Remarkably, at the end of January – the very moment the government was considering further involvement in Portugal – it simultaneously recognised the possibility of withdrawal. Following La Coruña and the bringing home of Moore’s army in what must have been a particular low point for British ministers, Castlereagh wrote to Cradock on 28 January 1809 urging him to maintain himself as long as possible in Portugal in order to give the Spanish an opportunity to regroup and to force the enemy to engage in long marches. If Cradock had to withdraw he was to go to Cádiz, if the Spanish wanted the British army there, but if the response was negative he should proceed to Gibraltar.6 Cradock for his part was clearly worried about his ability to maintain a presence in Portugal, and following receipt of the news of the departure of the British army from La Coruña he closed a number of provisioning depots in northern Portugal – at Almeida and Lamego – and sought to concentrate his army of about 10,000 men in and around Lisbon; though the 40th Regiment was garrisoned strategically at Elvas and Brigadier General Charles Stewart, with a force of 2,700, occupied Santarém. British popularity in Portugal was less than universal, with its troops in Lisbon not immune from attack by Portuguese.7
In addition, the departure of a number of the pro-French party in Portugal, whether through going to France with the Portuguese Legion under d’Alorna or from taking sail with Junot, did not mean there was not a pro-French faction still in Portugal. A British observer, the Reverend James Wilmot Ormsby, detected in October 1808 that there was still a strong French party in Lisbon, though in most of the country people detested the French. He noted the joy of the Portuguese at the extermination of the French but added, ‘it does not follow that because they hate them they should love us. Had they behaved with moderation the French might have been hailed as deliverers.’8 The result of this state of affairs was that little rebuilding of either administrative or military structures was achieved in Portugal in the autumn of 1808 and early spring of 1809. Ultimately the Regency would be reformed in the summer of 1809, but before the end of the previous year it had at least recognised that it was incapable of reforming the Portuguese army and sought the assistance of Great Britain to do so.
If Portugal was in a state of chaos in 1808, it is equally clear that its army was not fit for purpose. No discussion of the rebuilding and reform of the Portuguese army would be complete without looking at its historical evolution prior to the Peninsular War and the career of the man who more than any other provided the Portuguese impetus for change, Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.9 Beresford was to prove to be the instrument of reform and the creation of an efficient fighting force was made possible by the provision of financial and material support from Great Britain; but the undertaking and progression of this task owed much to the foresight and determination of Forjaz, one of the Secretaries to the Regency Council. The much maligned General Burrard had identified that nothing would be done in Portugal without a minister ‘equal to the task of instructing, urging and conciliating the government and people’ and Forjaz proved to be that man of vision and determination.10
Forjaz joined the re-established Regency Council as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, War and Marine and remained one of those most influential and supportive of the Anglo-Portuguese war effort throughout the Peninsular War.11 A lack of military organisation and modernisation in the Portuguese army had been identified as far back as the 1790s, and the need for reform had been advocated by Forjaz and some of his compatriots since that time. Following the conclusion of the ‘War of the Oranges’ in June 1801, the appointment of Karl Alexander von der Goltz as Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army led to recommendations for reform aimed at producing a trained and disciplined force, but internal resistance led to Goltz’s departure a year later.12 His short period in Portugal was not without result, for it led to the appointment of a military Commission to examine how the army could be improved, and Forjaz served as Secretary to the Commission. The Commission did not agree a final report and its resolutions were not acted on by the government. Forjaz, however, worked closely with successive Ministers for War and made suggestions for appointments to be made on merit and the reform of logistical support, which had they been acted upon might have reduced the serious problems encountered by the Portuguese army in the Peninsular War. It is likely that the policy of appeasement adopted towards Napoleon by António de Araújo, the Francophile Minister for War from 1804, was an important factor in the failure to address the issues required for the proper defence of the realm.13
Forjaz had been dismissed from the army by Junot, and having withdrawn from public life rather than support the French regime he had been one of the first to become involved in the re-establishment of a Portuguese army under the Supreme Junta of Porto in the summer of 1808. Serving under General Bernardim Freire de Andrade (his cousin), Forjaz sought to introduce many of the reforms he had long advocated for the Portuguese army.14 Relatively little had been achieved in the run up to the defeat of the French in August 1808, and indeed thereafter progress was very slow prior to Beresford’s arrival and appointment as Commander in Chief in the spring of 1809. The combination of Forjaz’s vision and application and Beresford’s commitment to the creation of a well disciplined fighting force, where promotion was based on merit rather than merely birth, meant that over the next few years these two men effectively combined to produce one of the finest armies in Europe.
In the autumn of 1808, the prospect of Portugal possessing an army to be reckoned with in the Napoleonic wars must have seemed remote. In despair the Regency Council reported to Rio in mid October that the country was effectively a demilitarised zone; a rather startling and pessimistic assertion given there were then over 30,000 British soldiers in the country in addition to the Portuguese forces.15 Junot had denuded Portugal of some of its best soldiers by creating the Portuguese Legion under the Marquis d’Alorna.16 The regiments raised by the Supreme Junta of Porto and others in 1808–9 were for the most part badly armed, poorly trained and in some cases lacking in leadership. There was a shortage of money to pay the troops, discipline was weak and there was a chronic lack of supplies. In addition to the troops raised in Portugal in 1808, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion had been formed in England, and this force commanded by Sir Robert Wilson had landed in Porto in the autumn of that year. Made up principally of Portuguese who had escaped from Portugal it consisted of two battalions of infantry and an artillery unit, and the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was to perform useful service until ultimately subsumed into the Portuguese army in 1811.17
The steps taken by the Regency involved a declaration of 30 September recalling all officers retired by Junot to the colours. This step could only have been moderately successful given that many officers had either gone to Brazil with the Court, joined the Loyal Lusitanian Legion or the Portuguese Legion. At the same time a radical move was made in creating six battalions of caçadores (light troops). This decision was not entirely innovative; one such regiment had been created previously under the Marquis d’Alorna as part of the reforms suggested by the members of the military commission, but this had been part of the force dispatched to France designated to become the Portuguese Legion in the service of Napoleon. In October and November, further decrees were issued designed to reorganise the army on previously existing lines, recalling men to their regiments and including a pardon for deserters.18 Forjaz instigated the formation of volunteer regiments in Lisbon in late 1808.
The restored format for the army thus envisaged twenty-four infantry regiments of the line (37,200), six battalions of caçadores (3,768) twelve cavalry regiments (7,128) and four artillery regiments (4,800), giving a regular army of some 52,000 men. In addition, there was theoretically a militia force of comparable size and a levée en masse, known as the ordenança, which could be called out in time of crisis. However, the reality was very different. Early in September a report prepared by Baron Frederick von Decken for the British Government suggested there were in fact 13,272 infantry, 3,384 caçadores, 1,812 cavalry and 19,000 militia.19 Portuguese returns for 26 November 1808 suggested that this figure had risen to 22,361 infantry, 3,422 cavalry, 4,031 artillery and 20,800 militia by that date, but Portuguese historians query the veracity of these and later figures when