Counterinsurgency In Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008: A Civilian Perspective. Robert Kemp

AID officer at the Brigade HQ managed the AID workers at the PRTs. Many AID workers at this time were contractors, rather than career employees.

      U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

      USDA officers focused on providing agricultural advice to the GOA, and to a lesser extent, individual farmers. They were not present in most RC-East PRTs, although two key posts—the Brigade HQ and the Jalalabad PRT—included them. The USDA officers complemented AID counternarcotics programs, providing advice on crops to substitute for poppy and micro credit programs for farmers.

      A View from Washington

      The State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Afghanistan during much of this time described his primary concern as acquiring the necessary “manpower, money, and time.”16 This reflected what he and others saw as the USG’s loosely held view that “in Iraq, we do what we must, in Afghanistan we do what we can.” In his view, while Gen. Barno clearly wanted to implement a COIN strategy early in this period, the lack of resources made this difficult in practice. At the same time the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was not comfortable with COIN, although by 2006, this was the de-facto strategy. The former DAS noted the relative autonomy he and his National Security Council (NSC) counterpart had on Afghanistan policy, since the administration was mostly focused on Iraq policy. This also allowed Embassy Kabul considerable input to policy, and embassy analysis and advice carried weight in Washington.

      United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)

      In RC-East, UNAMA had hub offices at Gardez and Jalalabad. The lead political officers worked closely with USG political and military officers. The UNAMA officers had a wide mandate, dealing with conflict prevention and resolution, monitoring human rights, and promoting GOA capacity. They also played a substantial role in organizing elections. The overall approach of UNAMA in Afghanistan was one of a “light footprint” which placed Afghans in decision-making roles with international actors as advisors. This sideline method was presented as the most effective means of ensuring a sustainable and independent government in Afghanistan.

      Now that the major players in RC-East and their goals have been introduced, the next three chapters will look at the major pillars of the counterinsurgency strategy: local government, development, and security.