An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Francis Hutcheson

the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into Beauty is called Treatise I. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is Treatise II. The Essay on the Passions, Treatise III. And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, Treatise IV.

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      THE CONTENTS

TREATISE I

An ESSAY on the Nature and Conduct of the PASSIONS.

SECTION I

       A General Account of our several Senses and Desires. Selfish or Publick.

SECTION II

       Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes,

SECTION III

       Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions,

       SECTION IV

       How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects,

       SECTION V

       A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration,

       SECTION VI

       Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness,

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       TREATISE II

       ILLUSTRATIONS upon the MORAL SENSE,

       SECTION I

       Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason,

       SECTION II

       Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice; the Fitness or Unfitness of Actions,

       SECTION III

       Mr. Woolaston’s Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue, considered,

       SECTION IV

       Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense,

       SECTION V

       Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct,

       SECTION VI

       How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous,

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TREATISE I

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions

SECTION I

       A general Account of our several Senses and Desires, Selfish or Publick

      [1/1] The Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the Affections and Passions; or those Modifications, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil. [2] In this Inquiry we need little Reasoning, or Argument, since Certainty is only [2] attainable by distinct Attention to what we are conscious happens in our Minds.

      Art. I. “Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some sensitive Nature.” To understand therefore the several Kinds of Good, or Evil, we must apprehend the several Senses natural to us.

      There seems to be some Sense or other suited to every sort of Objects which occurs to us, by which we receive either Pleasure, or Pain from a great part of them, as well as some Image, or Apprehension of them: Nay, sometimes our only Idea is a Perception of Pleasure, or Pain. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes simple, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of Extension,

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      or of Duration; one of which accompanies every Perception, whether of Sense, or inward Consciousness. Other Pleasures arise only upon some previous Idea, or Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas. These Pleasures, presupposing previous Ideas, were called Perceptions of an internal [3] Sense, in a former [3] Treatise.^* Thus Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than Tastes, or Smells; the Harmony of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds.^† In [4] like manner, Affections, Tempers, [4] Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral

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      Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our previous Opinion