A pair of Tomcats with radio call signs “Fast Eagle 102” and “Fast Eagle 107” was scheduled to fill the southernmost CAP station. Comdr. Henry M. “Hank” Kleeman, the commanding officer of VF-41, flew the lead F-14 fighter, Fast Eagle 102, and his wingman Lt. Lawrence M. “Music” Muczynski piloted Fast Eagle 107. Lt. David J. Venlet and Lt. (jg) James P. “Amos” Anderson served as the radar intercept officers (RIOs) in Fast Eagles 102 and 107, respectively. Muczynski later admitted that he would not have been disappointed had the sortie been completely uneventful. On the previous day, 18 August, he had seen plenty of action performing a pair of intercepts, one of which was against a powerful MiG-25. Once airborne Fast Eagles 102 and 107 topped off their fuel tanks then headed south to their CAP station at the southern end of the patrol area. While en route to their station they monitored on their radios a hassle that was taking place to the west between two Libyan MiG-25s and two VF-41 Tomcats. The Libyans eventually broke off and returned to base. Meanwhile, a pair of birddog A-7E Corsair II aircraft kept watch over a Soviet-built Osa-class missile patrol boat that had moved into the exercise area. Minutes later two Bedevilers swung south to intercept a pair of MiG-23 Flogger Es, which were heading north toward the battle force. The Tomcats arrived on station at sunrise and commenced a racetrack patrol pattern, cruising at twenty thousand feet at three hundred knots. The aircraft timed their patterns so that one plane was always pointed toward the Libyan coast while the other flew its northern leg.81
At approximately 0715, while the two Phantoms from VF-74 were escorting the two MiGs, Kleeman began what he thought was his last turn toward the coast before breaking off to refuel from an airborne tanker and returning to the carrier. Suddenly Venlet detected an air contact on his radarscope due south at eighty miles. It was proceeding north from the Libyan air base at Ghurdabiyah on the south shore of the Gulf of Sidra. The E-2C detected the contact at the same time and tracked its northward progress. Venlet immediately noticed the contact climb to twenty thousand feet and increase its speed to 550 knots. It was heading right for Fast Eagle 102. Venlet reported the contact to the E-2C and to the battle force antiair warfare commander (AAWC) stationed on the Nimitz. The AAWC, a senior officer in the battle force, had the authority to initiate defensive measures to protect the force from a hostile air threat. Venlet received no reply, however, because the radio circuit was busy with reports from the F-4Js escorting the MiG-23s.82
Muczynski and Anderson in Fast Eagle 107 also held the presumed-to-be-Libyan contact on their radarscope. Muczynski abandoned the racetrack pattern and swung his Tomcat into a combat formation known as a “loose deuce.” This maneuver placed him four thousand feet above Kleeman and two miles off and slightly ahead of his skipper’s right wing. The loose deuce, an aggressive and flexible formation, allows each fighter to protect the other and enables either plane—depending on who spots the enemy first—to initiate an attack. The attacker becomes the “engaged” fighter, while the other plane—the “free” fighter—climbs to a higher altitude to take advantage of the situation set up by the engaged fighter. More than likely the free fighter takes the first shot. The crews of Fast Eagles 102 and 107 had spent countless hours practicing this maneuver and they believed it was a great example of a good offense being the best defense. Kleeman banked twenty degrees to the right, starting a gradual turn that put him on the tail of the “bogey” (unidentified air contact), but the aircraft altered course and continued to close in on him. The VF-41 skipper altered course further to the right, but the Libyan plane, guided by ground control intercept (GCI) radar, again changed course to maintain an intercept on Fast Eagle 102. Unable to loop in from behind, Kleeman and Muczynski increased speed to 550 knots and proceeded directly toward the Libyan plane with Fast Eagle 102 flying at an altitude of eighteen thousand feet. They prepared to execute a demanding but effective combat maneuver known as an “eyeball-shooter intercept.” Kleeman, acting as the “eyeball,” steered directly for the contact while Muczynski, the “shooter,” jockeyed into a position from which he could aim a Sidewinder at the tailpipe of the Libyan aircraft.83 Still anticipating a routine intercept, Muczynski told Anderson to get his camera ready. They had taken pictures of Libyan pilots on the first day of the exercise and Muczynski believed that “there was no reason to expect anything different from the day before.”84
