The German Invasion of Norway. Geirr H. Haarr

out how to conquer the country he had barely been aware of a few hours earlier. Returning at 5pm with some ideas and sketches, von Falkenhorst realised that his whole career was at stake. His ideas were to Hitler’s liking, though, and the Führer decided he was the right man for the job. Von Falkenhorst was ordered to gather members of his staff and to start preparations immediately. Jodl noted in his diary that von Falkenhorst ‘accepted with enthusiasm’.¹⁸

      Generaloberst Walter von Brauchitsch, C-in-C of the German Army was less enthusiastic. He called von Falkenhorst to his office and told him in no uncertain language that he disapproved of Hitler’s decision and saw the whole operation as ‘unnecessary’. Besides, he had not been consulted and the Führer was ‘doing all of this only with the advice of Raeder’. It probably did not help von Brauchitsch’s opinion of the operation that von Falkenhorst was to report directly to the OKW and not to him – an unprecedented break with procedure. Generaloberst Halder, the army Chief of Staff, also expressed discontent with the operation and the fact that army command was largely kept out of the planning.¹⁹

      Meanwhile, Krancke’s group had produced a workable base-plan for the invasion. Spending a day reading this and other material available from Norway, von Falkenhorst and his staff took up work in some discreet back-offices of the OKW building in Berlin on Monday 26 February. Initially, only some fifteen officers were directly involved. To maintain secrecy there were no secretaries, which meant work from seven in the morning until late at night, seven days a week. Kapitän Krancke remained a member of the group, representing the Kriegsmarine. Oberst Robert Knauss from the Luftwaffe and Major Strecker from Abwehr handled liaison with their respective services and Oberst Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of the Operations Office, would secure a close connection to the OKW – although he did not become involved in the details of the planning. Hitler, on the other hand, kept a keen interest in the operation and influenced the planning on several occasions.²⁰

      The knowledge of Norwegian infrastructure, administration and armed forces was at best meagre and outdated. An invasion had been so far off the table that methodical intelligence had hardly been gathered. Maps were scarce and it was often necessary to rely on travel guides and tourist brochures. The embassy in Oslo had sent a fair amount of information regarding military installations, ports and harbours over the past years, but it was found to be unsystematic with limited verification. An intense programme of intelligence gathering was initiated under Major Pruck of the OKW, partly involving the embassy. In addition, a discreet search was initiated for merchant sailors and business people who had been to Norway as well as those who had been there as part of the children’s aid programmes after WWI. On the day of the invasion, the German commanders would have a surprising amount of detailed information available to them, a credit to the efforts of the German intelligence. There were significant gaps, though, and in many cases the information was available centrally, but had not reached the operational end in time.

      Concerning the Norwegian Army, von Falkenhorst’s intelligence officer, Hauptmann Egelhaaf, could provide only a sketchy picture. Public sources indicated the existence of six army divisions, but details of mobilisation and deployment in case of an emergency were not available. Egelhaaf reckoned that centralised depots, inexperienced officers and an inadequate number of NCOs would slow the mobilisation process down and concluded that ‘The Norwegian Army cannot offer sustained opposition against an attack from the major powers.’ Oberst Erich Buschenhagen, Chief of Staff for XXI Corps, agreed, provided the attack came as a surprise, applying ‘all means at hand’. The Norwegian Navy and Air Force were for all practical purposes disregarded at this stage, as were the coastal forts.²¹

      In late February, less than two weeks after the Altmark episode, German naval attaché Korvettenkapitän Richard Schreiber made a visit to the Norwegian Admiral Staff, accompanied by his colleague, air attaché Hauptmann Eberhart Spiller. The Germans asked to meet the head of Naval Intelligence, Kaptein Erik Steen, and told him that they had secure information from Berlin regarding an imminent British action against Norway. This would certainly draw Norway into the war, and the Norwegians would have to make a choice in due course on which side they would join. The warning was clear and would not have been made without instructions from Berlin. Steen made a report of the meeting to the Admiral Staff and commanding admiral. The report was forwarded to the Norwegian Foreign Office, but apparently not to the commanding general or the Ministry of Defence.

      On 4 March, Schreiber was back at the Admiral Staff again. This time he informed Steen that he had been called to Berlin to give an update on the general situation in Norway. In particular, he had been asked to comment on whether the country would oppose British forces occupying parts of the Norwegian coast and now asked for Steen’s advice on what to say. A somewhat perplexed Steen referred to the prime minister’s speech in January, where he clearly said that Norway would defend itself as best it could against any intruder.

      Schreiber and Spiller went to Berlin a few days later. In separate meetings, they were asked to give their view of the general situation in Norway, the attitudes of the military and civilian administration and in particular their views on what opposition the Norwegians would put up against an invasion, German or Allied. They were both of the opinion that resistance against Allied intruders would be symbolic at best, as the Altmark episode had demonstrated. How a German invader would be met was more uncertain, but also in this case they apparently both assumed that opposition would be limited. It is unlikely that Spiller and Schreiber were given the full details of Operation Weserübung, but both returned to Norway with instructions to report as much as they could find on the Norwegian armed forces, airfields and harbours. Neither could travel freely in Norway, and the information they provided was mostly taken from public sources and largely limited to the Oslo area, adding little to the information from the professional intelligence officers.²²

      In the afternoon of 29 February, von Falkenhorst and his staff met with Hitler and presented their first sketch of Operation Weserübung. The Führer liked what he heard and, on head of OKW, Generalmajor Wilhelm Keitel’s recommendation, approved the overall concept. He gave a few instructions and asked to be updated every other day. Jodl proposed to have Weserübung developed independently from Operation Gelb, the campaign in the West, and this was accepted even if the two operations needed to be synchronised; Gelb tentatively starting three days after Weserübung.

      Hitler signed the formal directive for Weserübung on 1 March. This was the first official acknowledgement of the operation to the services from the OKW. The rationale for the operation was listed as threefold: to pre-empt British intervention in Scandinavia and the Baltic, to secure the iron-ore supply from Sweden and to extend the operational basis for the navy and air force against Britain. The available forces were limited and if at all possible, the operation should be carried out as a ‘peaceful occupation’ under the pretext of giving ‘armed support to Nordic neutrality’. Maximum surprise and swiftness would have to compensate for low numerical strength, and secrecy was vital. Opposition could not be tolerated and should be met ‘with all necessary force’. There was no mention at all of Quisling and his NS Party.

      The Army High Command objected immediately against diverting forces to what they considered a secondary operation. Presumably there was also some resentment for being kept out of the planning and the troops having been assigned without their consulation. Generaloberst Halder held that Hitler had not ‘exchanged a single word with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army on the subject of Norway’. Protests were futile, and the next day Jodl noted laconically in his diary: ‘The Army agrees [to Operation Weserübung].’²³

      Weserübung Süd, the invasion of Denmark, would primarily secure Copenhagen and the airfield at Aalborg in northern Jylland, the latter to be captured by paratroopers followed by an airlifted battalion. Mechanised units would cross the border in the south and push north on the Jylland peninsular, while groups of smaller warships and requisitioned civilian vessels would land troops on the west coast and the islands. Command in Denmark was given to XXXI Corps under General der Flieger Leonard Kaupisch; subordinated to von Falkenhorst during the invasion phase.

      In Norway, Weserübung Nord would see regimental-strength landings from warships at Narvik,