Epictetus and Laypeople. Erlend D. MacGillivray. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Erlend D. MacGillivray
Издательство: Ingram
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Философия
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781793618245
Скачать книгу
You learn syllogisms from the philosophers, but you know better than they how you should act in life.”143

      ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου καταγελάσονται.ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα ἐπισείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ “ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον: δεῖ μὲν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν: ταῦτα μωρά ἐστιν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις συλλογισμόν, τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι.

      Finally, when his students raise their concern that people who lack a background in philosophy might judge them to be impious, Epictetus responds (in strikingly similar language to others philosophers,144 including one who was on trial a few decades later in this very circumstance145) by again contrasting the value of philosophical and lay thought, and arguing for the latter’s redundancy:

      So, who is this person who has been given the power to pass such a judgement on you? Does he know what piety or impiety actually is? Has he studied and learned of it? Where? From whom? . . . The truly educated person is under no obligation to pay any heed to the uneducated one when he passes judgement on what is religious or irreligious, just and unjust.146

      οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι; . . . ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου.

      It is important to highlight that the sense of division between philosophers and laypeople could be apprehended and even reinforced by the latter. Epictetus frequently portrays people (including slaves) who lack philosophical education as laughing (καταγελάω) at philosophers, being repelled if they hear that they are ignorant (ἀγνοέω) of what the good (ἀγαθός) is, openly reviling (λοιδορέω) philosophers—even having the propensity to become violent if they are confronted with philosophical exposition.147 As he warns one of his students:

      If you commit yourself to philosophy, prepare from the beginning to be ridiculed and laughed at, to have many people jeering at you and to hear them say, “Look, he has returned to us a philosopher all of a sudden!”148

      εἰ φιλοσοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖς, παρασκευάζου αὐτόθεν ὡς καταγελασθησόμενος, ὡς καταμωκησομένων σου πολλῶν, ὡς ἐρούντων ὅτι ‘ἄφνω φιλόσοφος ἡμῖν ἐπανελήλυθε’.

      Less threateningly, Epictetus also notes that laypeople can conclude that philosophy scholars know nothing and speak gibberish (βαρβαρίζω) and advance nonsense (φλυαρέω), or accuse them of adopting a supercilious (ὀφρύς) look,149 and state that people say, “Nobody gets any benefit from going to [a philosophy] school,” οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς.150

      The opinion that laypeople have toward philosophers is a topic that is also frequently reflected upon by a wide range of classical thinkers, such as by the Epicurean Philodemus, Persius (the satirist and one-time pupil of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus), the rhetorician Quintillian, and numerous other authors, who record that people might consider philosophers to be objectionable, miserable, effeminate, fixated upon boring and pointless speculations, believe that philosophical schools provide no benefit and lead people away from right thinking,151 and, in rather memorable phrasing, hold that each tradition is “dwelling in a separate word-maze of its own construction,” καὶ διαφόρους λόγων λαβυρίνθους ἐπινοήσαντες.152 Furthermore, laypeople are recorded as believing that many of philosophy’s students “have assurance and a pose and a gait, and a countenance that is filled with arrogance and a disdain which spares nobody,” ἔχοντες θράσος ἔχουσι καὶ σχῆμα καὶ βάδισμα καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπεροψίας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστὸν ἀφειδούσης ἁπάντων.153

      Because of such derision from certain portions of society, and perhaps especially within a Roman context, Seneca reflects that people are often hesitant to start imitating philosophers in some areas of their life, in case they feel compelled to follow them in everything and end up a fully observant philosopher.154 This attitude is also documented by Epictetus, and to remarkably involve an individual who apparently did harbor philosophical pretensions:

      If you want to know what Romans think of philosophers, just listen to this. Italicus, who was reputed to be amongst the greatest of them as a philosopher, once became angry with his friends in my presence. Claiming that his situation was desperate he proclaimed: “I cannot bear it!” “You are killing me. You will make me just like him”—and he then pointed to me!155

      Πῶς ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἂν θέλῃς γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. Ἰταλικὸς ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτέ μου χαλεπήνας τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὡς ἀνήκεστα πάσχων, “Οὐ δύναμαι,” ἔφη, “φέρειν: ἀπόλλυτέ με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι,” δείξας ἐμέ.

      Such an attitude is also apparent in the frequently documented phenomenon of Roman parents who attempt to prevent their children from either studying, or from becoming overly preoccupied with philosophy.156

      Describing a more combative approach, and in one particularly extended portrayal of a layperson’s views, Seneca describes someone directly challenging the austere moralizing of philosophers by staunchly advocating that better benefits can be obtained through sensual pleasure such as gluttony, drinking, and adopting a lax attitude toward the disposal of money, that is, the inversion of usual philosophical convictions.157 Meanwhile, in a depiction of lay opinion Persius notes that the schools’ students were widely believed by the public to be fixated upon arcane and useless theories; with him imagining one layperson’s withering response after the details of Epicurean cosmology had just been detailed as being:

      “What I know is enough for me. Personally, I have no desire to be like Arcesilas or those troubled Solons with their heads bent, eyes fixed on the ground, while they gnaw their mumbles and rabid silences to themselves and weigh words on their stuck-out lips, repeating the fantasies of some aged invalid: that nothing can come from nothing, that nothing can return to nothing. Is this why you’re so pale? Is this the reason for missing lunch?” These jibes make the rabble laugh, and with wrinkled nose the muscular youths redouble their quivering cackles.158