The news of the British victory over the French at Vimeiro reached England on 1 September and resulted in much celebration, as it was presented as a complete victory.83 The content of the definitive Convention arrived in England with Dalrymple’s letter of 3 September 1808 headed ‘Cintra’ on 15 September.84 Church bells were again rung and cannon fired but jubilation soon turned to anger and recrimination. Dalrymple gave his reasons for entering into the Convention rather than continuing hostilities. These were: first, the time of year and the ability of the enemy to consume much time in the defence of strong places in the absence of a convention, and secondly, when terms had been agreed for the armistice Sir John Moore had not arrived with his army, and he had doubts about the ability to land such a large army on an open and dangerous beach. While of course Dalrymple did not at the time of negotiating the Convention possess either Lisbon or the Tagus Estuary, Wellesley had already landed an army at least as big as that of Moore on the beaches about the Mondego estuary.
A storm of protest was launched by the Whig opposition in parliament, and in the media, where Whig publications were perhaps surprisingly joined by their Tory counterparts. Within days of the news becoming widespread, condemnatory editorials were joined by satirical poems and commentary of a highly critical nature. Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage and Wordsworth’s tract Concerning the Convention of Cintra will forever live in the minds of English-speaking peoples interested in the topic because of who they were and the quality of their writing, but the daily and weekly press contained a plethora of amusing and sometimes vicious poetry, prose and caricatures, of which it is noticeable featured Wellesley as much as Burrard and Dalrymple.85 This may well have been because Wellesley’s brother, Richard, was part of the government and thus an objective to attack by opposition supporters.86
Part of the responsibility for the build up of public anger may have been that not only of Arthur Wellesley but also politicians at home ‘over egging’ the nature of the victory at Vimeiro. Newspaper reports were full of statements to the effect that this was the end of Napoleonic tyranny in Portugal and Spain and that the battle was more significant than that of Trafalgar, in that it had shown French troops were not invincible.87 Some eleven days before the arrival of Dalrymple’s dispatch containing the definitive terms of the Convention, the cabinet was aware of the terms of the armistice because the Bishop of Porto had furnished these to the Portuguese Minister in London, who in turn had drawn them to the attention of George Canning to whom he made a formal protest.88 Canning and others found it difficult to believe the veracity of these statements and the government did not publicise the true nature of the agreement until the terms were printed in the Gazette on 16 September. As one British soldier put it, the news occasioned a ‘political electric shock’.89
The Whig opposition had been lukewarm in its support of the war with France. There was, however, a very keenly held view that the terms of the Convention were not only foolish but inimical to the interests of Portugal and Spain. Wordsworth, who had previously exhibited republican sympathies, tried along with others to hold a meeting in Cumbria with a view to submitting an address to the King on the subject, and it was probably only when this stratagem failed that he turned to writing his tract.90
For the Whigs, ‘Cintra’ was a heaven-sent opportunity to attack the Tories and the government found themselves in some difficulty. As unpalateable as it seemed, the convention could not in reality be abandoned, though Canning wrote to Bathurst, Percival and others, including the King, railing against it. In that correspondence he argued that Britain should repudiate those parts of the convention repugnant to the Portuguese and not within the competence of a military commander.91 There were comparisons drawn with the loss of Minorca in 1756, following which Admiral John Byng had been court martialled and shot, and the debacle at Buenos Aires leading to Whitelocke’s court martial in 1808.92
The government moved quickly, Castlereagh recalling Dalrymple on 17 September to England to explain his conduct. In his letter Castlereagh made the point that His Majesty was disappointed with certain Articles of the Convention which were deeply upsetting to England’s allies and stating that no ally should be exposed to an injury so offensive under the countenance of a British army.93 The uproar was such that Richard Wellesley advised his brother to return home, which Arthur did, taking leave of the army on the basis that his duties in Ireland required him there.94 Wellesley’s own trumpeting of his success at Vimeiro, which he called a ‘complete victory’ with only half his army over ‘the whole of the French force in Portugal’, was now coming home to roost.95 The government realised that it was in danger of being blamed for the terms of the Convention and that if it did not investigate the matter further, the public would hold it responsible. While recognising the fait accompli, it was decided to establish a Board of Inquiry. On 1 November, the King ordered the establishment of an Inquiry into the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, the causes and circumstances which led to them, and into ‘the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of the said Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and any other officer or officers who may have held the command of our troops in Portugal’.96 General Sir David Dundas was appointed President and six other experienced soldiers and statesmen nominated to the Board.97
The Inquiry sat from 14 November to 27 December 1808 at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea. It took evidence from Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley, the three principal officers present in Portugal at the time the Armistice and Convention were negotiated and signed; as well as from a number of more junior staff officers. A voluminous amount of documentation was submitted to the Inquiry and this was listed in its Report placed before the House of Commons in January 1809.98
In essence, Dalrymple gave as his evidence that his instructions and objective had been to get the French out of Portugal and cut off their retreat to Spain, so as to enable the British army to assist Spain. Bearing in mind that Junot still had an intact army and held strong positions, combined with the difficulties of holding his provisioning fleet on station, he felt this was best achieved by the Convention. He not unreasonably pointed out that he had consulted his Lieutenant Generals, including Burrard and Wellesley, and that none of them had objected to the terms as eventually settled (there had been considerable negotiation).99 Where he differed from Wellesley was in his assertion that Wellesley had been involved in the negotiation of the Armistice. Dalrymple also felt that Burrard had played no great part in the negotiation of the Armistice.
Burrard gave evidence to the effect that he felt the army was exhausted after the battle of Vimeiro. It suffered from a lack of provisions and its cavalry was heavily outnumbered by the French and any advance as it approached Lisbon would be entering countryside more favourable to cavalry. He had therefore ordered a halt, anticipating in due course the arrival of Sir John Moore with a substantial force.
Wellesley had moved to distance himself from the terms of the Convention while still in Portugal. On his arrival in London he made it very clear that he had not approved the terms of the Armistice.100 He maintained that while he had favoured an advance following the victory at Vimeiro, Burrard’s decision to halt was not unreasonable. Further, while Wellesley had favoured such an advance with a view to cutting off the French from Lisbon, he pointed out that was in no way incompatible with his support for an armistice and convention when the circumstances had changed on 22 August, for by then the French