If we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, A SENSE, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Tho it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will [5] shew that there are such Natural [5] Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the External Senses, universally known. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from Grandeur and Novelty. These we may call, after Mr. ADDISON, the Pleasures of the Imagination; 12 or we may call the Power of receiving them, an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. “our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery.” This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called Ḱοινονοημοσύνη or Sensus Communis13 by some of the Antients. 4. The fourth Class we may call the Moral [6] Sense, by which “we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue, or Vice in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our
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Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth [6] Class is a Sense of Honour, “which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.”
There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness, and Unworthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without any conception of Moral Good, or Evil.” Thus the Pleasures of Sight, and Hearing, are more esteemed than those of Taste or [7] Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the Imagination, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. Plato* accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of Innocence in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their Innocence, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another Class of Sensations.
A like Division of our Desires.
[7] II. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal Sense,† and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the
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Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising [8] from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame.*
The third Class of Publick Desires contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the Happiness of others, or the removal of Misery; such as those of Gratitude, Compassion, [8] Natural Affection, Friendship, or the more extensive calm Desire of the universal Good of all sensitive Natures, which our moral Sense approves as the Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower Attachments of Love.
Secondary Desires of Wealth and Power.
Now since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reasoning about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our original Desires, “secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires, with strength proportioned to the several original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object.” Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the Universality of these Desires of Wealth and Power, since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. “How foolish then is the Inference, some would make, from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature is wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage; since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to [9] gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes, as the selfish ones?”
[9] “How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists,
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who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest Virtues, and most generous Actions?” The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the Intention is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet’s Sentiments:
——— Hic onus horret, Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus: Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est, Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.—HOR. Epist. 17.14
“Further, the Laws or Customs of a Country, the Humour of our Company may have made strange Associations of Ideas, so that some Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason of some additional grateful Idea, may become very desirable; or by like Addition of an ungrateful Idea may raise the strongest Aversion.” Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a Badge of Honour, an Evidence of some generous Disposition, a Monument of [9] some great Action, may be impatiently pursued, [10] from our Desire of Honour. When any Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture is constituted as a Mark of Infamy, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, tho in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional Ideas.* Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these
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things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the publick Esteem, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.
The Uses of these Associations.
Should any one be surprized at this Disposition in our Nature to associate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what [11] great Evils, and how much Corruption [11]