Beresford’s reputation as an able administrator and a strict disciplinarian appear likely to have been factors in his appointment, combined with qualities already referred to here. While Canning was now committed to the defence of Portugal, he was under no illusions as to the challenge faced by Beresford, referring to it as an ‘arduous and difficult undertaking’. It involved placing a British army officer in a position of power in a country with different laws, a fractured government, a divided society, a different religion, and different customs and climate. The appointment was to give him command of the Portuguese army, but on the basis that Beresford was to be subject to the overall command of the commander in chief of the British forces in Portugal. As such he was thrown into a complex series of relationships where political, economic and military factors fell to be decided by a number of parties who were sometimes geographically distant, personally jealous and whose policies were not perfectly aligned. The lack of any meaningful central authority with the ability to make things happen in Portugal had to be altered, and it is a tribute to Forjaz, Wellington and Beresford that an efficient war machine was created over relatively few years. That this could be achieved in the face of French military might was doubted by many at the outset and Beresford himself expressed the view that it was not impossible, indeed not improbable that he would go to and return from Portugal given the state of affairs there.45
The Portuguese had requested an officer of the rank of Lieutenant General to command their army. Beresford, whom we have seen had only been promoted to Major General in 1808, was made up to Lieutenant General ‘during the time in which he shall be employed the [sic] command of the Portuguese forces’.46
Beresford arrived in Lisbon on 2 March 1809 after an eight-day voyage, during which his vessel ‘missed the French fleet by little’.47 While it was rumoured that the French were on their way back to Portugal he found the Portuguese in high spirits and full of enthusiasm.48 Five days later he was appointed Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army. He wrote to Charles Stewart, brother of Castlereagh and soon to be Wellington’s adjutant general in the Peninsula, explaining that he had not wished to be made a Marshal, but that the Portuguese had insisted that this was necessary for the command of the army. Beresford’s suggestion that he be appointed a Lieutenant General in the Portuguese army would not give him command of that army because it contained a considerable number of Lieutenant Generals already, all of whom would have been senior to Beresford and thus would have had command over him.49 Probably wisely, Beresford determined that the terms of his appointment and the extent of his authority required clarification before he took up his duties. In particular, he was understandably anxious to establish that he would have authority over all military appointments and promotions and it was only when agreement on this point and his ability to discipline those who would not obey commands was secured that he moved to finalise his appointment.50 Indeed, he had stressed the necessity of such powers in a paper sent to Castlereagh in early February prior to taking up his appointment.51 As a result it was a further week before he formally took command of the Portuguese forces on 15 March.52
The Portuguese may have been full of enthusiasm but Beresford found the army, both officers and men, in a state of insubordination, to such an extent that officers no longer gave orders and if they did so, there was no certainty they would be obeyed.53 Hence his initial task was to get control of the army. It is not therefore surprising that in his first Order of the Day (Ordem do Dia) Beresford made it clear that discipline and subordination would be key elements of his command and in a carrot and stick approach he stated that he had confidence in the Portuguese people and their ability to build an army as good as any in Europe. Sensing perhaps potential distrust of a foreigner he specifically asserted that he was a ‘Portuguese Officer, and to the Portuguese he confers his honour and his reputation.’ 54 Serving the Portuguese crown while bearing in mind Britain’s interests was to be a challenging task for Beresford over the next eleven years.55
The means of instilling discipline and authority, combined with ensuring the ability to fight as a unit through understanding and training in military regulations, was the introduction of British officers into the Portuguese regiments. This had been agreed with Castlereagh before Beresford’s departure from England, though at the time neither had perhaps envisaged the number of officers which would be required or the consequences of the inducement to be offered to those officers. Beresford had travelled with a small personal staff to Portugal. These included William Warre of the Anglo-Portuguese wine family, and Robert Arbuthnot, who had served with him previously in South America, Madeira and in the campaign of 1808–9 ending at La Coruña. Arbuthnot was now to serve Beresford as ADC and military secretary until the close of the war. Soon after taking up his appointment in Lisbon, Beresford was to make a number of appointments which not only established the way he intended to work, through a combination of British and Portuguese working together, but which were to endure throughout the war and beyond in many cases.56 His four adjutants were the aforementioned Major William Warre, who had been born in Porto and was able to speak and write Portuguese fluently, Captain William H. Sewell, Captain Conde de Lumiares and Captain Dom José Luiz de Sousa.57 In addition he appointed Manuel de Brito Mosinho as Adjutant General of the army and António de Lemos Pereira de Lacerda his Portuguese military secretary. Both of these men were to play a vital part in keeping the show on the road over the ensuing years.58
On arrival in Portugal in March 1809, Beresford was faced with a theoretically unified command but in practice a series of small forces operating of necessity independently. In addition to being poorly armed, clothed and fed, many regiments fell far short of a full complement. A report of 10 March 1809 sent to the Prince Regent contained an appendix purporting to set out the real state of the Portuguese army. In effect it identified an army based north of Lisbon to guard the city of some 16,000 with 7,500 militia under Lieutenant General António José de Miranda Henriques, and a second army of some 6,000 with 12,000 militia designed to protect Porto and the north under Bernardim Freire.59 There were in addition garrisons in various forts and forces of a lesser size in the southern provinces. That report made no reference to the Loyal Lusitanian Legion but in any event in view of the steps subsequently taken to raise regiments and fill existing regiments, the figures are suspect.60 Later, following the efforts of Forjaz and Beresford combined, with the financial assistance of the British government, the annual size of the army including artillery and policemen has been calculated at between 48,000 and 53,500 during the period 1809–11.61
The moulding of a well-disciplined fighting force required experienced officers with the ability to drill and train recruits. Beresford secured these by obtaining their secondment from the British army, while simultaneously enforcing the retirement of those Portuguese officers not up to the task and promoting promising younger officers within the Portuguese service.62 Obtaining men of fighting age necessitated an efficient recruiting system combined with a commissary to feed, clothe, arm and pay the soldiers. These requirements meant Beresford had to persuade the Portuguese political (both in Portugal and Brazil) and military establishment of the potential benefits if he was to make substantial progress. Self-evidently, the task could not be achieved in the short term, not least because the country was in the course of being invaded for the second time in three years, and steps needed to be taken to meet that threat. Nevertheless, immediate actions were taken which ensured the incremental improvement of the army over a surprisingly short period of time.
History did give Beresford one advantage. There had been a practice of foreigners being brought in to advise and indeed to command the Portuguese army in times of crisis. The British had sent the Marquis de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, to assist the Portuguese during the war of the Spanish Succession. In the mid-eighteenth century, during the Seven Years War (1756–63), the Portuguese had engaged the Prussian General the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe to command their army. He effected considerable reforms with the help of British and Prussian officers, but on his dismissal many of these changes were reversed, as inimical to the ruling elite. A further attempt to reform the Portuguese army took place after reverses in the war of 1801, ‘The War of the Oranges’, led to Portugal giving up possession of Olivença and its surrounding territory to Spain.63 Reference has already been made to a military commission established in the autumn of 1801 to advise