With a relative closing rate of eleven hundred knots (eighteen miles per minute), it was only a matter of seconds before the American aviators saw the Libyan aircraft. Kleeman spotted the contact when it was approximately eight miles away. What had been a single blip on the AN / AWG-9 radar repeater was actually a pair of Libyan planes flying less than five hundred feet apart in a tight formation known as a “welded wing” (in which the lead pilot performs the aerial combat while the wingman protects the leader). At a range of two to three miles the skipper identified the aircraft as Soviet-built Su-22 Fitter Js (single-seat, single-engine ground attack planes).85
The Su-22 was no match for the F-14 in combat maneuvering ability and firepower. The Fitter was considerably slower than the Tomcat and unable to turn as tightly. It was armed with two internal 30mm cannons and a pair of AA-2 Atoll heat-seeking, air-to-air missiles. Unlike the all-aspect homing capability of the Sidewinder, the Atoll could not be employed with any probability of success unless it was aimed directly at an opposing jet’s exhaust pipe. Ignoring the disproportionate odds in his favor, Kleeman carefully initiated an offset intercept of his unsophisticated foes.86
As Kleeman closed in on the pair of Fitters, Muczynski executed a hard left turn that placed him behind the Libyans. The rigorous maneuver pounded Muczynski’s and Anderson’s bodies with a force seven times that of gravity. At approximately 0718 Kleeman initiated a 150-degree turn to the left that would put him in an escorting position alongside the lead Fitter.87 At the instant the lead Libyan was one thousand feet in front of and five hundred feet below Kleeman, the Libyan radioed to his wingman: “I’m preparing to fire.” A fraction of a second later he called out: “I’ve fired!”88 Kleeman immediately noticed the area under the Fitter’s left wing erupt in smoke and fire. Shockingly, the Libyan pilot fired an Atoll missile at the tail of Kleeman’s F-14. Simultaneously Kleeman and Muczynski shouted that the Libyan had launched a missile, and the two pilots banked hard to the left to avoid the heat-seeking missile, which passed safely under the tail of Fast Eagle 102. It flew unguided until it ran out of fuel. Kleeman managed to send an urgent report to the Nimitz, notifying the carrier that a pair of Libyan Fitters had attacked the Black Aces. In accord with the Reagan ROE, Kleeman and Muczynski took immediate action to defend themselves. Without hesitation they performed a crossover maneuver.89 Kleeman told Muczynski, “You go for the guy that shot at us. I’m going for the wingman.” Muczynski replied, “Roger that.”90 Since the Libyans had fired once already, Kleeman figured they might try it again. Then he thought, “The only acceptable course of action was to shoot at them.”91
The moment the lead Fitter pilot carried out his desperate attack, the Libyan pilots broke their tight formation and headed in different directions. The leader executed a climbing left-hand turn then turned right toward the north. The wingman turned east in the direction of the morning sun. Satisfied that Muczynski was pursuing the lead Fitter, Kleeman settled in one-half mile behind the Libyan wingman but held off firing a Sidewinder lest the missile home in on the blazing solar disk instead of on the Fitter’s tailpipe.92 Kleeman knew he was not ready to fire. “I realized that that was not a good position to shoot,” he recalled. “I waited about ten seconds until he cleared the sun, [and then] fired my missile. . . . There was no chance that I wasn’t going to pull the trigger. It did go through my mind that it was likely to cause a ruckus, but I had no choice.”93 The AIM-9L streaked across the bright Mediterranean sky and slammed into the aircraft’s tailpipe section. Kleeman recalled that “the missile . . . struck him in his tailpipe area causing him to lose control of the airplane, and he ejected within about five seconds.” Kleeman observed the pilot descend in his parachute.94
Meanwhile, Muczynski streaked to a firing position one thousand