The Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) was officially established on April 8, 1968.[85] It consisted of an airborne headquarters and signal squadron (eighty personnel), two infantry airborne commandos (278 personnel each), an airborne field battery (eighty personnel capable of providing two three-gun troops of pack howitzers, or two groups of six medium (82 mm) mortars), an airborne field squadron (eighty-one personnel), and an airborne service commando (i.e., combat service support and administration — eighty-nine personnel).
The regiment’s mandate was impressive if not over-optimistic . The Cdn AB Regt was required to be capable of performing a variety of tasks, which included: the defence of Canada; the U.N. “stand-by ” role; peacekeeping operations; missions in connection with national disasters; “Special Air Service”–type missions; coup de main tasks in a general war setting; and responsibility for parachute training in the CAF. The respective Canadian Forces organizational order (CFOO) stated, “the role of the Canadian Airborne Regiment is to provide a force capable of moving quickly to meet any unexpected enemy threat or other commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces.”[86] In addition, the army commander, Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson, ordered the Cdn AB Regt planning team to visit both the U.S. Special Forces Center, as well as the British SAS Regiment to gather the “necessary stimulus and factual data upon which to develop your concept.”[87] Moreover, he directed that an element of the regiment must be proficient at: HALO [High Altitude Low Opening] team parachute descents; deep penetration patrols; underwater diving; obstacle clearance and laying of underwater demolitions; mountain climbing; and special service forces–type team missions.[88]
Although outwardly a conventional airborne regiment, it was clear that the Cdn AB Regt, both officially, in accordance with its CFOO, and through direction given by the CAF chain of command, was intended to be capable of special operations. The emphasis on SOF-like capability was also enshrined in the operational concept, as well as in the later doctrinal manual, CFP 310 (1) Airborne — The Canadian Airborne Regiment . Under the heading “Special Operations,” a long list of tasks was included that were clearly special forces–like in nature. Specifically, the document stated that the
Canadian Airborne Regiment is to be prepared to carry out the following operations for which it is specially trained: disruption of lines of communications; destruction of critical installations; psychological warfare operations; special intelligence tasks; recovery tasks; deception operations; internal security operations; counter-guerilla operations; and support of indigenous paramilitary forces.[89]
The emphasis on special operations was not lost on the Cdn AB Regt’s leadership, which focused at times almost exclusively on daring, direct-action , commando-like raids. Moreover, as a number of former commanding officers noted, if something happened (e.g., a terrorist incident), they knew they would get the call, so they attempted to train individuals in the necessary skills required for special operations.
The quality of the original individuals was incontestable. Official recruiting themes stressed the superior attributes of the new genre of warrior. They emphasised the fact that the new paratrooper had to be an excellent athlete, an expert at small arms, and a survival specialist. Furthermore, they underscored the necessity of their soldiers being robust, courageous, and capable of a high level of endurance.
Not surprisingly, the Cdn AB Regt received a high percentage of the more ambitious, determined, and energized individuals in the CAF. They skimmed the cream of the army. Only experienced officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were accepted. All riflemen within the commandos were required to be qualified to the rank of corporal. This meant that they had previously served within a regular rifle battalion. As a result, they were already competent and experienced in the basic drills of soldiering. Equally important, they were, on the whole, older and, normally, more mature. This allowed the regiment to direct its training efforts toward specialized training such as mountain and pathfinder operations, patrolling courses, skiing, and unarmed combat.
The Cdn AB Regt quickly forged a reputation for undertaking tough, demanding, and dynamic activities. It set new standards for physical fitness and training realism. In consonance with its status as a strategic force capable of global deployment, the regiment travelled throughout Canada and the United States, as well as to exotic locations such as Jamaica, to practise its lethal craft. It conducted training and exchanges with the British SAS, American Rangers and Special Forces, and the French Foreign Legion. By the early seventies, the airborne regiment was at its zenith of power. It had the status of a mini-formation , direct access to the commander of the army, and an increased peacetime establishment of 1,044 all ranks.
The Cdn AB Regt deployed to Montreal, Quebec, during the FLQ Crisis in October 1970, and four years later was dispatched to Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of that island. However, in all cases the regiment functioned solely as conventional infantry. On November 26, 1976, the Cdn AB Regt was moved from Edmonton to Petawawa and its formation status was stripped.[90] It became a simple unit within the newly re-roled special service force (SSF), which provided the army with a relatively light, airborne/air-portable quick reaction force in the demographic centre of the country, one that could be moved quickly to augment either of the flanking brigades (i.e., 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade in the West and 5 Mechanized Brigade in Quebec) for internal security tasks, to the Arctic, or to U.N.-type operations.[91]
The restructuring inflicted additional wounds. The regiment was dramatically pared and it lost both its preferred standing within the army manning and exemptions from the mundane taskings that other units endured. Out of necessity, it began to accept more junior members across the board (i.e., officers, senior NCOs, and men); this resulted in a corollary degradation of capability. Moreover, it became increasingly under attack by senior CAF leaders, who were not favourable to “special soldiers,” particularly during a period of constantly shrinking defence budgets.
Adding to the frustrations of the members of the Cdn AB Regt was the fact that despite the regiment’s CFOO and international stand-by status, it was never deployed. Senior CAF leadership argued that to deploy the regiment would strip Canada of its strategic reserve. More realistically, the problem centred around the make-up of the airborne unit itself. It lacked the necessary mobility (i.e., armoured and wheeled vehicles) as well support capability to deploy for extended periods of time. As a result, the army command deemed that it was easier to send conventional units to do the operations, which were all conventional in nature anyway.
Downsizing of the regiment continued, further degrading both the status and capability of the Cdn AB Regt, with the result that it was reduced to battalion status in 1992. Nonetheless, in December of that year, the Cdn AB Regt deployed to Somalia on a U.N. Chapter VII operation, or, in simpler terms, a peace-making operation, under Security Council Resolution 794. Unfortunately, the Cdn AB Regt experienced disciplinary problems in theatre that detracted from their actual performance.[92] The regiment pacified its sector in less than three months, earning the praise of Hugh Tremblay, the director of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation in Somalia, who stated to all who would listen, “If you want to know and to see what you should do while you are here in Somalia, go to Belet Huen, talk to the Canadians, and do what they have done, emulate the Canadians and you will have success in your humanitarian relief sector.”[93]
Nonetheless, the mission was ultimately redefined in the media and the public consciousness as a failure, due to the poor leadership and the criminal acts of a few. The inexplicable and lamentable torture killing of Shidane Arone, a Somali national caught stealing within the regiment lines, became the defining image of the Cdn AB Regt’s operation in Africa. The public outcry and criticism of the Department of National Defence (DND) as a result of the attempted cover-up at NDHQ, and later revelations of hazing videos within the Cdn AB Regt, created a crisis of epic proportions, and senior political and military decision-makers desperately sought a quick and easy solution to their troubles. They