Epictetus and Laypeople. Erlend D. MacGillivray

and consider especially Diss. III.19, a discourse that is entitled “What is the Position of the Layperson, and What That of the Philosopher?” Τίς στάσις ἰδιώτου καὶ φιλοσόφου.

      129. Diss. III.15.13. Eshleman (2012, 73–74) comments in this regard are worth quoting at length: “Echoing Socrates, he [Epictetus] repeatedly cautions against chasing after the meaningless approval of lay people, which no specialist heeds when it comes to his own art (2.13.3; 14.2; 4.1.117, 5.22, 12.14). Why would a philosopher care if he is admired by non-philosophers (1.21.3-4; cf. 2.7.4-7, 13.16-19, 2.9.50-4) or despised by the ignorant (4.5.22), whose behavior betrays their incomprehension of true moral value? . . . [For Epictetus] exclusion of lay voices serves to marginalize inappropriate (sophistic, crowd-pleasing) modes of philosophy.” See also the discussion in Hock (1993, 139) and Boter (2010, 327–331) and similar comments to Epictetus’ from Seneca at Ep. 5.6, 7.1-8, 10.5, 20.3, 23.8, 25.7, as well as Muson. 18b. Okell (2005, 193), also notes that in Seneca’s play Hercules: “Hercules is struggling to save mankind from the restriction of fear and tyranny, but mankind (in the form of the chorus) is clearly not interested in being saved or in being heroic.”

      130. See also Ench. 51.

      131. Diss. II.1.21.

      132. Diss. I.8.8-7, and I.19.1-2. That Stoics could even characterize philosophers as being ignorant (or ἄγνοια), but due to their lack of consistently upheld correct behavior/mindset, and not because of any epistemic failings, see Cuany (2015).

      133. Gill and Hard (1995, 101).

      134. See Kraus (1999).

      135. Diss. III.7.1. See also Diss. III.15.8-13 along with the discussion in Hoof (2010, 103).

      136. Diss. II.17.5, I.25.32-33.

      137. Diss. II.12.2.

      138. Consider especially Diss. IV.8.17-24, and Ench. 46, 47, cf. Diss. II.1.36-39 and 13.22-23. For comments on some of these passages, see Oakes (1993, 53).

      139. Diss. I.29.31; 26.30-31, see also II.22.36.

      140. Diss. III.16.9.

      141. Ench. 33.6.

      142. Med. 6.35.

      143. Diss. I.22.18-19.

      144. For example, see Ep. 91.19, where Seneca approvingly notes that the Cynic Demetrius compares the speech of laypeople to be like the grumbling of the digestive tract. See also the strong language used regarding the views of nonphilosophers’ judgments at Med. III.4, and Apuleius Apol. 39.1.

      145. Apuleius Apol. 3.6, 27.1.

      146. Diss. I.29.52, 54. Eshleman (2012, 36 n.63) also draws attention to this passage. See also a similar statement from Epictetus at Diss. IV.5.22. Meanwhile, Wildberger (2014b, 309–310) argues from Ep. 95.56: “Like Socrates and like his fellow Stoics, Seneca is clearly an intellectualist. For him this means that one must not only practice ethical behavior but seriously study philosophy in order to become a good person.” See also Herm. 1.

      147. Regarding laypeople laughing at philosophers, see Diss. I.11.39, III.15.11; III.20.18; on them being repelled II.14.21, III.23.28-30, cf. Diss. II.13.4 and IV.8.34-36; and regarding the thread of violence from nonphilosophers, see II.12.24-25, and IV.1.7.

      148. Ench. 22.

      149. Respectively, Diss. II.21.11, III.9.14, 20.19; 21.22; Ench. 22.

      150. Diss. II.21.15.

      151. For example, Philodemus Rhet. Fr. 3, Pers. 5.86, Quintillian Inst. 12.3.11, Constant. 3.1, Ep. 73.1, 76.4, Aristoxenus Harm. 2.102, Dio Or. 66.25, 72.8, Vit. Auct. 7.10, Symp. 34, Fug. 14-15, Pisc. 12, 37, Merc. Cond 25, Juv. 2.8-9, 14-15, and Diod. Sic. 2.29.5-6.

      152. Lucian Icar. 29.

      153. Plut. Virt. prof. 81.B.

      154. Ep. 5.3.

      155. Diss. III.8.7.

      156. Horace Sat. 1.4.109, Seneca Ep. 108.22, Muson. Rufus Fr. 16.10, and Tacitus Agric. 4.3.

      157. Ep. 123.10-11.

      158. Pers. 3.80-89.

      159. Tacitus Hist. 3.81.1.

      160. Dio Or. 72.7-8.

      161. See also the discussion in Hilton (2018, 27).

      162. Herm. 15.

      163. See though my comments here at p. 14 n.76, regarding the debate over classifying the Cynic school as a philosophical school or not.

      164. See again Sedley (2003a).

      165. For instance, in his Epistles Seneca, to my count, depicts objections being raised to Stoic philosophy on at least five occasions: Ep. 74.22, 92.21, 102.8, 121.1, 124. It is hard to ascertain whether his imagined interlocutor belongs to a particular, or any, philosophical school, but informed debates range over topics such as empiricism and the Stoic understanding of oikeiosis. For a description, although likely overemphasized for satirical purposes, of philosophers from different schools who turn away from each other in disgust at a dinner party, see Symp. 6.

      166. For example, see Frede (1999, 783–790) and Hatzimichali (2011, 1–5, 14–20).

      167. On this, see in particular Boys-Stones (2001, 99–122), along with the studies of Reydams-Schils (2011) and Long (2013b) and comments by Sellars (2014, 106–108).

      168. See Cicero Tusc. 1.79, Fin. 4.79, Philodemus Stoic Hist. 61.2-6, Galen Php 4.7, and the discussions in Frede (1999, 777–778) and Tieleman (2007).