Past failures can also prompt the foreign power to shift from partial to full regime change or to change its level of force. The memory of the Vietnam War, for example, did not prevent American leaders from attempting regime change in the decades that followed. Instead, the experience in Vietnam changed how they pursued it. With the exception of Grenada, the Reagan administration looked to topple foreign governments by funding insurgents indirectly rather than directly.50 In 1977, Vietnam abandoned its indirect regime change strategy, after failing to generate an internal uprising against Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge. Instead, Hanoi adopted a direct strategy focused on an invasion. The Vietnamese foreign minister insisted that there were still at least nine battalions and twenty provincial leaders in Cambodia sympathetic to Hanoi who would assist in the invasion.51 Simply put, although policymakers’ cost estimates are sometimes wrong, more accurate ones would not necessarily cause them to forsake regime change. As long as the targeted leader appears not only resistant, but also susceptible to overthrow, FIRC will remain a constant temptation.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that whether the foreign power seeking regime change replaces the target state’s institutions or leader depends on the relative strength of the external and internal opposition to the targeted leader. States seeking regime change prefer to align with strong external opposition groups because those groups are more willing to accept the foreign power’s terms. When the external opposition to the targeted leader is weak, however, the foreign power may instead encourage the leader’s internal rivals to launch a coup. Although foreign powers can also pressure the leader to step down, resignation is less likely to resolve the political instability in the target state. For this reason, it tends to be an option of last resort, pursued when the external opposition has popular support but requires direct military aid, which the foreign power is unwilling to provide. The only instance in which the foreign power might pursue full regime change despite a weak external opposition is when the target is expected to rapidly gain or regain military power. Because the internal opposition can be a less reliable ally, the foreign power is often reluctant to install it when the target state may recover the means to resist militarily.
Table 2. Hypotheses on Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
| The Effects of Domestic Opposition |
| H1a: The Causes of FIRC |
| 1. When states’ interests diverge, the stronger one side’s internal or external opposition is, the greater the probability that the opposing side will pursue FIRC. |
| 2. The greater the military vulnerability of one state in a dispute, the more likely it is that the stronger state will attempt regime change when the weaker state’s leader faces domestic opposition. |
| 3. When a foreign power confronts a domestically weak leader, a major event or crisis can serve as a catalyst for the decision to impose regime change. |
| 4. When a state seeks to effect regime change in another state, it is more likely to pursue full regime change when the external opposition to the targeted leader is strong relative to the targeted leader. |
| 5. When the external opposition to a targeted leader is weak and the internal opposition is strong, states seeking regime change are more likely to pursue coups in target states that are not expected to rapidly gain or regain military power. |
| 6. When the internal opposition to a targeted leader is weak and the popularly supported external opposition requires military assistance, states seeking regime change are more likely to pursue the leader’s resignation if they lack a strategic motive to use military force. |
| 7. When a state seeks to effect regime change in another state, it is more likely to pursue full regime change if the targeted state is expected to gain or regain military capabilities in the near future. |
| H1b: Responses to FIRC |
| 1. All else equal, targeted leaders without domestic opposition will make more concessions than those with opposition. |
| 2. A targeted leader is more likely to adopt defensive actions when the foreign power threatens regime change but does not signal the intention to use direct force. |
| Alternative Hypotheses |
| H2: Psychological Bias |
| FIRC is more likely to occur between two states engaged in a dispute when psychological bias causes policymakers to view the opposing side’s leader as the source of that dispute. |
| H3: Bureaucratic or Interest-Group Pressure |
| FIRC is more likely to occur between two states engaged in a dispute when bureaucrats or interest groups push for the removal of the opposing side’s leader. |
| H4: Credible-Commitment Problem |
| FIRC is more likely to occur when conditions undercut the ability of one or both sides in a dispute to prove their commitment to an agreement. |
| H5: Incomplete-Information Problem |
| FIRC is more likely to occur when conditions undercut a foreign power’s ability to credibly threaten a target state in a dispute. |
Table 2 presents a summary of the hypotheses proposed by my argument and those of alternative ones. In Chapter 3, I test several of these hypotheses using quantitative data. A statistical approach allows me to test my argument across a large number and diverse array of cases, while controlling for the effects of alternative arguments. Statistical tests, however, have their limitations. They are less helpful in proving a causal relationship or testing hypotheses that defy quantification. Some of my argument’s hypotheses are indeed difficult to test quantitatively. In particular, the hypotheses on the effects of major events or crises (H1a3), the leader’s response to regime change (H1b1 and H1b2), and the foreign power’s preference for partial versus full regime change (H1a4 through H1a7) require a more nuanced understanding of conditions and events surrounding each case. Accordingly, I test these hypotheses in the case studies that follow Chapter 3. If my argument is valid, we should observe that domestic opposition in the target state increases the risk of FIRC. In particular, we should find that it constrains the leader’s ability to make concessions to the foreign power, while at the same time making the leader more vulnerable to overthrow. Leaders without such opposition will not necessarily make concessions, particularly if they have the military means to resist making them. But their stronger base of domestic support should nevertheless cause the foreign power to prefer a settlement by making regime change too costly to pursue.
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