Although policymakers sometimes achieve their objectives through regime change at relatively low cost, they also at times find themselves caught in quagmires with little hope of reward. In this chapter, I also address how policymakers estimate costs, why their estimates are sometimes off, and how their goals can influence their odds of success. I also explain why failed missions sometimes convince policymakers to choose a different approach to regime change rather than abandon the task altogether.
Partnering with the Opposition
For states to see regime change as worth their while, they must have some assurance that the opposition in the target state will help them achieve their foreign policy objectives. This is likely to be the case whenever the opposition—internal or external—has preferences that are at least marginally closer than the leader’s preferences to those of the foreign power. Although the foreign power may still have to incentivize the opposition’s compliance, the costs of doing so will be less than the costs associated with coercing the leader. Of the two types of opposition, the external opposition’s preferences are typically closer to those of the foreign power. For this reason, the stronger the external opposition is militarily, the more likely the foreign power will be to use it to carry out full regime change. In the sections that follow, I detail why the external opposition tends to share the foreign power’s preferences and explain why leaders cannot simply change their policies to convince the foreign power to abandon regime change.
Full Regime Change
When a foreign power pursues full regime change, its priority is to transform the target state’s domestic political institutions. By structuring those institutions such that only certain actors can attain political power, the foreign power can ensure that only actors who share its preferences determine policy. At the same time, the foreign power can also ensure that those opposed to its preferences are denied political power, which means that only by overthrowing the political system could they reverse the foreign power’s policies. Full regime change thus increases the likelihood of longer-lasting policy change.
The stronger the external opposition, the more likely it is that the foreign power will collaborate with it to bring about full regime change. External opposition groups are more likely than internal opposition groups to accommodate the foreign power’s policy preferences. Unlike the internal opposition, the external opposition appeals to a different set of supporters from that on which the current leader relies for power. Because the interests of these supporters rarely overlap with those of the leader’s supporters, it is unlikely the foreign power’s demands would harm the interests of this group. Indeed, in some instances, the external opposition’s interests may overlap entirely with those of the foreign power. The external opposition may share an ideology, ethnicity, or religion with the foreign power or adhere to similar political values. Yet, even when neither side shares an identity, the external opposition may view the foreign power as a natural ally due to its shared antipathy for the targeted leader. Because the external opposition is disadvantaged by the existing political system, it may also be able to convince its followers to compromise their policy preferences to attain the foreign power’s help in overthrowing the system. Thus, the same policy changes that the current leader’s supporters would reject might be embraced by the external opposition and its supporters in order to attain power.
The external opposition not only relies on different supporters from the current leader, it also often prefers very different political institutions. External opponents of an authoritarian leader, for example, often prefer more representative institutions that will ensure their power. Opponents vying with a democratic regime, in contrast, often favor more autocratic forms of government to protect their personal interests. In either case, the external opposition’s desire to transform institutions enables it to accommodate the foreign power’s demands in ways neither the current leader nor internal opposition can. Whereas authoritarian leaders might jeopardize their power by relenting to foreign demands for elections, an external opposition group that favors popular rule would face fewer costs when complying with such demands. Indeed, instituting these reforms may be their goal. Though Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega could not hold free and fair elections without risking his political power, his popularly supported opposition was seeking to institute democratic rule and, therefore, could embrace such elections.
Just as it is more costly for dictators to comply with demands to liberalize than it is for their popularly supported opponents, so too is it more costly for popular rulers to accommodate foreign demands for unpopular policies.3 King Charles Albert of Piedmont-Sardinia, who attempted to fashion himself as a popular monarch by instituting representative government, discovered the difficulty of trying to maintain domestic popularity while placating the regional hegemon. In 1848, he went to war against Austria-Hungary to win independence, but after suffering defeat on the battlefield, he accepted an armistice. In the months following the defeat, Charles Albert found himself under domestic political pressure from leftist revolutionaries agitating for a return to war. He relented to their pressure and reneged on the armistice, only to be defeated again by the Austrians. This time, he was forced to abdicate. Learning from his father’s experience, his son suppressed the leftists and restored the monarchy’s power.4
Targeted leaders cannot prevent regime change simply by persuading their supporters that placating the foreign power is an unfortunate necessity. Although the leader could submit to the foreign power’s demands once assured domestic political support, the leader’s supporters will only accept the need for concessions when convinced that resistance is pointless. To convince them of this, the foreign power must threaten to make resistance more costly than compliance. Threats of an invasion accompanied by war preparation measures, for example, might persuade the leader’s supporters that concessions are necessary. But if the foreign power wants to avoid the various costs of those actions, it may never undertake them. Instead, it may avoid the costs of using direct force altogether by using covert or indirect measures to oust the leader. Without a visible or even verbal threat from the foreign power, the leader’s supporters will continue to see capitulation as unnecessary and will punish the leader for conceding. Hence, unlike the external opposition, the leader cannot accommodate the foreign power and dissuade it from pursuing regime change without incurring political costs.
Though partnering with a targeted leader’s external opposition can have its advantages, a foreign power may at times be forced to look elsewhere for help in overthrowing a leader. First, in some instances, the external opposition’s policy preferences may be more opposed to those of the foreign power than to those of the current leader. Such groups may still threaten the leader, prompting the leader to resist the foreign power, but they will be of little help to the foreign power in overthrowing the leader. Second, the external opposition can also be costly to install in power. Even when external opposition groups share the foreign power’s preferences, as political outsiders, they cannot engineer coups from within the political system. The only exceptions are when the leader has already tried to co-opt them by bringing them into the government or when they partner with the internal opposition, which leads the coup. More typically, the external opposition must rely on military force to overthrow the standing regime. This means that outside powers may have to fund an insurgency, support a popular rebellion, or conduct a military invasion to effect full regime change. Due to these potentially high costs, the foreign power’s preference for full regime change depends on the external opposition’s strength. The stronger it is, the more likely the foreign power will pursue full regime change, as long as the external opposition remains marginally more willing than the leader to comply. Otherwise, foreign powers may look for less costly ways to overthrow the targeted leader.
My argument thus far suggests the following testable hypothesis:
H1a4: When a state seeks to effect regime change in another state, it is more likely to