. The Ault Report contained 242 recommendations for improving the Navy’s fighter weapon systems, the most important of which was basic training in air combat maneuvering (ACM).
To its credit the Navy took assertive action to revamp fighter combat training during the Vietnam War, while the Air Force did not. In late 1968 the Navy began pulling together the staff and curriculum for what became the Navy Fighter Weapon School, better known as “Top Gun.” Based at Miramar Naval Air Station near San Diego, the school graduated its first class of “Fighter Ph.D.s” in March 1969. After Top Gun graduates and fleet crews trained by Top Gun alumni began arriving in Vietnam in 1972, the Navy kill ratio soared to slightly over twelve-and-a-half enemy planes shot down for each Navy loss. With its overwhelming air victory in Vietnam the Navy fighter community learned an important lesson: the skill of the crew is just as important as the technology built into the aircraft. The crew deserved a capable fighter system and they had to be thoroughly trained in the latest dogfighting techniques.
The Top Gun motto—“You fight like you train”—was evident over the Gulf of Sidra on the morning of 19 August 1981. The Black Aces epitomized the aggressive tactics taught at Top Gun, particularly the use of the “loose deuce” formation. Kleeman and Muczynski immediately took command of the action and relentlessly prosecuted the engagement until their foes were destroyed. From the moment they catapulted off the deck of the Nimitz they regarded their sortie over the Gulf of Sidra as a potential combat mission. Top Gun had trained them well; they were prepared to defend themselves.104
Later that year Muczynski and Anderson participated in a seminar on fighter tactics at the annual Tailhook Reunion in Las Vegas. Needless to say, their discussion about the recent air battle was the highlight of the convention of carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aviators. The two airmen were modest about their unexpected notoriety, stating that any aircrew in the wing could have engaged the Fitters and would have achieved the same outcome. They endorsed rigorous training in air combat maneuvering for fleet fighter crews and emphasized that continuous training had been instrumental in their recent success.105