Chapter 2 examines the structures and dynamics of the peace process that made captured peace possible. I begin with an overview of the peace negotiations and the contents of the agreements that made up the peace accords, examining the extent to which local actors were able to shape the scope and the contents of the agreements. I then address the implementation of the accords, with particular emphasis on the gap between the content of peace accords and their actual implementation. I also examine the extent to which the incumbent government undermined societal reconciliation through the 1993 amnesty law, which has had significant implications for peacebuilding. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 1994 “elections of the century” that mark El Salvador’s transition to democracy, as well as the return of the incumbent ARENA party to power.
Chapters 3 through 5 offer an empirical analysis of postwar peacebuilding in El Salvador by exploring the political, economic, and social dynamics of a captured peace. Chapter 3 assesses postwar politics, including the challenges of democratization and increasing polarization. I review the electoral reforms implemented during and after the peace accords in order to highlight systematic barriers to participation that may have benefited the incumbent party. The chapter then focuses on the monopolization of political discourse by political parties, as well as the extent to which parties provide a meaningful conduit for popular representation. I also provide a discussion of the internal development of political parties and examine how party polarization affects representation and the quality of democracy. This is followed by an analysis of the postwar election cycles after 1994 for presidential elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014) and legislative and municipal elections (1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015).
Chapter 4 examines the postwar economy, which has been characterized by deepening economic exclusion through the application of the neoliberal model across four successive ARENA administrations. The policies implemented under the administration of Alfredo Cristiani were concurrent with the negotiation of the peace accords and the early phases of their implementation. The continued application of the model by the Calderón Sol and Flores administrations deepened the reforms, which resulted in increased political and social opposition. The popular dissatisfaction with the economy under Flores led to a change in discourse under the Saca administration, which was instead imbued with populist language and social programs while continuing neoliberal policies. ARENA’s policies did little to alleviate socioeconomic exclusion, and the economy became overly dependent on remittances sent back from Salvadorans living abroad. The failure of these policies was exposed by the global financial crisis, from which the country has yet to recover. I also assess the extent to which the Funes administration was able to diverge from the model established by the ARENA governments and the conflicts that arose as a result of policies that threatened elite interests. Additionally, various corruption scandals exposed the extent to which those in power used the state for their own benefit.
Chapter 5 addresses three dominant problems of postwar society: migration, crime, and the limitation of political space for civil society. Social exclusion and marginalization have both political and economic roots that precede the peace accords, although the impact of neoliberalism and the retraction of the state from public spheres have contributed greatly to these problems. The failure to deal with these issues has resulted in the mass emigration of Salvadorans in the postwar era, which has resulted in the deterioration of families and society and has helped fuel a wave of crime and violence of epic proportions, for which El Salvador has now become notorious. The multifaceted causes of this crime and violence are examined, which includes a discussion of state complicity and failures during the implementation of security reforms. This chapter also explores policy responses to crime and highlights how ARENA used social exclusion and authoritarianism as instruments of the state to maintain the status quo.
In the final chapter I summarize the book’s major findings and discuss the extent to which it is possible to reclaim the captured peace. I also discuss the lessons that El Salvador’s captured peace holds for peacebuilders and seek to identify mechanisms that might limit the advantage of incumbent elites.
Chapter 1
Elites and the Salvadoran State
The main bequest of the nineteenth century was a small elite, entrenched in power and virtually closed to newcomers, that was to shape the twentieth century. . . . Upon those weak foundations they built a structure heavy with injustices, inconsistencies, and political ineptitude.
—Héctor Lindo-Fuentes, 19901
EL SALVADOR WAS a backwater colony of the Spanish empire in Latin America, which lacked the natural resources and labor pool that were so plentiful in countries such as Mexico and Peru. As a consequence, little investment in the basic infrastructure of the country took place before independence. While an independent El Salvador inherited the poverty of its colonial past, much of the extreme inequality of Salvadoran society is often attributed to the development of the coffee oligarchy known as Las Catorce (the Fourteen Families).2 The country’s oligarchy ruled El Salvador by itself for the first century after independence, then through the military for a sixty-year period beginning in the 1930s, using force to quell any real or perceived challenge to the status quo. Even modest attempts to alter the social order were resisted by elites, who relied on an intricate nexus of political patronage, the military, and state and financial institutions to protect their interests. As Elisabeth Wood has so astutely noted, “Salvadoran history is thus characterized by elite resistance to change.”3 This resistance ultimately culminated in a violent civil war during the 1980s. This chapter focuses on the historical efforts of the oligarchy, in alliance with the military, to preserve power, extend economic dominance, and control the population. In doing so, it highlights the sources and structures of elite entrenchment that would make the captured peace possible.
El Salvador’s “Radical Liberalism”
At the time of Central American independence,4 in 1823, the Salvadoran economy was largely dedicated to the production of indigo.5 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, El Salvador’s once booming trade in indigo declined significantly due to the manufacture of cheaper dyes in Germany. Additionally, the U.S. Civil War resulted in a decreased demand for the Salvadoran export, and shipping the crop was complicated by a naval blockade. Recognizing that the indigo market was shrinking, exporters began searching for a replacement crop.
Coffee and the State
El Salvador’s rich volcanic soil and mountainous terrain were ideal for the cultivation of coffee, which grows at altitudes higher than 750 meters above sea level. The introduction of coffee in the mid-nineteenth century coincided with the expansion of the state apparatus at a time when the country’s Conservatives and Liberals were fighting for political dominance. Coffee and land were at the heart of the dispute. In the mid-nineteenth century, El Salvador’s land system was divided into private, communal, public, and communal lands (ejidos).6 As coffee cultivation spread, the desire for land ownership increased and coffee growers increasingly pressured local governments to sell town lands. After several municipalities conceded, coffee growers began to pressure the national government.7 In 1847 the Salvadoran legislature passed its first law supporting coffee, offering service exemptions and tax benefits to those who had more than fifteen thousand coffee trees.8 In 1859 and again in 1863, Gen. Gerardo Barrios, often credited with introducing coffee to El Salvador, offered