El Salvador’s Liberals believed that coffee held the key to the country’s modernization and prosperity. The Liberals were able to consolidate power by using the state to create policies directly benefiting coffee production. The liberal land reforms of 1881 and 1882 abolished communal lands, which were considered an “impediment to agricultural production and economic growth” by the oligarchy.10 Opposition to the ejido system was not limited to the oligarchy. As Aldo Lauria-Santiago demonstrates, other social groups opposed the ejido system as well.11 While the reforms did create an opportunity for other groups, the vast majority of the land was claimed by the agrarian class.12 Under the 1881–82 reforms, thousands of campesinos were made landless and were subsequently forced to work on haciendas. The “land reform” strengthened the Liberals’ control of the economy and the state by further concentrating wealth in the hands of a select few. Seventy-three percent of the land confiscated by the reforms was distributed to 5.6 percent of the new owners, while 50 percent of the owners received 3.45 percent of the land.13 Banks were created to facilitate the purchase of new lands. In 1880 Banco Internacional was established as El Salvador’s first commercial bank. Banco Occidental was founded in 1890 and Banco Agricola Comercial in 1895. By the end of the century, there were more than half a dozen banks dedicated to financing the agricultural sector. The availability of land and financing enabled both large and small growers to expand coffee cultivation. It also increased the power of coffee growers vis-à-vis the state. Thus, coffee, the state, and finance became entangled early in El Salvador’s history.
One noteworthy characteristic of the Salvadoran elites was their espousal of the virtues of liberalism alongside mechanisms, policies, and practices that were distinctly illiberal. From very early on, there was a rhetorical commitment to liberal political ideas. The constitution of 1886 reaffirmed Liberal values by creating a secular state, providing for the popular election of municipal authorities, and protecting private property.14 Elections helped create the façade of liberal democracy, though the actual practice was quite deficient. Erik Ching explains that elites developed sophisticated patronage networks at the municipal and national levels, which allowed them to subvert individual liberties for their own gain.15 He describes these networks as “highly personalistic, typically hierarchical units designed to monopolize voting, control public office, and militarily resist rival networks when necessary.”16 Political bosses bargained with voters for their votes, which were known because voting was conducted orally and in public until 1950. This bargaining enabled elites to use public offices for their own enrichment. Coffee growers occupied the presidency for seventeen years between 1856 and 1898, and eight of the ten presidents from 1898 to 1927 were from coffee families.17 By 1895 well over 90 percent of the members in the Salvadoran legislature were coffee planters.18 This dominance continued well into the twentieth century, as growers consolidated their hold on the state. One notable example was the Meléndez-Quiñónez family (1913–29), which used a combination of party patronage through the National Democratic Party (PND) coupled with a repressive intelligence apparatus known as the Ligas Rojas.
Coffee growers and producers used various instruments of the state to protect their own interests. The unpopularity of the land reforms, especially among the Indian communities, resulted in several revolts during the 1880s. Municipalities reacted by imposing a tax on coffee growers to fund the rural police (1884) and the mounted police (1889), which Robert Williams notes were “under the growers’ direct control.”19 The desire to maintain order and stability in the countryside resulted in a close relationship between the landed elites and the military. For the oligarchy, stability was paramount to other freedoms commonly associated with liberal politics in the European tradition. The National Guard was established in 1912 and paid for by the coffee elite itself to maintain internal security by policing rural areas.20 Peasant conscripts were also used throughout the countryside to maintain order and provide information on “suspicious” activities. The use of peasant conscripts also disrupted communal relations, further strengthening the oligarchy.21 By 1930 much of the Salvadoran countryside was under military control.22 Thus, the Liberals’ proclamations of democracy were undermined by authoritarian tendencies.
The coffee elites were also responsible for the growth of the financial and commercial industries.23 The Salvadoran Coffee Association (ASCAFE), the organization of coffee growers, was formed in 1929 to consolidate elite interests.24 The Cafetalera, as it came to be known, has been likened to a “second state” or an “invisible government, often making policy decisions associated with government bureaucracies.”25 As a result, coffee production continued to expand well into the twentieth century. From 1919 to 1932 the amount of land devoted to coffee cultivation grew from 70,000 to 106,000 hectares.26 By 1931 coffee accounted for 96 percent of El Salvador’s exports.27 This dependence left the country vulnerable to the Great Depression, during the first six months of which the price of coffee fell 45 percent; it would later tumble another 12 percent.28 From 1930 to 1932, export earnings from coffee were cut in half, dropping from 34 million colones to 13 million colones.29 Additionally, many of the smaller producers were driven out of business and the wealth from coffee became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a select few.30 Smaller producers were unable to pay their debts to the banks and, as a result, several banks came to own portions of the coffee industry.31
La Matanza
Working conditions on coffee fincas deteriorated with the Depression. Income in 1931 was one-half that in 1928 and the daily wages of plantation workers were slashed in half, from 30 to 15 centavos.32 Declining economic conditions resulted in increasing tensions throughout the countryside. Peasant uprisings, which had been sporadic throughout the countryside for the past century, were becoming more dangerous for elite interests.
President Pio Romero Bosque, a reformer who had been critical of the civil-rights violations of previous administrations, promoted labor unions and allowed competitive presidential elections. The growing strength of labor unions and peasant activism, coupled with the founding of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), in 1930, raised concerns among the elites. In 1931, Labor Party candidate Arturo Araujo, a sugar and coffee producer, was elected president. Araujo’s campaign promised land reform and labor rights, both of which were in direct conflict with the interests of the coffee elites. In December 1931, Araujo was overthrown by the military and replaced by his vice president, Gen. Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. Tensions were exacerbated by the electoral fraud of the January 1932 municipal elections, in which the government suspended elections in strongholds of the PCS and refused to certify results in areas where the PCS claimed victory.33 Days later a peasant uprising led by Communist Party founder Augustín Farabundo Martí would dramatically alter the future of El Salvador. The military acted swiftly and ruthlessly. In the end, as many as thirty thousand peasants, most of whom were not actual participants the rebellion, were dead, including Martí.34 La Matanza (the Massacre), as it came to be known, resulted in the implementation of a military-oligarchy coalition that would rule El Salvador for another five decades. Whether the threat of mass rebellion was real or perceived, the oligarchy reached an agreement with the military to maintain stability and protect elite economic interests. William Stanley suggests that the military may have exaggerated the extent of the “Communist threat” in order to gain control of the state apparatus.35 Martínez, who initially had very little support among elites or the armed forces, consolidated power through the centralization of decision making, public works, and services; replacing civilians with officers at the municipal and local level; discouraging labor unions, and prohibiting peasant organizations.36 Martínez also established the National Party of the Fatherland (Pro Patria), an extensive hierarchical party network, to guarantee his victory in the 1935 presidential and municipal elections. The party’s success (and the consolidation of broader powers) relied on the incorporation of workers and peasants into the party’s corporatist structure, offering modest protection from elites in exchange for support.37
Martínez and the coffee elites had differing interpretations