By early April Beresford was proceeding with his staff to army headquarters at Tomar (some 140 kilometres north of Lisbon) with a view to ascertaining the strength and quality of the troops there and organising new levies in that city. The reorganisation of the Portuguese army was about to begin with the assistance of British officers. In this task he was greatly aided by the arrival of Benjamin D’Urban, whom he made his Quartermaster General and who was to remain an integral part of Beresford’s command structure throughout the war and for some years thereafter.80
Beresford’s approach to the rebuilding of the army was multi-faceted and indeed comprehensive. He directed that each regiment should prepare accurate records of men and equipment.81 He engaged William Warre to translate the British army regulations into Portuguese and these were subsequently published. Immediate implementation of those regulations was begun and Warre reported on 27 April that under the instruction of the British officers the Portuguese troops were ‘coming on very well’.82 The importance of this move was clearly shown when the time came for the British and Portuguese forces to work together. As early as 24 March Beresford had begun to introduce an informal brigading of regiments under British as well as Portuguese officers.83
The use of and performance of the British officers will be dealt with in a later chapter, but Beresford had been authorised initially to engage up to twenty-four such officers (perhaps one for each infantry regiment). That number was to prove woefully inadequate and was considerably augmented in due course, though when Beresford first sought additional officers from the British army the then Commander in Chief, Sir David Dundas, told Wellesley that the King’s instructions were not to exceed the twenty-four initially approved.84 These original appointees were given one step up in the British service and a further step in the Portuguese service; thus a captain became a major in the British service and a Lieutenant Colonel in that of Portugal; at the same time retaining their seniority in the British army. Later appointees only received a step in the Portuguese army. Not all twenty-four original officers came out from England and Cradock was asked to facilitate the move to the Portuguese army of those he could spare who were requested by Beresford. From 9 March onwards these British officers were being appointed in the Portuguese army.85 While Cradock clearly facilitated Beresford in respect of the request for officers, eighteen of the twenty-one who availed of the opportunity to transfer at this time were Lieutenants or Ensigns, whereas what Beresford desperately needed was officers with substantial experience.86 Beresford and Cradock would seem to have got on reasonably well, even if Cradock proved reluctant to move the troops under his command too far from Lisbon, for later Cradock’s only son, John Hobart Cradock, was to serve in Lisbon as Beresford’s aide-de-camp.87
While witness accounts suggest considerable progress with training was made in the first five or six weeks following Beresford’s appointment as Marshal, work was cut short by the need to move the forces north as part of the Anglo-Portuguese campaign against General Soult, which began in May.88
Allied to the introduction of a strenuous training regime, Beresford moved quickly to impose his authority on the army. Nowhere was the lack of discipline and the disregard for authority more forcefully demonstrated within weeks of Beresford’s arrival than in the defence of northern Portugal. Silveira had abandoned Chaves following a disagreement on whether to stand or withdraw from that town in early March, which split his force in two; and he himself proved reluctant to implement Beresford’s order to withdraw south of the Douro with a view to protecting Lisbon, on the basis that his force would be of greater use maintaining itself in and protecting the northern provinces. Further, he argued a number of his officers would desert if he retired south, for nine-tenths of his officer corps were from the two northern provinces (Minho and Trás-os-Montes) and would be unwilling to leave their houses and families to the mercy of the enemy.89
General discipline was imposed forcefully, with even small infractions leading to serious consequences. Court martials became a regular feature, not just for desertion, which was a serious problem, but for other substantial misdemeanours. The Portuguese court martial process was extremely cumbersome and Beresford moved to replace it with a more streamlined version. Once again Beresford approached this subject with a carrot and stick. Exhortation was matched with consequences for failure to obey. This was vital because the lack of discipline was not just a problem in the ranks but had to be tackled at officer level as well; for Beresford was faced with a situation where officers frequently took leave without the permission of their superiors. In the case of desertion the consequences were usually, but not always, dire. He made it clear that a soldier’s duty was to fight for the nation, and a failure would be punished.90 Beresford left no doubt that the practice of soldiers selling equipment was prohibited, and would be punished severely. Likewise, he made it clear to officers that the practice of brutality towards the ranks would not be tolerated and he outlawed it and provided that infractions would be severely punished.
In order to impose a system of immediate justice Beresford demanded the replacement of the Portuguese court martial processes, telling Forjaz that if they were not changed it would be impossible to introduce discipline to the army, declaring that the trial of a deserter which ‘should have taken five minutes took five days’.91 The core of the problem for Beresford was extensive pre-trial and trial processes reduced to writing and the fact that a decision then had to be referred to the Council of War before any sentence was carried out. On his own authority Beresford short-circuited the trial and post-sentence procedures, and it was only some time later that authorisation for his own procedures was received from Prince João, and even then it was limited to when the army was on campaign, though Beresford seems to have continued to apply it in other circumstances.92 In order to get the process under way, Beresford appointed a well established lawyer Judge Advocate for the army, José António de Oliveira Leite de Barros.93
Initial sentences were severe. An early case, which was determined on 20 April 1809, resulted in ten years’ hard labour being imposed on a soldier who refused to march on the basis that it was illegal to move a soldier more than three leagues from his encampment.94 Insubordination could involve a prison sentence, such as the one-year imprisonment in the Torre de Belém imposed on Major Manoel Xavier Botelho in January 1810.95 Desertion usually, but not always, resulted in execution by shooting, as Beresford insisted that the alternative of garrotting be terminated.
Beresford needed to tackle other aspects of army organisation involving both personnel and logistics. Recruitment went on remorselessly under the hand of Forjaz, but with Beresford very often hounding him.96 Where Beresford played a major role involved the removal of non-performing officers and their replacement by either experienced officers from the British service or young, active and interested Portuguese. Many of the latter filled the junior officer ranks initially, but appointments made in the first few years of the war were later to rise to high positions. Beresford showed a determination to promote on merit, which was both feared and admired. On initial enquiry Beresford found that many of the junior officers (captains and lieutenants) had been in situ for upwards of thirty years, or in some cases much longer. Others had risen to command regiments, but they were now too old and in some cases too infirm to face the rigours of a campaign. Some of their appointments had been purely political, with no real intention of pursuing a military career, but in any event many were too old to march with their regiments and deemed incapable of performing the training or leading in battle. The process of weeding out those deemed incapable or unwilling to perform their functions was commenced immediately.
To counter a practice of leave taken on the grounds of illness, Beresford persuaded Forjaz to support the introduction of a system whereby those officers who reported sick had to go before a special board of physicians who in turn reported to a panel of officers empowered to make the decision on whether or not to grant leave.97 Officers who went absent without leave were liable to be demoted to the ranks.98 In March and April 1809, Beresford began the process of remodelling the officer corps of the Portuguese army ultimately reaching a situation where each infantry regiment had a balance of British and Portuguese officers. Nowhere was this more noticeable than at the top of the regimental command structure, where frequently first and second in command would come from different nationalities. The Ordens do Dia (Orders of the Day) reveal the promotions made. Not unnaturally, the promotion of British officers caused some resentment, which Beresford met by assuring the