7.2 Virtues in Research
Those responsible for training new researchers should seek to develop not only their students' research skills, but also their characters. Contemporary moral philosopher MacIntyre (1984) argues that new participants in any complex social activity, such as scientific research, must develop virtues in order to learn their craft Students or novices must accept the authority of established standards of excellence in research and recognize the inadequacy of their own work in light of those standards. In time, these students may gain the capacity to criticize or further develop these standards.
The process of initiation into a field requires the practice of particular virtues, which we will discuss. New researchers require justice in order to discern what they owe to whom. They must determine, for example, how to show their gratitude to their teachers, how to treat animal subjects of research humanely, and how to compensate human subjects appropriately. They require courage to take the risks necessary for good research. Perhaps the most crucial virtue for researchers is honesty or truthfulness. The division of labor among many researchers requires clear and complete presentation of data, even when such data contradicts an attractive hypothesis. The entire enterprise of scientific research would collapse without the commitment to a truthful sharing of results. Consequently, the scientific community levies harsh punishments on scientists who betray this trust. The virtue of honesty also promotes a high regard for, and even relentless pursuit of, the truth. The truthful researcher constantly seeks to expand his or her knowledge and avoids sources of information that may be misleading. Such researchers candidly evaluate their own performances and, by practicing the virtue of humility, they seek out criticism from those who can correct their errors.
In order to cultivate such virtues in their students, educators cannot merely talk about them in the classroom. Because the virtues are not abstract intellectual concepts, but rather habits of good character and behavior, students will acquire them only through active participation in research under the close guidance of mentors who possess these virtues themselves.
Research from the “positive psychology” movement indicates that under the right circumstances, virtues can be taught, and MacIntyre's work suggests that virtuous behavior will flourish only within communities that hold the virtues at the core of their common life (Bryan and Babelay 2009). Therefore, academic departments must recruit and promote faculty members who exemplify these virtues.
This emphasis on the moral formation of researchers is meant to supplement, not replace, the existing guidelines on ethical research. Indeed, fidelity to fundamental research statutes, such as those regarding informed consent, could be considered a virtue. However, these guidelines may not always provide a clear direction in challenging situations and, from time to time, institutions will promulgate the guidelines as unethical. In such cases, a morally acceptable outcome depends on virtuous persons recognizing what is required of them and acting rightly – thereby displaying virtues such as justice and courage.
7.3 A Christian‐Platonic Background of Virtues
We assume that a student who embraces a research career will seek a practical pathway by which the student can develop virtuous habits of character. Lessons from literature that reflect on virtues would further allow researchers to learn from the long history of ethics (e.g. authors such as Homer, Aristotle, Benjamin Franklin, and Jane Austen). Several religions consider the virtues necessary for a good and moral life; thus, researchers can enrich their understanding of the virtues by engaging with these traditions and welcoming religious perspectives in discussions about research ethics. This so‐called open pluralism can contribute to the professional development of novice researchers, particularly if they belong to one of these religious traditions (Kinghorn et al. 2007).
To illustrate, we will offer a few considerations from the ascetic tradition of the Near East. In the Platonic model of psychology, the human psyche consists of three key elements: the noetic, or intellect; the incensive, describing desires and animations; and the appetitive, the ability to satisfy bodily needs. These elements are further reiterated in the Patristic writings of the Fathers of the Christian Church as the powers of the human soul and can be characterized by the virtues of justice in the search for truth, courage, and temperance, respectively – with wisdom as the overruling principle of the human soul.
A contemporary French philosopher of Christian‐Platonic understanding, John Claude Larchet, builds on the philosophies of early Christian Patristic Fathers of the Church such as Saint John of Damascus and Saint Maximus the Confessor. Larchet describes three essential powers of the human soul as vegetative (nutrition and growth), animal (aggressiveness, desire, and affectivity), and reasoning (reason being the principal characteristic that distinguishes humans from all other creatures). The power of reasoning has two important faculties: the spiritual faculty (intellect, or nous, linked to a human's noetic ability and responsible for the moral and psychological senses of consciousness) and the faculty of self‐determination (Larchet 2011).
Although it adopts the Platonic virtues, the Christian ascetic tradition, with respect to the incensive element of the soul, focuses on the virtue of love – cultivating practices that exhibit brotherly love and compassion (Vitz 2014). Early Christian‐Platonist thinker, Saint John Damascus, described the contrasting “sins” to the incensive powers as including “heartlessness, hatred and lack of compassion” (Palmer et al. 1981). Peter of Damaskos stated that love of neighbor is highest among all virtues (Palmer et al. 1983). And Saint Isaac of Nineveh stated that a person whose incensive powers are in the right order has a heart “burning with love towards the whole creation: towards men, birds, animals, demons and every creature…cannot bear to hear or see the least harm done to or misfortune suffered by creation” (Popovich 1994; Alfeyev 2000).
To summarize, the pursuit of virtue in the Christian ascetic tradition is ultimately the struggle to acquire a compassionate heart and demonstrate mercy toward every human being and creation. Clement of Alexandria (150–215 AD) and John of Damascus (676–749 AD) have described the “passions” as barriers to manifesting love. The passions should not be understood as human emotions but, rather, as vices precluding obedience to the Word of God (see ‘The Stromata’ in Roberts and Donaldson 1885 and ‘An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith’ in Schaff and Wace 1899). Examples of these passions are avarice, bitterness, resentfulness, anger, pride, jealousy, lustfulness, or what the ascetic fathers called “self‐love.” The Church teaches that such “passionate” persons will be preoccupied with satisfying their own desires for pleasure, wealth, and praise – and as such will fail to attend to or cultivate the true virtues of compassion and mercy. Particularly relevant to the practice of research, those who give in to their passions will regard others as rivals or as impediments toward satisfying their self‐love (Vitz 2014): a pattern that is likely to erode the spirit of teamwork and undermine a research team's effectiveness and success.
An important reason for bringing to light these traditional thinkers in contemporary practice, and in regard to the ethical growth of researchers and scientists, is that we believe a similar model can be used as an impetus toward understanding the purpose and virtuosity of performing scientific research.
7.4 Skills Versus Wisdom
There is a distinction between the two types of knowledge – wisdom and skill – that applies to every realm of life, including medical research. It may not be surprising if someone who is highly skilled in laboratory work or in writing lacks basic wisdom to discern which endeavors his or her research will bring about the most benefit to others.
The distinction between phronesis, or practical wisdom, and techne, or technical skill, as used in Aristotle's language is important. The practical wisdom is the development or internal formation of the Self as someone cognizant of his or her purpose who acts with wisdom in all areas of life . The technical skill is involved more with the production