Portuguese forces raised in 1808 were lacking in equipment, provisions and discipline.21 A return for 5 January 1809 lists 21,094 infantry but some without arms or uniforms. A theoretical cavalry force of 3,691 could not be put in the field due to a lack of horses, while there was an artillery force of 2,419. The remaining British force under Sir John Cradock amounted to just over 10,000 men, with a rather alarming number of a mere 5,221 effectives. These were centred on Lisbon from whence it was anticipated initially they would sail for England in the event of a major French advance, though later a retreat to Cádiz or Gibraltar was contemplated.22
Furthermore, it is clear from the correspondence of Sir John Cradock with the British Envoy to Lisbon, Sir John Villiers, that the former had been told by Forjaz that the quality of those recalled to the Portuguese army did not greatly impress him and further there were less than 10,000 serviceable arms for the Portuguese forces in mid December.23 At the beginning of the month, Major General MacKenzie, who had just arrived in Lisbon, observed to Castlereagh: ‘I am sorry to say that very little assistance can be relied on from the government of this country. The reestablishment of their military force goes on, but very slowly and without energy.’ Forjaz had told him that there was an extreme lack of arms for both the regular forces and the militia.24 A month later, in early January 1809, Villiers wrote to Canning stating, ‘this part of the Peninsula will fall whenever it is attacked, unless measures for its defence are immediately taken’, going on to add that at present it may be considered as defenceless.25
By February 1809 there were two Portuguese armed forces of any size operational in Portugal together with garrisons in fortresses such as Almeida and Elvas. The larger of the two forces, under the command of Lieutenant General António José de Miranda Henriques, was headquartered at Tomar with the objective of protecting Lisbon. This corps nominally amounted to just under 15,000 regulars and 2,000 cavalry with artillery support. The second force was operative north of the Douro in the provinces of Minho and Trás-os-Montes. This corps was split into two forces, with that under Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade covering Porto and another group under Brigadier General Francisco da Silveira operating in Trás-os-Montes with headquarters in Chaves. The combined total of these two forces was calculated at only 6,444 with some cavalry. It was supplemented by a large force of militia.26
In London, notwithstanding the successful expulsion of the French from Portugal following the battle of Vimeiro, there was recognition by government ministers that the rebuilding of the Portuguese army would require financial assistance. Indeed, even prior to Vimeiro Arthur Wellesley had suggested it would require substantial British help to rebuild the Portuguese army.27 The Government proceeded with caution, given its own requirement for troops to meet disorder at home and the possibility of French invasion. However, Portugal clearly fell into the category of an ally who could and would fight if given the materials to do so. Additionally, both Portugal and Brazil offered important military, naval and economic advantages to Great Britain, just as they would have done to France. The initial decision to give financial aid was communicated to Villiers in November 1808, when it was agreed that cloth for uniforms, leather and materials for 10,000 men would be sent to Portugal. It was to be March 1809 before arms and clothing for this number was in fact delivered to the country.28
Credit should be given to the Regency for recognising the need to bring in outside help in order to reorganise and rebuild the army. By letter of 26 December 1808, Cipriano Ribeiro Freire on behalf of the Portuguese government requested a British officer to reform and rebuild the Portuguese army, and in what proved to be an inspired choice, Beresford was nominated for that position in February 1809.29 The request baldly stated: ‘Present circumstances rendering it extremely desirable that there should be at the head of the Portuguese army a general officer, whose experience and other qualifications may fit him to command the Military Force of this kingdom, whether for its own immediate defense [sic], or for the general cause and liberty of the Peninsula …’30 That the decision to send a British general to help build the Portuguese army was taken at all, let alone within weeks following the retreat to and evacuation from La Coruña, is perhaps remarkable but shows a determination not to allow the hard-earned fruits of the victory at Vimeiro to slip away. Indeed, the decision when first announced was ridiculed by some who expressed the view that Lisbon would be in French hands before the appointee could reach the Tagus.31
How and why was Beresford chosen by the Duke of Portland’s administration to reform and rebuild the Portuguese army? The decision was made within a month of the request being received by the government in London, surely indicating an understanding at cabinet level of the imminent dangers facing Portugal and a wish to capitalise on the military success of the 1808 campaign in that country. Beresford’s appointment was no racing certainty. While no specific general was requested by the Portuguese, Villiers was told privately that Wellesley would be most welcome.32 It is unclear whether Wellesley indicated that he was not interested, but in any event Castlereagh felt he was too valuable to be put forward for the job and opposed his appointment.33 Lieutenant General Sir John Doyle’s name was mentioned, probably at the behest of the Duke of York. He was senior to Wellesley, so it was perhaps as well that this suggestion was not implemented, as it would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to appoint Wellesley commander of all Allied forces a month later. There were certainly more senior candidates than Beresford, a relatively junior Major General. Canning favoured Sir John Moore, but by the last week of January news of his demise had reached London. Canning then appears to have decisively supported Beresford’s nomination, explaining that his appointment was due not only on account of his military ability but because of his knowledge of Portugal and the Portuguese people and language.34 Further factors leading to his selection may have included the interest Beresford had shown in training Portuguese infantry while in Madeira, and his own recommendations for the creation of a modern Portuguese army shortly after arriving in Portugal in 1808, before leaving for Spain with Sir John Moore’s army.35
The decision to appoint Beresford seems to have been the result of strong support from Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, at this time Minister for War and the Colonies and an ally of the Wellesleys. Castlereagh had also been born in Ireland in the same year as Arthur Wellesley (1769), just one year after Beresford. In his seminal work on the Peninsular War, Sir Charles Oman hypothesised as to whether Wellesley had had any influence on the appointment.36 Certainly Wellesley and Beresford were on good terms and remained so throughout the war, as is ascertainable not just by their mode of familiar address but by Wellington’s frequent exchanges with Beresford, whether in person or through correspondence.37 Furthermore, the rebuilding of the Portuguese army with British assistance was the subject of a proposal which Wellesley had put forward in the summer of 1808, as part of a plan to secure Portugal from the French and give support to the various Spanish armies. Wellesley foresaw that the combined numbers of a rebuilt Portuguese army with a British army in Portugal would give this alliance a very strong say in the conduct of the war.38 While there seems to be no irrefutable evidence that Wellesley played a hand in Beresford’s nomination, Sir Charles Oman’s speculation that the appointment was part of a plan by Castlereagh and Wellesley to involve another of the Anglo-Irish Tory coterie is an attractive theory.39 A further factor which may have assisted Beresford’s appointment was the relationship by marriage of his father with the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland.40
Beresford was nominated less than two weeks after his return from La Coruña.41 Napier suggested that parliamentary interest was the deciding factor in Beresford’s appointment and that this caused great discontent amongst those officers of superior rank.42 If there is justification in Napier’s assertion that the appointment arose through parliamentary influence, then it would not be the first or last occasion such appointments were due to political influence. Beresford’s Strictures, written in the 1830s in response to Napier’s suggestion, make some relevant points regarding the appointment. Those fall into two categories: The first concern his previous experience in Portugal and Spain, which involved his tenure as Governor of Madeira, his nomination as a commissioner to implement the Convention of Cintra by Dalrymple, whom Beresford did not know, and his selection by Sir John Moore to cover the retreat and embarkation at La Coruña.43 The second point Beresford makes is that in 1809, after his return from La Coruña, he had hoped to visit his family in Ireland, a family which he had not seen much of since 1793; but that when summoned by Castlereagh