No Ordinary Men. Bernd Horn

to the war against terrorism and will continue to be an important part of our domestic security.”[111]

      Similarly, General Ray Henault, the CDS at the time, asserted, “The presentation of the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation to members of JTF 2 brings important recognition to a group of incredible CAF members whose accomplishments normally cannot be publicly recognized in the interest of national security.”[112] He concluded, “Canadians should be very proud of this specialized Canadian military unit.”[113]

      The importance of the mission and the recognition of the CANSOF contribution was also evident in the governmental decision to increase the size and capability of JTF 2. The MND quickly realized the strategic impact, at a relatively low cost, that even a small SOF task force could achieve. As such, he pushed for expansion.[114]

      Despite the great effort and incredible results, the JTF 2 initial deployment to Afghanistan ended rather quickly. By late 2002, with the Taliban largely routed and the country entering what appeared to be a period of relative calm, Canada withdrew all of its forces from Afghanistan. However, it returned the following year as a contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. As part of the redeployment, Canadian SOF also maintained a footprint in the form of a Joint Liaison Team-Afghanistan (JLT-A ) in theatre.

      But the winds of change were blowing. On December 24, 2004, the Americans requested Canada to deploy another Canadian SOTF as early as possible. The request affirmed that Canada’s previous SOF contribution to OEF in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 “was highly valued by the United States” Moreover, it confirmed “that relatively small numbers of special operations forces exert a disproportionately large operational impact.”

      This was no surprise, since JTF 2’s performance had elicited praise from the American ambassador, Paul Cellucci. He publicly stated, “Canada’s elite Tier 1 JTF 2 is as capable as any Tier 1 [s]pecial [f]orces in the world [and it] makes a significant contribution whenever deployed.”[115]

      The request was strongly supported by both the CDS, General Rick Hillier, and the deputy minister, W.P.D. Elcock. They explained, “The deployment of Canadian special operations forces to Afghanistan would make evident our ongoing commitment to an active engagement in the Campaign Against Terrorism and it would also demonstrate our direct burden sharing with our closest allies.”

      The deployment was also in consonance with ongoing strategic object­ive for the CAF in the global war on terrorism. The deployment would assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing security and stability in the country and in supporting reconstruction activities; it would assist with the elimination of al-Qaeda , the Taliban, and other anti-coalition militants, as continuing terrorist threats to international peace and security; and it would support efforts to address the humanitarian needs of Afghans.

      The high-level support was not surprising. After all, the leadership were now well-versed in the strength of the unit. “One of my first visits,” acknowledged General Hillier, “was to Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2), our special forces unit based near Ottawa, no strangers to me after the many operations.” He explained, “JTF 2 troopers are the Olympic athletes of soldiering, our version of gold medalists, taking on the most difficult missions and tasks with a level of skill and professionalism that has earned the respect of special forces units around the world. Like the U.S. Delta Force or the British Special Air Service (SAS), they get the most dangerous and demanding of missions, from hostage rescues to acting as bodyguards for VIPs (like me!) to operating for long periods of time on their own in enemy territory.”[116]

      With such endorsement, the Government of Canada authorized the deployment of a JTF 2 SOTF to Afghanistan in support of OEF on June 1, 2005. Its mission was “to conduct combat operations in the Afghanistan theatre of operations (ATO) in support of U.S.-led operation Enduring Freedom for a period of one year.” CANSOF was back at war.

      Later that year, a JTF 2 SOTF was back in country supporting OEF. Although originally committed for only a year, the mandate was continually extended, lasting in the end until the end of Canadian operations in Afghanistan in 2011. Their mission, however, remained largely unchanged. General Hillier affirmed that Canadian SOF had established a presence on Afghanistan battlefields and that they were effective disrupting the Taliban leadership.[117] He declared, “What we want to do is take out the [Taliban] commanders who are engaged in orchestrating, facilitating, paying, leading, planning, and driving folks to attack us or attack the Afghans or attack the innocent.” He added, “And our special forces are focused very much on that.… I said, during a recent speech, that we had removed from the battlefield six commanders who were responsible for the deaths of [twenty-one ] Canadian soldiers.” Hillier explained, “Well that’s changed. We’ve removed seven commanders who have been responsible for the deaths of [twenty-seven ] soldiers.”[118]

      Canadian scholars have reinforced Hillier’s declarations. A team studying operations in Kandahar Province noted that “insurgent operations in 2007 were increasingly characterized by lack of co-ordination and poor planning, which could be attributed to the growing effectiveness of ISAF’s special operations forces.” They explained:

      SOF units from all ISAF contributor nations in the south were pooled for the task of arresting known bomb[-]making cell leaders [and] drug lords, and a legal case [was] prepared for their arrest[.] Canadian (and other ISAF) SOF troops would [then] be deployed to apprehend the suspect. As often as not, if the target was a Tier 1 Taliban leader, he would try to shoot his way out, with predictable results. Consequently, Taliban command-and -control capacity in the south in 2007 was less effective than the previous fall.[119]

      In addition, conventional commanders also spoke to the influence CANSOF was exerting in theatre. A Canadian battle group commander noted the impressive effect SOF had on his area of operations in Kandahar.

      The SOF strikes had a chilling effect on the Taliban. In one strike they killed an important leader and [sixteen] of his fighters. The Taliban leadership in Kandahar City felt a lot of pressure from SOF. They were moving every day so we saw a reduction in activity. They [Taliban] were being disrupted — they were on the move, on the run.[120]