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The Division of the Stoicks.
Cicero, in the Fourth Book of Tusculan Questions,21 gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the Passions: First, into Love and Hatred, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is present or expected. About Good we have these two, Libido & Latitia, Desire and Joy: About Evil we have likewise two, Metus & Ægritudo, Fear and Sorrow. To this general Division he [60] subjoins many [59] Subdivisions of each of these four Passions; according as in the Latin Tongue they had different Names for the several Degrees of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of Lexicons would probably get the most precise Meanings of the Latin Names in that Book; nor would it be useless in considering the Nature of them.
The Schoolmen, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, have not so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired Aristotle.
II. ’Tis strange that the thoughtful MALEBRANCHE did not consider, that “Desire and Aversion are obviously different from the other Modifications called Passions; that these two directly lead to Action, or the Volition of Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations; and other Affections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion, or their correspondent Propensities: So that Desire and Aversion are the only pure Affections in the strictest Sense.
Sensation and Affection distinct.
If, indeed, we confine the Word Sensation to the “immediate Perceptions of [61] Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence [60] or Operation of any Object or Event, which are occasioned by some Impression on our Bodies;” then we may denote by the Word Affection, those Pleasures or Pains not thus excited, but “resulting from some Reflection upon, or Opinion of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one hand, or from a like
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Reflection or Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either to our selves or others.”*
Passion.
When more violent confused Sensations arise with the Affection, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of Passion, especially when accompanied with some natural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.
Division by Malebranche.
If this use of these Words be allowed, the Division of MALEBRANCHE is very natural. Good Objects excite Love; evil Objects Hatred: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully expected, or certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense, [62] the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil [61] present, raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; and Evil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Aversion: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.22
Desire and Aversion. Joy and Sorrow.
PERHAPS it may be more easy to conceive our Affections and Passions in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises Desire: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises Aversion, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper Affections, distinct from all Sensation: We may
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call both Desires if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself.* A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The Reflection upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect [63] of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of Sorrow, distinct from [62] those immediate Sensations arising from the Objects or Events themselves.
Affections may be distinguished from Passions.
These Affections, viz. Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow, we may, after MALEBRANCHE, call spiritual or pure Affections; because the purest Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beside these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent confused Sensations, connected with bodily Motions, from which our Affections are denominated Passions.
Affections attended with undesigning Propensities. Anger.
We may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, distinct both from Sensation and Desire; if by Desire we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: viz. a certain Propensity of Instinct to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the Means of some Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we [64] observed above,† the Propensity to Fame [63] may continue after one has lost all notion of Good, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our particular Affections have generally some of these Propensities accompanying them; but these Propensities are sometimes without the Affections or distinct Desires,
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and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the Affections could have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are some sort of Goods intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion Misery to the Offender, a Determination to Violence, even where there is no Intention of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And ’tis principally this Propensity which we denote by the Name Anger, tho other Desires often accompany it.
So also our Presence with the distressed is generally necessary to their relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we shall find a Propensity to [65] run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus also, beside the calm Desire of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we have a strong Propensity to their Company, to the very [64] Sight of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to our selves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. These Propensities, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call Passions, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them passionate. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run