Geographic Variations of the Insurgency
Besides varying from an ideological standpoint, the insurgency varied geographically between provinces. In Paktika, Khost, and Paktia Provinces, much of the insurgent violence was ideological in nature, with groups crossing the border from Pakistan in small groups, carrying out attacks, and then retreating into North and South Waziristan, in the FATA.
In Konar Province to the north of Jalalabad, the situation was even more complex. Apolitical violence was commonplace, not only because of the lucrative earnings to be made in smuggling drugs, timber, and jewels, but because of a high level of common crime. At the same time, ideological groups from Pakistan could easily cross the border to carry out attacks on Afghan and coalition forces, as well as the GOA. The rugged topography of Konar attracted insurgents, who established a base of operations in the Korangal Valley, west of Asadabad, in the summer of 2005. Similarly, some insurgent elements in Konar and Nuristan had a Salafi/Wahhabist element that was strongly ideological, and had been present for years.
Taliban as the Leading Force of Insurgency
The Taliban was the largest and most important of the groups composing the insurgency during this period. It could be viewed in two, overlapping ways: as an ideological organization, committed to spreading a conservative view of Islam; and as an ethnic Pashtun organization−one that promoted Pashtun interests.
In general, the Taliban had limited support among the border population for a variety of reasons. The locals viewed Taliban attacks on security forces and pro-government Afghans as a cause of further instability and violence, in a population that badly wanted peace and stability. While the influence of Islam in the border region was tremendously strong, permeating every facet of life, the strict views of the Taliban were out-of-sync with much of the population, particularly younger people who had lived outside Afghanistan. The Taliban discredited itself through the mismanagement of government while in power, particularly by neglecting administrative functions; many rural areas were self-governing during the period 1997−2001. Finally, they were seen as linked to Arab extremists like al-Qaeda, which some blamed for some of Afghanistan’s problems over the previous decade.
Across the border in Peshawar, many educated Pashtuns had a more benign and supportive view of the Taliban. They saw the Taliban as promoting and protecting ethnic Pashtuns from threats, be they from other ethnic groups, governments, or military forces. Others continued to view the Taliban as a pious and devout Muslim group, a protector of moral values, although this appeared to change by 2008 as the Taliban increased its operations in Pakistan.
While the Taliban could carry out disruptive attacks, they had limited ability to operate in large groups for long periods. They were overmatched in any fight against Coalition forces and increasingly so against the Afghan National Army (ANA). In 2005, their tactics centered on IED attacks, minor attacks on patrols and bases, and the intimidation and assassination of GOA officials and pro-government mullahs. Interestingly, they rarely carried out attacks that would kill large number of civilians – like rocketing cities. Their inability to disrupt the September 2005 Parliamentary elections and the October 2004 Presidential elections reflected limited capabilities, but may also have reflected a narrow understanding of elections, their importance, and how to subvert them. However, by the end of this period, the Taliban and other groups were showing some success as measured against their strategy (as outlined at the end of Chapter 2). By carrying out attacks, or maintaining the threat of attacks, they certainly decreased the ability of local government and the Coalition to do their jobs, and drove a wedge between some local communities and the government.
Other Insurgent Groups
The network of Jalaluddin Haqqani claimed responsibility for a considerable number of attacks in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika Provinces during this period, and was perhaps the most formidable opponent in these provinces, particularly as it gained strength. Operating out of North Waziristan, Haqqani, a former mujahedeen leader and his commanders (including his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, who increasingly took over leadership from his aging father during this period) at times mustered forty or more men for cross-border attacks, several of which were repulsed with many casualties after coalition forces called in air strikes. The goals of these attacks may have been for propaganda purposes – to show that his network was capable of attacks on military, as opposed to civilian, targets. At the same time, if fighters were receiving training in Pakistan, these may have been “graduation” exercises. The group also increased their ability to carry out IEDs and suicide bombings. The Haqqanis had ties with the Zadran tribe, which controlled an area at the intersection of Khost, Paktika and Paktia Provinces; these links increased their ability to operate inside Afghanistan. They also expanded their capacity to attack as far away as Kabul during this period.
The roles of other insurgent groups were less clear. al-Qaeda issued statements denouncing the coalition presence in Afghanistan, and may have been behind some car bombings. Several al-Qaeda leaders were detained or killed in the FATA, suggesting an active engagement in the insurgency. Public statements by the Pakistani military noted that sweeps in the FATA often encountered Arabs, Chechens and Uzbek fighters. HIG had actively opposed the GOA, and the coalition presence and may also have been responsible for some attacks in Konar and Nangarhar.
Pashtun Population as the “Center of Gravity”
During 2004 and 2005, much of the insurgent activity in eastern Afghanistan was in three border provinces – Paktika, Khost, and Konar – with lesser but still significant activity in the southern districts of Ghazni, and along Paktia’s border with Pakistan. Not coincidentally, this area – roughly southeast of the country’s ring road – has a predominantly Pashtun population, where the Taliban found some degree of support and could blend more easily into the local population. In the struggle for “hearts and minds,” these Pashtuns were the center of gravity for both coalition forces and the Taliban and its associated militias. Further to the north and west, the ethnic composition of the population had a larger percentage of Tajiks and Hazaras, which made it much more difficult for the Pashtun-based Taliban to operate effectively. Due to this ethnic composition, these areas experienced a lower volume of attacks.
4. Civilian Components
This section will look at the roles of the various U.S. and international civilian actors in RC-East during the period 2004–2008, as well as some perspective from Washington.
State Department Political Officers
The State Department assigned political officers to both the PRTs and the Brigade HQ. These officers had four main tasks. First, they were reporting officers, tasked to provide information on political, political-military, economic, and social trends to the Embassy in Kabul. Second, they were conduits of information to the U.S. military on various topics: what U.S. government (USG), State Department, and embassy policy was, what was happening in Afghanistan at the national level, and developments in Pakistan—a very relevant topic for the border provinces. Third, they were charged with promoting USG policies to the provincial government. Finally, and in some ways most importantly, they were responsible for helping the nascent GOA govern effectively. At both the PRT and Brigade levels, the political officers traveled with the commanders, meeting with political leaders (usually governors) as well as military leaders. This freed the commanders to focus more on military aspects.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID officers, called Field Program Officers, were assigned to both PRTs and Brigade commands in RC-East. These officers were responsible for administering USAID projects at the provincial level (although they were not responsible for administering at the provincial level national-level programs run out of Kabul). They were also tasked with advising military officers on development issues; advising the GOA on