The Election of 1980
In the November election Ronald Reagan won the presidency in a landslide, capturing forty-four states and 51 percent of the popular vote. Jimmy Carter won only six states and the District of Columbia and 41 percent of the popular vote. A master of modern media politics and a champion of the conservative values of Middle America, Reagan campaigned against big government. He advocated lower taxes, fewer regulations, and less interference by government in business and everyday life. Radiating an unwavering faith in the abilities of the American people and in the potential of the free enterprise system, Reagan preached that all Americans could achieve unprecedented prosperity if only government would “get off their backs.” In the area of foreign affairs he called for a stronger national defense, the restoration of U.S. prestige around the world, and a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union (which he decried as an unrelenting enemy of American values and a threat to world peace). He also spoke out on the problem of international terrorism: “We must take a stand against terrorism in the world and combat it with firmness, for it is a most cowardly and savage violation of peace.”15
Carter suffered one of the worst electoral defeats by an incumbent president in U.S. history. Many Americans viewed the magnitude of the loss as a repudiation of his leadership. Others, including Carter himself, believed that the landslide was more an indication of the nation’s frustration over a set of circumstances that no president could have handled to the satisfaction of the public. In the latter half of his term these circumstances included rising gasoline prices, double-digit inflation, high unemployment, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and, most frustrating of all, the long captivity of the American hostages in Tehran. As a final insult to Carter and his presidency, the Iranian government did not release the hostages until moments after Reagan took the oath of office on 20 January 1981.
Reagan Grapples with the Terrorism Issue
President Reagan wasted no time making good on his promises to increase defense spending by huge amounts, to develop a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union, and to combat international terrorism. Since fighting terrorism would certainly involve Libya, that country was briefly discussed at the first meeting of the National Security Council on 21 January 1981. The new president and his chief advisers considered Qaddafi a genuine threat to American interests in the Middle East and Africa and were determined to thwart his efforts to destabilize friendly governments in the region. According to political scientist Lisa Anderson, the Libyan dictator “was selected for special attention by the United States as the symbol of all the United States finds repugnant in international affairs—support for international terrorism, opposition to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and support for a diminished U.S. role in the world.”16
Five days later, on 26 January, Reagan and his top national security advisers—Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen, FBI Director William H. Webster, and CIA Director William J. Casey—gathered to discuss state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism. This deadly phenomenon continued to claim more innocent victims with each passing year. Since 1968 when the CIA began compiling statistics on terrorism, the year just completed was in fact the bloodiest one on record. Particularly alarming was the rate at which Americans were becoming vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In 1980 nearly 40 percent of all terrorist incidents involved American citizens or property. Of the 278 attacks on U.S. citizens, ten people were murdered and ninety-four injured.
Reagan and his advisers regarded international terrorism as an issue of vital national importance, and combating it became one of the new administration’s highest foreign policy priorities. They reviewed the federal government’s programs and resources devoted to countering terrorism. They evaluated everything, from the secret antiterrorist Delta Force to the various interagency working groups and task forces responsible for carrying out U.S. policy on terrorism. They concluded that more had to be done, but they quickly realized that before they could develop new policies for confronting terrorism, they had to learn as much as possible about the nature of the enemy. They determined that greater emphasis had to be placed on the collection of intelligence on the terrorist threat. Casey immediately ordered all CIA stations to elevate terrorism on their list of intelligence collection priorities, known as the “essential elements of intelligence” in the intelligence trade. At some stations, especially those in Europe and the Middle East, collecting intelligence on terrorism became the number one priority.17
The next day, 27 January, at a ceremony held on the White House lawn Reagan welcomed home the Americans who were held captive in Iran for 444 days. Reagan was intensely concerned about the well-being of the former hostages, and his anger over their captivity had not yet subsided. Furthermore, the American people were overjoyed that the hostages were returned safe and sound, but they were still angry and frustrated that Iran had been able to humiliate the United States virtually without consequence. Speaking before the former hostages and their families and with the world as his audience, Reagan proclaimed that the time had come to retaliate against terrorism.18 He proclaimed: “Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear that we live in an era of limits to our power. Well, let it be understood that there are limits to our patience.”19
Reagan’s rhetorical bombshell took some of his closest advisers and several career officials by surprise. Kenneth Adelman, a former member of Reagan’s transition team and at the time working at the State Department, had drafted the phrase “swift and effective retribution.” Adelman had traveled with former President Carter to West Germany to greet the former hostages on their journey home from Iran and learned firsthand how badly the Iranians had treated their captives. When Adelman briefed Reagan on their condition the president became “very disturbed” by what he heard. The hostages had been treated far worse than anyone suspected. Following his meeting with Reagan, Adelman composed the powerful phrase, believing it was appropriate for the moment. He had no doubt that Reagan would follow through on the tough statement.
Reagan’s declaration effectively committed his administration to a war against international terrorism even before it had developed a strategy or even knew with certainty what it was confronting.20 Nevertheless, Haig became the first administration official to take up the call to arms against terrorism. At his first news conference as secretary of state, held one day after Reagan’s remarkable statement, the former chief of staff in the Nixon White House and former NATO supreme commander asserted that “international terrorism will take the place of human rights [in] our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights.”21 In an attempt to clarify his remark Haig explained that the campaign against terrorism by the Reagan administration would have the same priority that the battle for human rights had held in the Carter administration. Nevertheless, Haig refused to speculate about actions the administration might take following a future terrorist incident. He stated that Reagan’s pledge of “swift and effective retribution” was “consciously ambiguous.”22
Haig also expressed his belief that the Soviet Union played a significant role in international terrorism. He claimed that the Soviets were actively “training, funding, and equipping” terrorists, and he accused them of “conscious policies . . . which foster, support, and expand this activity which is hemorrhaging in many respects throughout the world today.”23 Haig was convinced that Moscow controlled a vast terrorist network and used the terror weapon to undermine Western interests. His view was buttressed by the writings of American journalist Claire Sterling. In her book The Terror Network Sterling claimed that an existing international syndicate of disparate terrorist organizations helped one another and obtained support from “not altogether disinterested outsiders,” most significantly the Soviet Union and its allies. The outside assistance included training, weapons, funding, diplomatic cover, and logistical support. Although Sterling did not agree with Haig’s belief that the Soviet Union directed the day-to-day operations of terrorist groups, she emphasized