The Canadian component of the FSSF, however, proved to be problematic for the Canadian government. Facing a manning shortage resulting from a conscription crisis, the continuing demands to provide reinforcements for the FSSF, which was difficult to administer and in the context of the dying days of the war was also arguably redundant, prompted the Canadian government to make a simple decision. The time had come to pull the Canadians from the force. As such, the FSSF was disbanded at Menton on December 5, 1944.
The disbandment of the FSSF was not surprising. As the tide of the war shifted in favour of the Allies, who by late 1942 had begun to field large modern armies, SOF evolved to provide specific capabilities not resident with the larger conventional military and perform distinct tasks such as raiding, sabotage, and economy-of -effort missions to tie down enemy forces. These activities were soon eclipsed by tasks such as strategic reconnaissance and unconventional warfare. But even at that, the Allied strategy had become a very attritional conventional approach, much akin to a large steamroller simply flattening the opposition before it. As such, the precision and special capabilities provided by SOF were neither required nor appreciated by most senior military commanders.
In the end, despite the overall success and value of special operations, SOF never received full acceptance from the larger military community.[68] The irregular nature of their tactics, the unconventional, if not rakish nature of the operators, who were often seen as lacking discipline and military decorum, as well as the almost independent status of the SOF organizations, were alien and distasteful to the more traditional and conservative-minded military leadership. Not surprisingly, at the end of the war, as already noted, most SOF organizations were disbanded.
Canada was no different. In fact, Lieutenant-General McNaughton provided a clear picture of his perception of SOF. “I have watched with interest the organization here [in England] of such special units as Commandos, Ski Battalions and Paratroops,” he noted. He concluded, “The cycle is always the same — initial enthusiasm which is very high, drawing good officers and men from regular units, distracting and unsettling others, and upsetting the units’ organization.” As a result, he clearly stated his opposition to the formation of such units.[69]
Not surprisingly then, as noted, all Canadian SOF units were disbanded by September 1945. However, a brief breath of air seemed to rekindle the flames of a national SOF capability in 1947. Former members of the SOE, FSSF and 1st Cdn Para Bn developed a plan to resurrect a distinct Canadian SOF entity. Their methodology was as shadowy as the unit they intended to build.
The long, costly global struggle had taken its toll and a debt-ridden and war-weary government was intent on creating a post-war army that was anything but extravagant. Notwithstanding the military’s achievements during the war, the Canadian government articulated two clear requirements for its peacetime army. First, it was to consist of a representative group of all arms of the service. Second, its primary purpose was to provide a small but highly trained and skilled professional force that in time of conflict could expand and train the citizen soldiers who would fight that war. Within this framework, SOF had no relevance.
As the army worked feverishly at demobilizing and at the same time creating the structure for the post-war Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the commanding officer of the small Canadian Parachute Training Centre in Shilo, Manitoba, became instrumental in the next phase of Canadian SOF.[70] He selectively culled the ranks of the disbanded 1 Cdn Para Bn, which also included those from the FSSF. Quite simply, he chose the best from the pool of personnel who had decided to remain in the active force to act as instructors and staff for his training establishment.
Devoid of any direction from army headquarters, the CO and his staff focused on making contacts and keeping up to date with the latest airborne developments. These prescient efforts were soon to be rewarded. It was the perpetuation of links with Canada’s closest allies, as well as the importance of staying abreast of the latest tactical developments in modern warfare, specifically air-transportability , that provided the breath of life that airborne and SOF advocates were searching for.
Not surprisingly, Canadian commanders were looking abroad for the way ahead in the post-war environment. In 1947, a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) study revealed that British peacetime policy was based on training and equipping all infantry formations to be air-transportable . Discussions with allies quickly ascertained that both the British and Americans would welcome an airborne establishment in Canada that would be capable of filling in the “gaps in their knowledge” — specifically in areas such as the problem of standardization of equipment between Britain and the United States, and the need for experimental research into cold weather conditions. To its allies, Canada was the ideal intermediary.
Canadian military leaders quickly realized that co-operation with their closest defence partners would allow the country to benefit from an exchange of information on the latest defence developments and doctrine. For the airborne and SOF advocates, a test facility would allow the Canadian military to stay in the game. In the end, for the sake of efficiency of manpower and resources, NDHQ directed that the parachute training and research functions reside in a single Canadian joint army/air training centre. As a result, on August 15, 1947, the Joint Air School (JAS), in Rivers, Manitoba, was established.
The JAS became the “foot in the door.” It was responsible for the retention of skills required for airborne and, with some ingenuity, special operations, for both the army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). More important, the JAS, which was renamed the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre (CJATC) on April 1, 1949, provided the seed from which a SOF organization would eventually grow.[71]
The hidden agenda of the airborne advocates quickly took root. Once the permanent structure of the army was established in 1947, they quickly pushed to expand the airborne capability within the JAS by submitting a proposal in the spring for a Canadian special air service (SAS) company.[72] This new organization was to be an integral sub-unit of the army component of the JAS with a mandate of filling army, inter-service , and public duties such as army/air tactical research and development; demonstrations to assist with army/air training; airborne firefighting; search and rescue; and aid to the civil power.[73] Its development, however, proved to be quite different, as its name implies.
The initial proposal for the special sub-unit prescribed a clearly defined role. The army, which sponsored the establishment of the fledgling organization, portrayed the SAS Company’s inherent mobility as a definite asset to the public at large for domestic operations. A military appreciation written by its proponents argued the need for the unit in terms of its potential benefit to the public. It explained that the specially trained company would provide an “efficient life and property[-]saving organization capable of moving from its base to any point in Canada in ten to fifteen hours.”[74] Furthermore, the Canadian SAS Company was framed as critical in working in support of the RCAF air search/rescue duties required by the International Civil Aviation Organization agreement.
The proposed training plan further supported this image. The training cycle consisted of four phases broken down as follows: 1) tactical research and development (parachute related work and field[-]craft skills); 2) airborne firefighting; 3) air search and rescue; and 4) mobile aid to the civil power (crowd control, first aid, military law).[75] Conspicuously absent was any mention of commando or specialist training, which the organization’s name suggested. After all, the Canadian SAS Company was actually titled after the British wartime Special Air Service, which earned a reputation for daring commando operations behind enemy lines.
In September 1947, the request for approval for the sub-unit was forwarded to the deputy chief of the General Staff. Significantly, it now had two additional roles added to it — public service in the event of a national catastrophe; and provision of a nucleus for expansion into parachute battalions. However, the proposal also noted that the SAS Company was required to provide the manpower for the large programme of test and development that was underway by the Tactical Research and Development Wing, as well as demonstration teams for all demonstrations within and outside