Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Francis Hutcheson

of this sense which we ought to obey throughout our lives.] ib.

       13. Laudis et vituperii sensus. [The sense of honour and shame.] 28. Homines in eo sibi invicem similes. [Uniformity of mankind in this sense.] 29.

       14. Sensus ridiculi. [The sense of the ridiculous] 30.

       15. Bona animi, corporis, et externa; et proinde appetitiones variae, sive suam, sive aliorum foelicitatem consectantes: quae et hominum moribus afficiuntur. [The goods of the soul, of the body, and the external goods. And accordingly the several appetites toward our own happiness or that of others. These are also influenced by men’s characters.] 30–34.

       16. aliae naturales, aliae opinabiles. [Some appetites are natural, others less general.] 34.

       17. Idearum conjunctiones, memoria, habitus. [The associations of ideas, memory, and habits.] 35–37. Usus sermonis. [The use of speech.] 37. Ingeniorum diversitas, ejusque causae. [The diversity of tempers, and their causes.] 37–39.

       18. Qua ratione cernitur partium ordo, a natura destinatus. [Perception of the order of our powers designed by nature.] 39–42.

Cap. II. De summo bono et virtute. [On the supreme good and virtue.] 42.

       1. Intellectus imperium in voluntatem. Voluntatis motus, et libertas. [The command of the understanding over the will. The motions of the will, and liberty.] 43, 44. Voluntatis in intellectum potestas. [The power of the will over the understanding.] ib.

       2. Axiomata de finibus et mediis. [The maxims concerning means and ends.] 44. Summum bonum quale. [What is the supreme good.] 45. <iii>

       3. Bona alia aliis contraria. [Some goods are inconsistent with others.] ib. Bonorum instituenda comparatio, ratione dignitatis et diuturnitatis, [We must compare enjoyments according to their dignity and duration.] 45, 46.

       4. Indolentia non bonorum finis. [Absence of uneasiness is not the chief good.] 47. Corporis voluptates vilissimae, minimeque diuturnae, neque omnes virtutibus contrariae. [Bodily pleasures are the meanest and the shortest. They are not always opposite to virtues.] 47–51.

       5. Quae ex vitae cultu, et artibus ingenuis, digniores; vitam tamen beatam haud praestant. [The pleasures which arise from the elegance of life and from ingenious arts are more worthy, yet they do not cause happiness.] 51–54.

       6. Sensus communis magna vis ad vitam beatam aut miseram. [Common sense is of great importance for our happiness or misery.] 54. Voluptates ejusdem honestae, et diuturnae; dolores itidem graves, et diuturni. [Its pleasures are worthy and lasting; likewise its sorrows are deep and lasting.] 55. Unicum horum malorum perfugium. [The sole refuge from these evils.] ib.

       7. Recti honestique sensus: ejus vis maxima ex perceptionum dignitate et duratione. [The sense of what is right and honourable. Its intensity is the greatest for the dignity and duration of its perceptions.] 56–58.

       8. Laudis et vituperii sensus, ad eadem omnia hortabitur. [The sense of honour and shame exorts to the same deeds.] 58.

       9. Ut etiam voluptates quaedam leviores. [As well as some pleasures of a lighter kind.] 59.

       10. Divitiarum potentiae que momentum. Sui conservandi studium saepe nimium. [The importance of wealth and power. The desire of self-preservation is often too strong.] 60, 61. In virtute sita est vita beata. [Happiness consists in virtue.] 62.

       11. Quod ex malorum inter se comparatione confirmatur. Errorum causae. [The same conclusion is confirmed by comparing the several evils. Causes of mistakes.] 62. Mala gravissima, ex aliorum miseria, et cujusque vitiis, nascuntur. [The most grievous evils arise from the distresses of others, and from the consciousness of moral turpitude.] 63–65. Summum bonum formale in virtute, una cum vitae perfectae prosperitate. [The formal supreme good consists in virtue, together with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime.] 65. Virtutis summa, in Deo amando, et benevolentia erga homines exercenda. [The sum of virtue consists in loving God and cultivating benevolence toward mankind.] ib.

       12. Deus, summum bonum objectivum. [God is the objective supreme good.] 66.

Cap. III. Virtutum divisiones. [The divisions of virtues.]

       1. Virtutis natura; ejusque gradus. [The nature of virtue and its degrees.] 66–69.

       2. Virtutes, vel intellectuales, vel morales. [Virtues are intellectual or moral.] 69. Virtus quî mediocritatem servet. [How virtue consists in mediocrity.] 70.

       3. Cardinales quatuor; earumque definitiones et partes. [Four cardinal virtues; their definitions and branches.] 71–74.

       4. Virtutum origo et causae. [The source and causes of virtues.] 75. Virtutes hae inter se conjunctae. [These causes are connected together.] 76. Mediocritas haud prima virtutis notio. [The primary notion of virtue does not consist in the middle way.] ib. <iv>

       5. Alia divisio utilior, prout virtutes Deum, homines aut nosmet ipsos respiciunt. [Another more useful division, according as virtues take notice of God, other people, or ourselves.] 76.

Cap. IV.

       1. Pietatis erga Deum partes duae; verae sententiae, cultusque iis consonus. [Two parts of piety toward God: true opinions and worship suited to them.] 77.

       2. Ex pietate nascuntur virtutes purissimae, gaudiaque maxima. [From piety arise the purest virtues and the greatest delights.] 77–80. Hominibus depravatis non desperandum.

Скачать книгу