A similar reaction to the one above, but with the added threat of violence to ensure that the speaker would refrain from continuing to enunciate philosophical thought, is also described by Tacitus when Rufus apparently tried to introduce ideas of cosmopolitanism to Roman soldiers.159 Worthy of note is also Dio Chrysostom’s comments that the crowds “seize the initiative and abuse and jeer at them [philosophers] as being wretched and foolish, knowing that if they establish them as senseless and mad, they will prove themselves to be self-controlled as intelligent/of sound mind,” οὐκοῦν προκαταλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὶ λοιδοροῦντες καὶ τωθάζοντες ὡς ἀθλίους καὶ ἀνοήτους, εἰδότες ὅτι, εἰ μὲν τούτους ἀποφανοῦσιν ἄφρονας καὶ μαινομένους, ἅμα καὶ αὑτοὺς ἀποδείξουσι σωφρονοῦντας καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας.160 The verb προκαταλαμβάνω holds the sense of seizing, or occupying beforehand, and is usually employed in a military context. The sense in this passage is, therefore, of laypeople who attempt to stake out ground to combat and critique philosophers, before the philosophers have a chance to critique them. This two-way derision between philosophers and laypeople is a dynamic that classical authors could directly reflect upon, such as Sextus Empiricus, who states: “Just as the scholar (ὁ φιλολόγος) is ridiculed by laypeople (οι ιδιώται), so is the layperson (ή ἰδιωτική) ridiculed by scholars (οἱ φιλολόγοι).”161 People who conceived of philosophy and those with an interest in it in the manner that the above sources portray, would doubtless find it a matter of little concern if they found themselves prevented from being able to lay claim to the identity of the philosopher.
Of final interest for us in this section is Lucian’s portrayal of someone asking a student of Stoicism to relay philosophical truths to him, but to request that he do so simply, and by adopting the character of a layperson (ὁποῖος τότε ἦσθα ἰδιώτης, “now do so as a layperson”), for he is an outsider (οὕτως ἀπόκριναι) and so cannot easily comprehend the ideas that the student has been coached in.162 With the use of the verb ἀποκρίνω (to be set apart), we notably have an example of an ancient source which frames the philosopher/layperson divide explicitly in the language of the insider/outsider.
Philosophers from Other Schools
One topic that has not been touched upon, but which should be mentioned in a discussion of philosophical identity in antiquity is the stance that philosophers took toward people whose allegiances belonged to rival schools of thought, such as Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, or Epicurean ones (etc.), and specifically whether they consider such individuals to be genuine philosophers or not. Understanding cross-school opinions of each other is, however, complex for it is rarely a directly addressed topic in ancient texts, and our understanding of respective philosophers’ attitudes toward other schools and their members is largely an inferred one.163 Of potential help for this discussion though are studies which highlight that after the decentralization of the schools as institutions in the first century BCE164 the historical record often reveals individuals who, while assured and ready to defend the veracity and superiority of their chosen school’s viewpoints,165 are prepared to constructively engage with other philosophies’ ideas and writings.166
Scholars have frequently observed that this relatively open stance toward other schools’ thought is particularly strongly expressed within the Stoic tradition,167 and that it can be traced back at least as far as Panaetius’ and his student Posidonius’ (ca. 185–109 BCE/135–51 BCE) apparent respect for and proclivity to cite Platonic and Peripatetic thought.168
Exploring this issue firstly with reference to Seneca, numerous studies have also recognized the potential that his large volume of writings have for revealing a member of the Stoic school’s attitude to, and possible impact from, other philosophies’ propositions.169 It is not, however, my intention to opine upon Seneca’s stance regarding other philosophical schools’ thought, which is a debated point and is beyond the scope of this book to address, but to rather highlight that he views them as being a legitimate part of the philosophical community. One helpful indication of his use of other philosophers as dialogue partners that can be profitably drawn attention to is Tuen Tielemans’ catalogue of citations that Seneca makes to philosophers, which reveals (with the exclusion of Socrates) that a substantial 170 out of 277 of them are to non-Stoic thinkers, and that Plato and Epicurus (and to a lesser extent Aristotle) receive especially heavy reference.170
Given the lack of explicit reflections on the attitude toward other philosophies in our sources, two passages in Seneca’s writings are of particular value. In the first, Ep. 21.9, after quoting Epicurus counselling his student Idomeneus that he should restrain his desires (cupiditates), Seneca remarks that he feels able to appeal to Epicurus’ words because he considers them to be “public property” (publicae sunt).171 Seneca then helpfully proceeds to liken this situation to the liberty he has to vote for a senator’s motion that he agrees with, without this compelling him to vote for a second that he does not.172 In other words, if approached with discernment and selectivity, Seneca believes that Epicurus’ philosophy can be a resource wherein insight and the useful articulation of truth might be found—or at least in the way that Seneca believes he can constructively frame them.173
In the second passage for our interest, Constant. 1.1, Seneca asserts that Stoicism and other philosophies make an equal (tantusdem) contribution to society (societas), but that because of their soft (mollis) nature non-Stoic traditions should be compared to females, while the Stoic school is of recognizably manly (virilis) character.174 From this passage it is apparent that Seneca differentiates other schools from Stoicism, and likely considers them to be less effective in their philosophizing, but so too is his belief that they are, in theory, engaged in the same enterprise as Stoicism—namely, philosophical deliberation.175
Turning to Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, direct reflections on other philosophical schools do not feature within the text, but scholarly interest on whether its contents have been shaped by alternative streams of thought to those of Stoicism have been regularly piqued. The most recent studies that have explored this topic conclude that the influence of other schools upon Marcus’ thinking is largely idiomatic and not substantive in nature.176 No catalogue of the references he makes to non-Stoic philosophers, to my knowledge, exists, but it can be observed that he positively cites the opinions of Epicurus four times, Heraclitus three, Pythagoras and Plato twice, and the Platonist Phocion and Pre-Socratic Empedocles once.177 This allows us to suggest that Marcus’ approach toward other philosophies mirrors Seneca’s: both have evidently invested considerable effort to learn about the opinions of other schools, and they consider them to be useful dialogue partners when they deliberate upon philosophical themes, but neither attempts to utilize this interest to try and effect a substantial syncretic or eclectic refashioning of Stoic philosophy.
Regarding Epictetus, compared to Seneca and Marcus there has been less evaluation of his engagement and interaction with different philosophical schools. Deliberation over whether his understanding of theology, psychology, or philosophical contemplation reveals a Platonic imprint can, however, be drawn upon, and where the weight of scholarly opinion rests upon the conclusion that while there is idiomatic influence, Epictetus’ views firmly align with traditional Stoic ones.178 With regards to direct references that Epictetus makes to other schools, the value of Epicurean and Academic strains of thought are particularly heavily critiqued by him,179 and his brief mention of Peripatetic and Pyhrronic philosophy is also critical in tone.180 Stephen Williams has noted Epictetus’ positive assessment of non-Stoic proponents from ten references he makes to Plato (whom it can be observed Epictetus’ teacher Rufus is also recorded as praising181) and five to