Promoted rank was only one of the problems facing Beresford in his effort to establish a committed officer corps in the Portuguese army. At the other end of the scale he had to deal with those whose primary interest was promotion rather than being part of the great drive to reform the Portuguese army, and he did not hesitate to refuse commissions.16 The process whereby an officer might transfer from one service to another was straightforward, save that it depended on the preparedness of the commanding officer of the British regiment in question to agree that he could spare the man seeking to make the move. The correspondence is littered with requests where consent by Wellesley is followed by correspondence with regimental commanding officers resulting in agreement or refusal to let a man transfer.17 This would seem to be indicative that the one step promotion in the Portuguese service only was sufficiently attractive to lure a considerable number of officers to transfer, for by the end of the war upwards of 300 had done so.18
The appointment of British officers to train and discipline the troops was only one facet of the challenge facing Beresford. He also had to remove Portuguese officers lacking in ability from causes such as incompetence and physical infirmity. At the outset there is little doubt that the British view of the calibre of many of the Portuguese officers was not complimentary. Warre expressed it thus: ‘The officers for the most part, are detestable, mean, ignorant and self sufficient. It is incredible the little mean intrigues, the apathy, and want of military sentiment, the Marshal has had to work against. Nothing but a very severe discipline can overcome these, and which I hope he will follow.’19 He did, however, acknowledge the promise of the young Portuguese officers.20
The testimony of Warre, while it may well reflect national prejudice, is important because he and his family spent much time in Portugal. He understood the language and was sympathetic to the cause. He was certainly not biased against the Portuguese nation, as is revealed by his complimentary remarks regarding their troops in general from an early date, recognising their potential:
The Portuguese troops immediately under the instruction of British Officers are coming on very well. I could have wished we had been allowed more time, but even now have great hopes of some corps. The men may be made anything we please of, with proper management, and, wherever I have had authority, I have soon settled the little mean jealousies and tricks of the officers, and without, I hope, gaining much ill will. I will endeavour to combine inflexible firmness with politeness of manner. I know it is the only way to make these fellows respect you, and the mass of officers is miserable indeed. This, however, will in time be altered. Merit is the great recommendation with the General, not grey hairs and numbers of years service, however much to be respected, for these subalterns, some of whom should be anything but soldiers.21
The reformado (retired) Portuguese officers were replaced not just by British officers but by mostly young Portuguese now being trained by the British. Between the time of his appointment as Commander in Chief in March and the end of July 1809, at least 215 Portuguese officers were retired and replaced by a combination of British and Portuguese officers. While this caused disquiet in Portugal, critically Forjaz stood by Beresford. Though many of the newly appointed Portuguese were at the levels of lieutenant and captain, from the outset Beresford seems to have attempted to strike a balance in the upper echelons of each Portuguese infantry regiment; so that where the Lieutenant Colonel was British the Major would be Portuguese, or vice versa. Thus infantry brigades were commanded by those such as Ashworth, Bradford, Campbell and Pack, as well as Lecor, Fonseca, Palmeirim and Bernardim Ribeiros. The cavalry commanders were Hawker, Madden, Póvoa and Barbacena. The artillery was under the command of Colonel Alexander Dickson, who was later to play a pivotal role for Wellington in the liberation of Spain and the invasion of France. Major General John Hamilton was appointed Inspector-General of the army, and from early 1810 was to command the ‘Portuguese’ Division formed in late 1809. That division was made up of two or sometimes three Portuguese brigades and usually served with the 2nd Division. The Conde de Sampãio was appointed Inspector-General of the cavalry in April 1809.
The process of making appointments to the Portuguese army was a little cumbersome, for while in theory all promotions were in the hands of Beresford, as Commander in Chief, they were subject to the approval of the Regent, Prince João. This meant that recommendations had to be sent to Brazil and then confirmed, a process which of necessity took a number of months. Until a confirmation was received the promotion remained conditional. The process also gave rise to another serious issue, for in August 1810 Beresford discovered that members of the Regency were making their own recommendations to Prince João without reference to Beresford. The Prince Regent having made appointments not sought by Beresford, the Marshal protested in the strongest terms against those advancements, requiring Forjaz to withdraw the recommendations in question and to undertake not to interfere in this aspect in future.22 Further issues arose concerning appointments which Prince João was persuaded to make by those at Court, but Beresford brooked no opposition to his control of promotions; no more than he had on the question of discipline and the court martial process.23
Likewise, Beresford insisted that he, and he alone, should determine whether any Portuguese or British officer be allowed to resign from the Portuguese service. It was not merely a matter for the officer in question. When a specific issue arose in the shape of the attempt by Francisco de Mello to resign his commission, Wellesley supported Beresford’s authority to determine the application. Forjaz also agreed that this was a matter within the Marshal’s remit, but even then Beresford insisted on getting a ruling from the Prince Regent in Brazil. and his authority was confirmed on 17 May 1810, some five months after de Mello had sought to resign. This interval shows just how long it took to obtain a decision when a matter was referred to Rio de Janeiro, and of course consideration of an issue might mean it could be many months before a decision was made. However, on this occasion another issue fundamental to Beresford’s authority over the army had been resolved in his favour.24
Relations between British and Portuguese officers varied, depending on the individuals involved. Although there were some serious incidents of both disobedience and personal antagonism, the records suggest that these were not widespread. Some of these stories involve merely personal disagreements; others breaches of discipline. Disobedience was not a one-way street and there are recorded instances of British officers being unwilling to submit to orders from Portuguese senior officers while training and in camp. One example of personal antagonisms (there is insufficient evidence to class it as a nationally motivated attack) and three examples of conflict in the course of training and on the battlefield will give a flavour of the sort of breakdown that might occur.
Edward Costello tells a most amusing story in his memoirs. He had gone to purchase rum at the headquarters of the 52nd Regiment when he fell in with a rather quarrelsome soldier from the 3rd Caçadores on his return. The Portuguese soldier threatened Costello with his bayonet whereupon Costello struck him hard. Other caçadores then approached Costello, allegedly yelling ‘kill the English dog’. Just in time a party of men from the 52nd appeared and rescued Costello.25
The first example of a breakdown in discipline concerns the unfortunate Major James Warde Oliver, a Lieutenant Colonel attached to the 10th Portuguese Regiment of line, and who was to die later at the second siege of Badajoz. In October 1809 he was accused of abusing officers, tearing the epaulettes off the shoulders of one of them and striking soldiers in the Regiment. He denied abusive conduct, though agreeing that he might have spoken harshly in the field where necessary in order to gain the confidence