16. On Seneca presenting himself as a Stoic, see Conradie (2010, 103–105), along with Constant. 2.1, and the commentary in Asmis (2015, 224).
17. Hine (2015, 22). See a recent study, Ahlholm (2017), which might cast Hine’s proposal into doubt.
18. Hine (2015, 29).
19. On this topic, see especially the reflections of Hadot (1995), Pavie (2012), and Sharpe (2014); and on this aim in the Stoic tradition, see in particular Sellars (2003). Sellars (2007, 117) also usefully states: “For a Stoic such as Epictetus, it seems that philosophy is not merely a matter of words or arguments, but also a matter of deeds or actions. This suggest a conception of philosophy which is quite different from the implicit conception that seems prevalent today.” Meanwhile, Reydams-Schils (2010, 567) argues: “Presumably Epictetus would measure his own success as a teacher by the actual moral progress of his pupils.”
20. Trapp (2014, 55).
21. E.g. Diss. I.1.25; 8.10-16; 12.17.
22. Epit.11k, trans. Pomeroy (1999, 81, 83).
23. Ep. 53.9, trans. Gummere (1917, 359). See also Ep. 106.12, and Med. 12.9. On the Stoics’ belief in the interconnectedness of contemplation (δόγμα), reason (λογικός), and action (πρακτικός), consider also Diog. Laert. 9.130, along with the comments of Reydams-Schils (2017, 188).
24. Regarding Plato’s reputed effect upon Speusippus see Plut. De frat. Amor 491f-492a; on Diogenes’ effect upon Crates Apul. Flor. 14, and Ep. Diog. Ep. 9; and on Xenocrates’ impact upon Polemo Diss. III.1.4, III.11.30, Seneca Ep. 108.23, Horace Sat. 2.3.253-257, and Diog. Laert. 4.16.
25. On Odysseus holding the Phaeacians spellbound, see Od. 2.333-334.
26. Nigr. 35, trans. Harmon (1913, 135).
27. See also Plutarch’s comments at Max. princ. 776c.
28. Ep. 6.1, trans. Gummere (1917, 25).
29. Ep. 108.1, Ad Marc. 4, 13.
30. The most complete consideration of this topic is still Nock (1933, 164–186). Consider as well more recent discussions in Rousseau (1996, 386–387) and Stowers (2011, 231–232), cf. Sedley (1989).
31. For critiques of philosophers who were interested in money, see for example Plutarch De Tuenda 16 and Galen San. Tu. 16; regarding feasting Att. 2.55.d, 3.103.d, 4.163-164, 13.607; sexual deviance Martial Ep. 7.58, Juvenal Sat. 2.8 13, and Seneca Ep. 123.15.
32. See Ep. 6.6, and Lucian Herm. 21.
33. Ep. 29.5-6.
34. For example, Or. 31.3 “For no-one is a philosopher who belongs among the unjust and wicked” trans. Cohoon and Crosby (1940, 339): οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν.
35. De Frat. 479E.
36. Respectively Att. 13.8.1,4, and 9.2.1.
37. Att. 9.2.5.
38. The passage that will be mentioned is actually found at Diss. II.19, and not in the first volume of the Discourses as Gellius intimates.
39. Att. I.2.7-8.
40. Lauwers (2015, 35–36).
41. Att. 17.19.
42. Diss. III.16.11.
43. Diss. II.9.17.
44. Diss. III.15.10-12.
45. Diss. III.15.1-6. From this passage, as well as Diss. I.15.7-8, Hock (1992, 139) argues that Epictetus: “discourages other visitors and students from coming back with warnings about the amount of time it takes to become a philosopher.” On the need for prospective philosophers to consider whether they have the stamina to live philosophically, see also Diss. IV.8.34-36 and Ench. 51.
46. For example, see Diss. II.9.13-14 and the study by Hijmans (1959).
47. Diss. II.19.20-21, 23. Glucker (1978, 184) remarks on this passage: “The true test of affiliation to a philosophical αἵρεσις, says Epictetus, is whether or not one follows its moral precepts in everyday behaviour—and such a test is true Stoic practice, which would entitle a man to be properly called a Stoic, is described [in this passage].” See also a similar discussion in Sellars (2007, 116–117).
48. For Epictetus’s perception that Epicureans seek after hedonism, consider, for example, Diss. III.7.2-9.
49. Diss. II.19.28.
50. For example, Diss. I.8.14, where he appeals to his students: “Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers and what belongs to them on other accounts?”: οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν. See also Diss. IV.9.8, where Epictetus discusses an individual who has exchanged philosophy for a life of vice. Regarding Diss. III.15.10-13, Sorabji (2007, 143) reflects that for Epictetus: “If you choose to be a philosopher, then you must change your whole way of life and cannot live like a tax gatherer, an orator, or a procurator of Caesar.” Consider also Epictetus’ comments at Fr. 10.
51. Diss. II.13.23, III.5.1-4, 12-17, and 24.78-80.
52. Diss. II.21.10.
53. For example, Diss. I.28.9; II.17.3; III.10.10-19, 22.66; 23.22, 37-38; IV.4.3, 4.42.
54. Diss. I.4.22.
55. See Diss. II.914, III.19.4-6, and the discussion in Hijmans (1959, 64–65).
56. Diss. II.13.23, 25-26. See also Diss. I.1.31.
57. See Att. 9.2.8.
58. Diss. III.2.11. See the wider discussion at Diss. III.2.8-15, and also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. III.22.80 regarding Cynics, who fail to live up to their calling, as well as similar critiques at Dio. Or. 32.9, Lucian Pisc. 48, Apuleius Apol. 39.39, Julian Or. 6.
59. Diss. IV.8.5-6. See also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. IV.8.15-16, Seneca’ at Ep. 76.31-32, and Dio’s comments at Or. 49.11, and 70.6.
60. For example, see Diss. I.2.24.
61. Diss. IV.8.17-20.
62. Diss. III.23.1,19,23, 24 27, 35.
63. Diss. III.23.37-38.
64. Diss. III.23.20, 22.
65. Diss. III.23.32.
66. Diss. III.23.17, 19.
67. Syn. Dio 2-3.
68. For relevant discussions, see Swain (2000 passim), Van Sijl (2010, 183–187), and Lauwers (2015, 46–52).
69. For a similar point being made, consider Lauwers (2015, 49).
70. Diss. IV.12.19, see also the comments on this passage from Brunt (2013, 169). Consider also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. I.2.36-37 and III.7.15 in particular, as well as at I.2.34-37; 8.14, II.8.24-25, III.16.9, and Ench. 12;13; 48.2-3. Long (2002, 109) comments on Epictetus’ “insistence on choosing between the stance of philosopher or layperson . . . but his purpose in doing so is not to select a philosophical elite or to adopt a censorious attitude toward ordinary people. He acknowledges that he himself is no Socrates, and at the end of this chapter [Diss. III.15.8-13].” See also the discussion in Tsalla (2014, 110). From Diss. III.25.1-4, Long (2002, 112) also importantly remarks: “When Epictetus speaks in this vein, he mitigates the philosopher/layperson contrast. He includes himself and everyone else in the intermediate category of progressives or aspirants to the ideal happiness promised by philosophy.”
71. De Off. 1.46, trans. Walsh (2000, 18). See also Ep. 6.1, 116.5, Tranq 7.4, Const. 7.1, Stob. 2.66.14-67,4, Diog. Laert. 7.83, 120, Fin. 1.15, De Off. I.xv-46, and especially Marcus