Irrigated fields and family compounds seen from the door of a helicopter. Khost
Province.
Border between Khost Province, Afghanistan, and North Waziristan, Pakistan.
Houses and fields in Hazara area, Bamian Province, 2005.
2. Strategy and Strategic Goals
In broadest terms, the strategy of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) was reflected in the Afghan National Development Strategy, adopted in 2008. This had as its main goals:
1.Security: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan.
2.Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights: Strengthen democratic practice and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.
3.Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.9
In general, U.S. COIN strategy in RC-East paralleled the GOA’s strategy, with a three“pillar” approach that included 1) economic development, 2) security and 3) governance.10 Counternarcotics and information operations were subordinate but important elements. Rule of law (which could be included under the governance pillar) and counterterrorism (CT) (which could be included under security) were also major elements of the strategy.
U.S. strategy was driven and limited by the resources available, with the Afghanistan theater clearly secondary to Iraq. For example, in 2004 RC-East was covered by only one brigade,11 along with some special operation forces and PRTs. U.S. strategy had both CT and COIN aspects to it,12 and this balance shifted over time, and with different commanders. At the same time, higher strategy was adapted and modified to fit local conditions by field-grade officers. In general, the military used a shape-take-hold-build strategy for field operations.
During the early part of this period, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), the overall command of U.S. forces including those in RC-East, had this mission statement: “conduct full spectrum operations throughout the combined joint operations area to defeat al-Qaeda and associated movements, establish an enduring Afghan security structure and reshape its posture for the Long War in order to set the conditions for long-term stability in Afghanistan.” This command mandated three main lines of effort for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): security; economic and strategic reconstruction; and governance and justice. The desired end-state of CFC-A was, “A moderate, stable and representative Afghanistan capable of controlling and governing its territory.”
By 2007–8 additional troops were available in RC-East. These additional resources allowed for smaller bases and combat outposts to be established, moving forces off the larger bases and closer to the population. This made sense in terms of securing the local population from attacks or intimidation by the insurgents, an important factor in counterinsurgency. But it added to the logistical problems of supplying outposts in remote areas, particularly during the winter months; moreover, these outposts were vulnerable to enemy attacks.
By early 2009, the U.S. Military reported to Congress that “The strategic goals of the U.S. are that Afghanistan is: 1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and is a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens.”13
UNAMA Strategy and Responsibilities
The Security Council originally delegated a range of responsibilities to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), in particular managing relief, recovery and reconstruction, holding elections, and providing strategic advice to other actors such as the U.S. military. This has the ultimate goal of promoting peace and stability in order to achieve national reconciliation. UNAMA’s role in RC-East specifically was (and is) to implement the UN’s political strategy of Afghan relief, reconstruction, and development, with particular concern for the maintenance of schools and commitment to the completion of construction projects.
Insurgent Strategies
The insurgency was composed of several different groups with different goals. A UNAMA political officer based out of Gardez during this time, Sebastian Trives, accurately describes the strategy of the insurgent groups in RC-East:
Prevent government outreach by estranging the population from it. This is done through the intensification of propaganda, the targeting of government personnel and infrastructure, and the creation of an atmosphere of fear within communities fueled by intimidation as well as acts of violence and killings targeting individuals seen to be pro-government.
Continue to target the international presence, both civil and military, in order to limit its operational space in the short term, while at the same time augmenting the political costs of involvement for the governments of the main contributing countries.14
The Haqqani network, an important insurgent group in eastern Afghanistan, intended to “force the departure of Coalition forces, primarily in their territory of Loya Paktia (the provinces of Paktika, Khost, and Paktia) through sustained harassment and persistent attacks aimed at creating an atmosphere of instability.”15 In assessing the group’s current goals and projected activities, this same source indicates that the Haqqanis may also “seek to strengthen their negotiating position ahead of any reconciliation talks” and “may in fact be angling for de-facto control of the Southeast;” in addition, the group wants to increase its influence in Logar and Ghazni in order to attack nearby Kabul, and control part of Route 1 that runs between Kabul and Kandahar.
Throughout the period 2004−2008, the insurgents were establishing shadow governments and justice systems, co-opting some tribes, establishing bases within Afghanistan, expanding the areas where they could operate, and hindering development projects. The ultimate goal of the Taliban was to regain control of Afghanistan. The next chapter will examine the various insurgents groups in RC-East in detail.
Men and boys in Khost town, 2005.
Aerial view of a typical Pashtun village, Khost Province, 2005.
3. Insurgent Groups
The insurgency in RC-East was neither monolithic nor easily understood. Terms such as “anti-coalition militias” or “al-Qaeda and associated militias” were used by the United States as catch-all phrases, but were not particularly useful in defining an insurgency composed of many factions. The number of players involved in the insurgency also did not allow an easy analysis of the goals of the insurgency, other than a general intent of forcing the Coalition out of Afghanistan, toppling the GOA, seizing power, and forming an Islamic state.
Along the frontier with Pakistan, the insurgency included not only the Taliban but also al-Qaeda, the Hezb-eIslami Gulbuddin (HIG) of Hekmatyar, foreign jihadists, perhaps Pakistani extremists groups, and fighters associated with Jalaluddin Haqqani – a former minister in the Taliban government. The motivation and goals of these organizations differed, but with some overlap and probably some degree of coordination between the groups. At the same time, not all of these groups were active in all border areas – Hekmatyar operated more in Konar and Nangarhar, while Haqqani’s network focused on Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, later reaching to Kabul.
In some cases, money rather than ideology drove attacks on coalition or Afghan