Two theoretical approaches stand out for their ability to explain why states would eschew bargaining and pursue regime change, despite its potentially high costs. The first suggests that actors either ignore or underestimate the costs of replacing foreign regimes. Theories along these lines suggest that either psychological biases or bureaucratic actors and lobbyists mislead policymakers, causing them to underestimate the costs of regime change. The second comes from the rational choice literature, which assumes states are rational unitary actors but face conditions that make bargains impossible to attain. The dominant arguments in this vein stress the problems of credible commitment and incomplete information.
PSYCHOLOGICAL-BIAS ARGUMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC-POLITICS OR INTEREST-GROUP ARGUMENTS
Scholars in the field of international relations have developed a rich body of research aimed at explaining why states end up in costly wars they come to regret. Very few of these arguments focus on regime change per se, but they can be used to explain why FIRC occurs despite its costs to both sides. One prominent strain focuses on the psychological biases that can influence actors’ decision-making. These biases can help us understand why actors might refuse to set aside their beliefs to negotiate with a foreign leader. In his influential writings on misperception, Robert Jervis explains that the desire for “cognitive consistency” can lead actors to disregard information incompatible with their preexisting beliefs.67 Once convinced a target is hostile, policymakers may overlook evidence to the contrary and consider that nation’s concessions to be insincere or unacceptable. They then pursue policies that antagonize the target and make cooperation impossible. Decision makers are especially likely to cling to their beliefs when they are already highly confident in them and face ambiguous situations in which their beliefs cannot be easily refuted.68 Cognitive consistency can also lead actors to hold firm to policies once they have made a decision. After deciding to pursue regime change, for example, policymakers may ignore new evidence that challenges their reasoning or initial cost estimates.69
Psychological bias may also lead policymakers to see regime change as the only effective way to deal with an adversary. When interpreting the source of another person’s actions, human beings have an inherent tendency to attribute any resistance or hostility to the personality, beliefs, or character of that person. In doing so, they tend to overlook the external conditions that could be causing that person’s resistance or hostility, including their own provocations.70 As a result, policymakers may be quick to conclude that the opposing side in a conflict is inherently problematic and that installing a friendly regime is the only effective way to neutralize the threat.71 In short, psychological bias can cloud actors’ judgments, causing those actors to dismiss other policy options and conclude that regime change is the only feasible course of action.
Another alternative explanation for why states end up in costly wars aimed at regime change focuses on the role of influential domestic political actors. Theories of international relations commonly assume that states function as rational unitary actors whose policy is set by a single decision maker. But leaders rely on the counsel of others to arrive at decisions—others who may attempt to steer policy along a course that benefits them personally. In his work on bureaucratic politics, Graham Allison notes that the advice presidents receive may reflect the bureaucratic incentives of their cabinet officials.72 Whether attempting to justify their budgets or enhance their own influence, bureaucrats may be inclined toward solutions that give the departments they represent an advantage. The professional training of these advisers, as well as the culture of their professional organizations, can also shape how they perceive the world and the policies they recommend.73 Military and defense officials, for example, may be more apt to see military force as effective and, thus, advocate regime change, whereas officials schooled in diplomacy may push for negotiations.
Interest groups might also convince leaders to pursue regime change. Lobbyists representing large and politically influential groups can use the threat of political punishment to pressure policymakers into pursuing regime change. When they have close personal or business ties to government officials, lobbyists may also be able to persuade policymakers to serve the lobby’s interests by removing a foreign leader. Jack Snyder, for example, contends that the expansionist policies of many great powers were the result of influential interest groups looking to satisfy their own economic and political interests.74
Arguments based on psychological bias and arguments based on bureaucratic and/or interest-group pressure suggest the following hypotheses with respect to FIRC:
H2: FIRC is more likely to occur between two states engaged in a dispute when psychological bias causes policymakers to view the opposing side’s leader as the source of that dispute.
H3: FIRC is more likely to occur between two states engaged in a dispute when bureaucrats or interest groups push for the removal of the opposing side’s leader.
RATIONAL ACTOR ARGUMENTS
In contrast to arguments that stress misperception as a central cause of conflict, rationalist theories focus on the conditions that engender conflict by causing bargaining to fail. Because my argument incorporates the problems of incomplete information and credible commitment, I do not argue that these explanations are wrong. Rather, I argue that they are insufficient. Actors should be able to resolve information and commitment problems by using signals, coercive force, and enforcement mechanisms. What is critical to determine is when policymakers will employ these measures to attain sustainable bargains.
Arguments relying on the logic of a commitment problem are common in the literature on FIRC. These arguments assert that policymakers pursue regime change because they do not trust the target to cooperate. Reiter, for example, contends that states are more likely to pursue total war, aimed at deposing the target state’s regime, when they anticipate that the current regime will renege on the wartime settlement. By replacing the target regime, the victor can ensure that the vanquished uphold the settlement.75 Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and coauthors argue that leaders who depend on large coalitions for political support (e.g., democratic leaders) are more likely to replace other popularly supported leaders with pliant dictators.76 The authors explain that leaders dependent on public support are obliged to provide their supporters with public goods, such as national security. Such leaders are more likely to depose other popularly elected leaders, because these leaders are equally beholden to their domestic public, and so more likely to renege on settlements that will prove unpopular domestically. Dictators, in contrast, can be bribed into doing a foreign power’s bidding. A commitment problem can also undermine the credibility of the foreign power’s promises. Todd Sechser argues that targeted leaders often resist making concessions because they fear that once they give in, the foreign power will demand more.77
Commitment-problem arguments show that fears of cheating can make sustainable bargains difficult to achieve. However, the question of why states do not use enforcement mechanisms to resolve such fears remains unexplained. Even when targets fear their concessions will be exploited, if the stronger state’s threats are sufficiently credible and punitive, the target should make those concessions to avoid a far worse outcome. My argument holds that states forego enforcement measures because they find them to be more costly than regime change. Another possibility, however, is that under certain conditions, enforcement measures