But, after all, the force was to be ready to deploy to Norway on December 15, 1942, for an arduous and very dangerous mission. So, even as the FSSF was in the process of establishing itself, its training regime was in overdrive. Upon arrival, members undertook their jump training, which in some cases, was all of forty-eight hours as opposed to the more standard three week course. In August 1942, journalist Don Mason captured the contemporary image of the force that was being created in Helena, Montana, where they were based: “The cream of Canada’s hard-fighting army youth is training in the United States today for ‘aerial commando’ raiding which one day soon will make the German and the Jap think cyclones have struck where they thought they were safe and secure.”[58]
However, by late 1942 it became clear that Operation Plough was not going to happen. There were three major impediments. First, Frederick’s request for the temporary diversion of 750 Lancaster bombers to insert his formation hit an immediate wall. The intractable architect of Britain’s strategic bombing campaign, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal of the Royal Air Force (RAF), responded, “That is our best bomber.” He continued, “if you can show us where Plough can accomplish more in its operation than one thousand Lancasters could do on the bombing runs, we shall consider the plane for your uses.”[59]
Frederick’s next dose of reality occurred when the Combined Operations Command planners briefed him on the Commando raiding program and, more important, the work of Brigadier Colin Gubbins’s Special Operations Executive and their Norwegian sabotage campaign. Although the SOE had never even heard of Operation Plough, or the FSSF for that matter, they, too, had plans for sabotaging most of the targets that the FSSF was theoretically earmarked to destroy. Significantly, Gubbins’s plan required very few aircraft and only two or three Norwegian soldiers for each target.[60]
The final nail in the coffin resulted from Colonel Frederick’s discussion with Major-General Wilhelm von Tangen Hansteen, the commander in chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Hansteen bluntly informed Frederick that the king and prime minister of Norway opposed the concept of Operation Plough. They were concerned that the large-scale destruction of power would create a greater hardship for the Norwegian people than it would for the Germans. Moreover, although they welcomed any assistance in ousting the occupying German forces, they did not wish to do so by destroying the vital industrial infrastructure that was key to Norway’s economic well-being .[61]
And so, with no aircraft, no host country support, and a competing organization that appeared to have a more efficient, more precise, and less resource-intensive means of achieving the same goal, Colonel Frederick quickly realized that Operation Plough was doomed. Any doubt he may have harboured was quickly dashed when he returned to London to meet with Lord Mountbatten prior to his flight to Washington, D.C. The chief of Combined Operations candidly explained to Frederick that Operation Plough was no longer a pressing issue.
By this time, Combined Operations and the whole raiding concept was under siege by the War Office. The Allied effort, particularly as a result of American might and industrial capacity, was slowly beginning to turn the tide of the war. Raiding and subversive activities, never fully supported by the mainstream military, were further marginalized as large-scale conventional operations such as the invasion of Northern Africa took shape.
Moreover, Mountbatten had no means of influencing the release of aircraft and he conceded that SOE provided a more economical means of achieving the desired result, not to mention at a more politically acceptable price for the Norwegian government in exile in London. As such, both men agreed to let Plough die. Frederick quickly sent a message to his formation in Helena, Montana. True to Frederick’s character — it was short and to the point:
Suspend effort on present line.… New plan may be radically different and not concerned with hydroelectric or other industrial installations…. Cease training on hydroelectric installations and … stress general tactical training, to include attack of fortifications, pill boxes, barracks, and troop concentrations. Change in weapons may be necessary to provide greater firepower, so suspend further small arms training pending a decision.[62]
On his return to North America, Colonel Frederick briefed General Marshall, the American army chief of staff. He then left for Montana, unsure whether the FSSF would be continued or scrapped. That decision was now left with the General Staff to get a political decision. By October 8, 1942, the Canadian chief of the General Staff forwarded a telegram to Lieutenant-General McNaughton, Canada’s overseas commander, informing him of the latest turn of events. The Canadians were now waiting for the Americans to make known their intentions prior to articulating their continuing support.
However, Major-General Murchie’s missive provided some telling clues. The alternatives considered were:
1 continue with special service force if Americans so desire;
2 amalgamate with 1st Parachute Battalion;
3 disband and disperse personnel; and
4 retain as an ordinary parachute battalion for service and abroad.[63]
Murchie highlighted the negative effects of options B, C, and D. He stated each has the “disadvantage of unwelcome publicity over cancellation of highly publicized special service forces as have B and C over apparent curtailment of our plans for Cdn [Canadian] Parachute Troops.”[64]
In due course, the Americans decided to proceed with the FSSF. On October 17, General Marshall informed Major-General Maurice Pope, the chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., that a decision was reached to retain the FSSF as a special unit.[65] It was now up to the Canadians to confirm their continued participation.
Although a will to continue seemed to be present within the military, the ultimate decision was the purview of the politicians.[66] As such, the War Cabinet Committee discussed the issue on October 28, 1942. From a Canadian perspective the existence of the “elite” First Special Service Force was considered by the government to be of marginal operational value after its original mission was cancelled. The Minutes of the War Cabinet Committee noted, “Though the future employment of the unit was doubtful, beyond its existence as a ‘stand-by ’ force, acceptance of the U.S. proposal [continue unit’s existence for special operations] was recommended as a token of intimate co-operation between the two countries.”[67]
With its existence guaranteed — at least for the time being — the question became: what was its role? FSSF became, in many ways, a highly specialized infantry, capable of a wide range of operations in virtually any terrain. In August 1943, the FSSF participated in the assault on Kiska Island. As the Japanese had already withdrawn from the Aleutians, the FSSF was quickly returned to the mainland and prepared for operations in Italy. Here the force made a name for itself because of its successful assault on Monte La Difensa, a seemingly impregnable German defensive position on the top of a 945 metre (3,100 feet) high mountain. Up until that time, the Germans had repelled numerous Allied attacks and, thus, delayed the advance toward the Gustav Line, the main German defensive line, and Rome, which lay beyond. On December 3, 1943, by a daring night assault that entailed climbing up the rear cliffs of the mountain, which the Germans considered impassable, the FSSF successfully captured the summit. However, the assault and subsequent struggle to maintain their hold over the saucer-shaped mountain top and extend their grip to the adjacent Monte La Remetanea inflicted a terrible toll on the formation. In the aftermath of the battle, the FSSF would never reach its former level of specialized capability or personnel. Reinforcements were simply pulled directly from normal reinforcement pools and given basic training on weapons and tactics.
Nonetheless, the FSSF reinforced its reputation at Anzio in February 1944, where, despite their light armament and only approximately 1,200 all ranks, they held an extended portion (thirteen kilometres) of the vital Mussolini Canal sector. Through aggressive night raiding, they struck fear into the enemy, who believed they were facing up to a small division. The German soldiers were so terrified by the FSSF raids that they nick-named them the “Black Devils.” In the