Policymakers consider more than just the relative costs when making their decisions; they also consider the relative odds of success. In this respect, policymakers may still be tempted to seek regime change, because coercion has a lackluster track record as well. Although some coercive measures may be more effective than others, the academic literature on coercion suggests its overall success rate is low.34 The case of Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević illustrates the difficulties associated with coercing foreign leaders. NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) ultimately succeeded in bringing about a settlement in that conflict, but it did not deter Milošević from launching another ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo just three years later. Milošević later backed down again, but only after another NATO bombing campaign.35 Thus, like regime change, coercion is not necessarily doomed to fail, but the expense required to ensure its success can lead policymakers to seek out other options, such as regime change.
States, of course, could give up on both coercion and regime change and do nothing. But the costs of inaction can also convince policymakers that some kind of action is required. When Ugandan dictator Idi Amin ordered an invasion of Tanzania’s Kagera Salient region, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere concluded that inaction would only encourage Amin’s aggression.36 The same was true for Vietnam, whose 1978 invasion of Cambodia was prompted by the massacre of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians during Khmer Rouge border attacks.37 Policymakers may, therefore, opt for regime change, not because they see it as cheap and effective, but because they have concluded that leaving the leader in power is more costly and ineffective.
Why Policymakers Sometimes Get the Costs Wrong
Although policymakers do not always underestimate regime-change costs, the historical record is full of instances in which policymakers assumed erroneously that they could install a foreign leader at little cost to themselves. Policymakers are especially likely to misjudge the costs of regime change when they rely on the targeted leader’s domestic opposition for intelligence. External and internal opposition groups alike may give rosy estimates of what it will take to dislodge the leader in an effort to convince the more powerful nation to aid them. Saddam Hussein, for example, relied on the advice of exiled Iranian politicians and generals in planning Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran. Eager to recover the livelihoods they had lost, these exiles assured him that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime lacked popular support.38 Saddam thus believed his troops would be greeted as liberators, as did the administration of George W. Bush when American troops invaded Iraq twenty-three years later.
When a foreign power bases its estimates on its own intelligence and/or experience, it is less likely to be led astray by opposition groups seeking foreign assistance. In 1861, for example, Mexican conservatives petitioned the United Kingdom, Spain, and France for assistance in establishing a monarchy, but only France took up their cause. The United Kingdom’s Lord Palmerston explained that, while he believed a monarchy would be “much more stable than a Republic,” he knew that the Mexican conservatives were weak.39 When they had previously approached the British government, “it came out that they required … many millions sterling, and 20,000 European troops to give any chance of success.”40
Still, policymakers may back the domestic opposition for several reasons, even if its claims of a low-cost mission lack credibility. First, when faced with time pressure, policymakers may act on the information available to them rather than take the time to cultivate reliable intelligence. For Napoleon III, the American Civil War created a unique opportunity to install a friendly government in Mexico at a time when the United States could not afford to counter a French invasion.41 Second, if relations between the stronger state and its target have been poor for some time, the stronger state may have withdrawn its representatives, inhibiting its ability to gather intelligence. Without a reliable intelligence network, the foreign power may be forced to rely on third parties, such as the opposition, for its information.
Third, even when the foreign power retains its representatives in the target state, these individuals are likely to have close ties to the opposition if their own government has been at odds with that of the target government. As a result, the information they collect may come directly from the opposition, whether or not policymakers back home realize it. The French minister in Mexico, Alphonse Dubois de Saligny, staunchly opposed the government of Benito Juárez. He played an influential role in convincing Napoleon III that the majority, “if not almost all” Mexicans, looked forward to a European intervention.42 Mexican representatives protested that Dubois not only had never left the capital, and thus could not comment on opinion in the countryside, but also had hosted reactionaries in his home and was influenced by “an exceptional and eccentric minority.”43
Another reason policymakers may underestimate the costs of regime change is that they may overestimate their ability to manage the political turmoil that led to regime change in the first place. The stability and cooperation of the new regime, much like the former one, depends on whether it can eliminate or co-opt its opposition. This opposition could come either from remnants of the former regime or from the same group that plagued the former leader. In Vietnam, for example, the Buddhist activists, whose confrontations with Diem had precipitated the 1963 coup against him, continued to agitate against the post-Diem leadership. The attempts by successive governments to deal with this powerful political force helped inspire many of the coup attempts that followed Diem’s overthrow.44
If the foreign power fails to provide the new leadership sufficient aid to manage these threats, the leader may attempt to survive by buying off the opposition and granting it concessions contrary to the foreign power’s interests. In Afghanistan, for example, former President Hamid Karzai refused to sign a long-term security agreement with the United States, released Taliban militants, and accused American forces of war crimes. It was later revealed that Karzai had been negotiating in secret with the Taliban, whose threat NATO forces had been unable to eliminate.45 Thus, the very domestic instability that inspired the foreign power to pursue regime change in the first place can complicate its attempts to install a stable, cooperative government.46
The task of eliminating or co-opting the new leader’s opposition may be even more difficult when the foreign power seeks to install a democracy. Not only must the new leader build political coalitions across a society that may already be deeply divided, but also democratic norms may limit the leader’s ability to crack down on opposition. Potential opponents to the new regime could take advantage of the greater freedoms a democracy allows, as well as its constraints on the use of force, to organize opposition to it. Even attempts at co-opting the opposition may prove difficult. The opposition may reject these offers if it anticipates it can seize full power simply by waiting for the foreign power to withdraw. In Vietnam, post-Diem rulers avoided cracking down on the Buddhist movement as Diem had done, for fear of suffering the same fate. American policymakers ultimately grew frustrated by the restraint Vietnamese leaders showed and came to favor rulers whose methods were similar to Diem’s.47 Thus, when foreign powers seek to install democracies, their political goals may conflict with their goal for a stable government. The greater the tension between these two aims, the more likely the foreign power is to encounter unexpected costs as it tries to reconcile them.
States may also underestimate costs when imposing democracy because they tend to assume the target population will welcome their efforts. And, indeed, the population may welcome regime change in the wake of a humanitarian crisis or after years of a brutal dictator’s rule. But once that dictator is gone or the crisis is over, opposition groups may begin vying for political power. Even in the relatively successful case of Panama, the heads of the new democratic government began fighting among themselves within a year of Noriega’s removal.48 Domestic groups may not be the only ones to cease cooperation once the dictator is gone or the crisis ends. The foreign power may also lose interest in making the kind of long-term investment necessary to build a viable democratic regime once domestic or international pressure to act has abated. In sum, the foreign power’s actions during the course of a regime change operation can affect just how much the actual costs and success of the operation diverge from expectations.
How Past Failures