The calm selfish Desires would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of Good in general, of infinite Good, or of the greatest Aggregate: Much less need we suppose any actual Inclination toward any of these, as the Cause or Spring of all particular Desires. ’Tis enough to allow, “that we are capable by enlarging, or by Abstraction, of coming to these Ideas: That we must, by the Constitution of our Nature, desire any apprehended Good which occurs a‐part from any Evil: [32] That of two Objects inconsistent with each other, we shall desire that which seems to contain the greatest Moment of Good.” So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any finite Good, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly [33] have the Idea of a Greater, or see this to be inconsistent with some more valuable Object, or that it may bring upon him some prepollent Evil. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable Presumption of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If this be any sort of Liberty, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by those who maintain “the Desire or Will to be necessarily determined by the prepollent Motive;” since this very Presumption may be a prepollent Motive, especially to those, who by frequent Attention make the Idea of the greatest Good always present to themselves on all important Occasions.
The same may easily be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.
There seems to be this Degree of Liberty about the Understanding, that tho the highest Certainty or Demonstration does necessarily engage
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our Assent, yet we can suspend any absolute Conclusion from probable Arguments, until we examine whether this [33] apparent Probability be not opposite to Demonstration, or superior Probability on the other side.
This may let us see, that tho it were acknowledged that “Men are necessarily determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive [34] appears to be prepollent;” yet they might be proper Subjects of a Law; since the very Sanctions of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive prepollent to all others. In like manner, “Errors may be criminal,* where there are sufficient Data or Objective Evidence for the Truth;” since no Demonstration can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet human Penalties concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of Argument, or Probability to engage our Assent, however they may as Motives determine our Election.
In the calm publick Desires, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm [34] universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Moment of the Good, and the Number of those who shall enjoy it.
When the publick Desires are opposite to the private, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is stronger or more intense.
Definitions.
[35] III. The following Definitions of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the Axioms subjoined may shew the manner of acting from calm Desire, with Analogy to the Laws of Motion.
Natural Good and Evil.
1. NATURAL Good is Pleasure: Natural Evil is Pain.
2. NATURAL good Objects are those which are apt, either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called Advantageous. Natural Evil Objects are such as, in like manner, give Pain.
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Absolute.
3. ABSOLUTE Good is that which, considered with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.
4. ABSOLUTE Evil, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.
Relative.
[35] 5. RELATIVE Good or Evil, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the Bonum simpliciter, and secundum quid of the Schoolmen.
Cor. RELATIVE Good may be Absolute Evil; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And Absolute Good may be Relative Evil; thus an unpleasant Potion may recover Health.
GOOD and Evil, according to the Persons whom they affect, may be divided into Universal, Particular and Private.
Universal.
6. UNIVERSAL Good, is what tends to the Happiness of the whole System of sensitive Beings; and Universal Evil is the contrary.
Particular.
7. PARTICULAR Good is what tends to the Happiness of a Part of this System: Particular Evil is the contrary.
Private.
8. PRIVATE Good or Evil is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either Absolute or Relative.
[36] Cor. I. PARTICULAR or private Good may possibly be universal Evil: And universal Good may be particular or private Evil. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there [37] are some apparent Instances; such as the Success of an unjust War; or the Escape of an unrelenting Criminal.
Cor. 2. WHEN particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.
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Compound.
9. COMPOUND good Objects or Events, are such as contain the Powers of several Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the Moral Sense and of Honour. The same is easily applicable to compound Evil.
Mixed.
10. A MIXED Object is what contains at once the Powers of Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the Pleasures of the Moral Sense, and Pains of the external Senses. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the publick Sense, and the Pains of Compassion toward the Sufferer.
Greatest Good.
[37] 11. THE greatest or most perfect Good is that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.
Moral Good.
[38] 12. AN Action is good, in a moral Sense, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend universal absolute Good; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing particular absolute Good, not inconsistent with universal Good.
Moral Evil.
13. AN Action is morally evil, either from Intention of absolute Evil, universal, or particular, (*which is seldom the case with Men, except in sudden Passions;) or from pursuit of private or particular relative Good, which they might have known did tend to universal absolute Evil. For even the want of a† just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.