The Cdn AB Regt represented Canada’s only capability to conduct special operations from 1968 to 1993. A widespread feeling, by former members of the Cdn AB Regt was captured by Brigadier General Jim Cox. “In our hearts,” he revealed, “we equated ourselves with the SAS and the SF [Special Forces] in the United States.”[95] In the end, although the regiment did not possess all the characteristics of a pure SOF organization, especially toward the latter years of its existence, it did have both the official mandate and the implicit understanding of the senior CAF leadership that it would be the entity that conducted special operations if required. Moreover, the Cdn AB Regt did practise direct action (DA)– and strategic reconnaissance (SR)–type tasks. In addition, it regularly exercised and conducted small-unit exchanges with SOF organizations in the United States and Britain. In the end, it filled an important position in Canada’s SOF history.
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Even before the Cdn AB Regt was disbanded, the genesis of Canada’s true contemporary SOF capability began to germinate. A fundamental shift in the perception of the nature of the threats to Western industrialized nations erupted in the late 1960s. Political violence, or, more accurately, terrorism, became recognized as a significant “new” menace. Bombings, kidnapping, murders, and the hijacking of commercial aircraft became frequent occurrences, exploding onto the world scene seeming out of nowhere. Not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe, countries descended into a state of violence, as both home-grown and international terrorists waged violent campaigns that recognized no borders or limits. The murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, West Germany, became one of the defining images of the crisis, as did the 1975 terrorist assault on the headquarters of OPEC in Vienna, Austria.[96]
But the problem went beyond a spillover of Mid-East conflict and politics. In Germany, groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang (or Red Army Faction), waged violent terrorist campaigns that resulted in death and destruction. Holland was besieged by Moluccan terrorists, and Britain struggled with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Northern Ireland question. Even in North America, terrorism raised its ugly head. The Americans saw the growth of radical groups such as the Weathermen, the New World Liberation Front, and the Black Panther Party, to name but a few.
In Canada, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) began a reign of terror that culminated in the October Crisis of 1970. In addition, foreign terrorists imported their political struggles and launched attacks against targets in Canada. A few examples include the storming of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa by three Armenian men (Armenian Revolutionary Army) on March 12, 1985; the paralyzing of the Toronto public transit system on April 1, 1985, as a result of a communiqué sent by a group identifying itself as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of our Homeland, in which they threatened death to passengers of the transit system; and the downing of an Air India flight off the coast of Ireland on June 23, 1985. This act, which killed 329 people, was the result of a bomb that was planted prior to its departure from Toronto’s Pearson International Airport.
Not surprisingly, like other countries around the world, Canada decided it needed a counterterrorist (CT) capability of its own.[97] Its first attempt was to create the Hostage and Rescue Patrol (HARP) under the auspices of the RCMP in 1982. The small, twenty-five-man team was well-trained by foreign SOF personnel, but, unfortunately, a bureaucratic failure to reach a suitable administrative arrangement for the force scuttled the project. The RCMP wanted the operators to do tours of three months in Ottawa and then one and a half months back in their home precincts. The members wanted a permanent posting to Ottawa so they could move their families. In the end, no agreement could be reached and the program was shut down.
Three years later, in 1985, following a number of high-profile terrorist acts committed on Canadian soil, specifically the attack on the Turkish Embassy, the Government of Canada could delay no longer. It was time to establish a CT force of its own. The initial discussion of whether the new CT force should be based in the military or the police became a struggle between the CDS and the RCMP commissioner. Neither wanted the responsibility of creating or owning the force. The commissioner of the RCMP felt the proposed entity was more a military commando unit than a police organization. The CDS was of the mind that the type of individual created in such an organization could be problematic. He feared that once they were done their tour of service they would invariably become mercenaries of one sort or another, and he did not want that type of fallout. As a result, he did not want that type of unit within his Canadian Armed Forces.[98]
In the end, the CDS had his way because the Solicitor General believed the CT task was a policing function. As a result, the following year, in 1986, the RCMP created the seventy-five-member strong Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) as Canada’s first hostage rescue (HR)/CT organization. The unit quickly established itself, drawing its personnel from existing trained police emergency response teams (ERT) from across the country. They received comprehensive training, much of it initially from a number of international CT experts. Although SERT was constantly busy, it was never deployed for an actual mission.
By the early 1990s, the continuing efforts of the federal government to combat its enormous deficit led to continuing deep budget cuts to all government departments. The RCMP was not immune. Faced with financial constraints, the requirement to pay overtime to members of the SERT, a force that had been in existence for years but had not yet deployed, as well as the requirement to continually rely on military airlift and other support provided the impetus for change. Moreover, the military in the post–Cold War era was also amenable to taking on new roles.[99] The deputy minister at the time, Bob Fowler, was instrumental in pushing for the DND to take on the role. And so, in February 1992, senior governmental, RCMP, and DND decision-makers decided to transfer the HR/CT responsibilities from the RCMP SERT to a military organization. As such, JTF 2 was born.
The challenge for the unit was immense. It had to select and train its personnel, and establish a new unit and be operational by April 1, 1993. The tight timelines meant that the first CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Romses, had little choice but to utilize the RCMP SERT model for pre-selection , selection, and qualification standards. The RCMP SERT was composed of two distinct entities. Its Dwyer Hill Training Centre was run by an RCMP inspector who was responsible for the infrastructure and training. However, the command and control of the actual SERT was vested in another RCMP officer. Romses, however, would be responsible for both the operational and training functions.
The RCMP trained the first group of JTF 2 personnel. The newly trained military members now became the training cadre, and from the second serial onward, took control of instructing the remainder of the military personnel. Increasingly, the RCMP SERT members maintained less and less responsibility.
Timelines were tight, but JTF 2 was ready for the April 1 stand-up date. A formal handover parade and mess dinner were held at Dwyer Hill on March 31, 1993, to mark the handover of the HR/CT role from the RCMP SERT to the CAF JTF 2. The following day, the unit was already undertaking operational tasks.
From the beginning, the CO realized that the unit would have to evolve. The RCMP SERT had been content to remain strictly a police HR type organization. Initial time constraints meant that JTF 2 had to take on that paradigm and the police culture that accompanied it. However, with the “black” (i.e., CT) role came the issue of utility. How often would it be used? Romses realized this could also create retention issues. Moreover, for JTF 2 to provide utility to the greater CAF a “green” role (i.e., a traditional military SOF role, such as direct action and strategic reconnaissance) would need to be developed.
As a result, the unit began to evolve in the mid to late-1990s , developing a more typical military SOF orientation and capability; however, HR/CT remained JTF 2’s primary focus. In 1994, the CDS approved growth for JTF 2, as well as a transition from a pure “black” CT role to other special operations tasks. As a result, the unit undertook tasks around the globe that gave its members both experience in foreign locations, and exposure to senior military and civilian decision makers.
Although