In some instances, internal opponents, once in power, cannot transform the political system without undermining their own political interests. When this is the case, regime change may ultimately do little to alter the target state’s policies. In Panama, for example, George H. W. Bush had initially considered orchestrating a military coup against Noriega, but Colin Powell, chair of the JCS, advised against it, noting that a new military leader would likely rule much as Noriega had.16 President Bush agreed that an invasion would be necessary to overhaul the current regime and democratize Panama. Whether the foreign power encounters a leader who is willing to transform the target state’s institutions, or whose interests lie in preserving them, depends on several variables. These can include the nature of the foreign power’s demands, its offer of assistance to the new leader, and the domestic political strength of groups hostile to the foreign power. These contingencies can affect the likelihood of producing a stable, reliable regime when working with the external opposition too. However, the difference remains that the leader’s external opposition has a much stronger incentive to overhaul the existing political order. As a result, though the internal opposition may be easier to install, the foreign power prefers to partner with the external opposition when possible as it is more likely to accommodate the foreign power’s interests.
LEADER RESIGNATIONS
Internal coups are not always feasible. Ethnic, religious, racial, or class loyalties may prevent supporters from abandoning the head of state, who can deliberately play upon societal divisions to ensure supporters and the military remain loyal.17 Leaders may also be able to shield supporters and the military from foreign pressure.18 Under such circumstances, foreign powers may still attempt partial regime change, but instead they may directly pressure the leader into stepping down. By coercing or inducing the head of state to resign, regime change can occur without a military confrontation.
The leader’s resignation, however, can be a costly and risky option for at least three reasons. First, such deals are often unappealing to the leader. Once the leader resigns, the domestic opposition could seek retribution or the foreign power could renege on its promises of amnesty. In fact, even if domestic amnesties could be made credible, the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not guarantee they will be respected.19 Further, resignation deals tend to be pursued when the foreign power is reluctant and the external opposition, though popularly supported, lacks sufficient military force. The leader is, therefore, in a relatively strong position and knows that the costs for resisting the deal will be low. Given the risks of conceding power, leaders have little incentive to accept such deals unless the foreign power can demonstrate that forced removal is the leader’s only other option. In Haiti, for example, the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations tried but failed to convince the military junta to step down by using sanctions. It was not until President Clinton mobilized forces for an invasion that the junta agreed to return power to deposed president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.20 States may, therefore, have to bear the costs of signaling their willingness to depose a targeted leader militarily before they can succeed in convincing that leader to step down.
A second reason resignation is often the foreign power’s option of last resort is that it leaves the leader’s coalition of supporters intact but with little incentive to accept the new regime. In contrast to an internal coup, in which at least some of the leader’s supporters are first induced or coerced to accept it, the leader’s resignation does not require their consent. Although the foreign power can pressure a new leader to co-opt the former one’s supporters, both sides may resist cooperation. Haiti’s President Aristide, for example, reneged on his promise to offer amnesty to opposition members once back in power.21 Former leaders can also capitalize on their supporters’ grievances to return to power or use them to meddle in politics back home. Liberia’s Charles Taylor continued to interfere in Liberian politics after his exile to Nigeria. His meddling later led the United States to demand his extradition for trial at the ICC.22 Finally, due to the lack of a credible foreign threat, leaders may only step down when offered a deal that effectively preserves their power. The deal the Reagan administration offered Panama’s Noriega was, according to Marlin Fitzwater, Reagan’s acting press secretary, like “getting the fox out of the henhouse, then giving him quarters next door.” Even with these inducements, Noriega refused to step down.23
Finally, the leader’s resignation is more likely to leave behind a new regime that is either unstable or uncooperative. Because states only tend to pursue the leader’s resignation when reluctant to forcibly install the external opposition, their preference for a low-cost approach may incline them to skimp on aid that the new leader needs to consolidate power. This aid can involve more than just money; foreign troops may be necessary too. For example, the United States tried to reduce its costs of using American troops to stabilize Haiti by working with the Haitian army to maintain order, even though the army had been complicit in the coup against Aristide.24 Without sufficient support from the foreign power, political instability may persist. Aristide’s efforts to reconsolidate power divided his supporters, some of whom later joined with former members of the Haitian army to oust him in 2004.25 Ultimately, the leader’s resignation often fails to address the sources of instability in the target state that precipitated regime change in the first place.
Because leader resignation is typically an option of last resort, rarely do foreign powers successfully coax leaders to step down without a fight. When leaders do step aside, their supporters have usually already defected or rebels are poised to seize power. In these cases, regime change is primarily undertaken by domestic actors. Though the foreign power may play a supporting role in negotiating the leader’s departure, these are not true instances of FIRC, because the leader would be removed regardless of the foreign power’s actions. For example, although Aristide claimed the United States ousted him in 2004, armed rebels were already on the verge of removing him from power.26
When foreign powers are primarily responsible for the leader’s resignation, their efforts tend to be aimed at helping a popular but militarily weak external-opposition group attain power. In these cases, the foreign power is often under domestic or international pressure to act but has only nonvital interests at stake and so is unwilling to bear the high military costs of directly installing the external opposition. As such, the foreign power often seeks the leader’s resignation as a quick-fix, low-cost solution to the crisis. The ouster of Haiti’s military junta in 1994 and Liberia’s Taylor in 2003 exemplify this approach. Both were largely humanitarian efforts to remove leaders accused of human rights violations. Unfortunately, as both cases also illustrate, a leader’s removal may not ensure lasting political stability.
In sum, when the external opposition lacks sufficient strength, foreign powers can pursue one of two types of partial FIRC, coups or leader resignations. Coups are more effective because some of the leader’s supporters are convinced to abandon the leader and support the new regime. When the leader resigns, in contrast, those supporters may not only lack incentive to support the new regime, but they may also retain the ability to challenge it. Accordingly, instances of successful foreign-coerced leader resignation are rare. Finally, as I explain in the next section, foreign powers pursue partial regime change only when the targeted state is not expected to rapidly gain or regain military power. Otherwise, they may persist in seeking full regime change. All told, my argument suggests the following hypotheses on partial regime change:
H1a5: When the external opposition to a targeted leader is weak and the internal opposition is strong, states seeking regime change are more likely to pursue coups in target states that are not expected to rapidly gain or regain military power.
H1a6: When the internal opposition to a targeted leader is weak and the popularly supported external opposition requires military assistance, states seeking